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1 \! THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF T i E  STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
STATE 3F IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
1 CASE NO. 8495 
1 
1 
) 
DEATH WARWNT 
GENE F RANCIS STUART, 1 1 
Defendant. 
1 
) 
"0: Tom Bcauclair, Director of Corredion. and Greg Fisher. Acting 
Wardel I, ldaho Maximum Security Institution: 
JCQ 
,T~.?F\\I ;-. . L- 
DEATF WARRANT-I 
YO/%,. 16:02.FAX 208 743 1288 !* RANDALL BLAKE ID RTTN' GEN CRIMINAL P. 03 i 
NHEREAS, the above-named Defendant, on the 14th day of October, 
1982, . vas found guilty of the crime of First Degree Murder as charged in the 
prosec itor's information; and, 
NHEREAS, on the day of December, 1982, the Court made and 
enterel l its Findings of the Court in Considering the Death Penalty, finding that 
the De 'endant is guilty of Murder in the First Degree and Imposing the sentence 
of Dea h; and, 
NHEUEAS, on the 3d day of May,' 198!5, the Idaho Supreme Court 
issued its opinion upholding the conviction and sentence: and, 
NHEREAS, on the 1 la day of May, 1987, the Court did enter an order 
denyln 1 the Defendant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief; and, 
NHEREAS, on the 16' day of October, 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court 
issued its opinion affirming the Court's denial of post-conviction relief; and, 
NHEREAS, on the 2Sd day of May, 2000, the Court did enter an order 
denyin 1 the Defendant's Second and Subsequent Petiilon for Post-Conviction 
Relief; and, 
NHEREAS, on the 4L" day of December, 2001, the  Idaho Supreme Court 
issued Its opinion affirming the Court's denial of postconviction relref and issued 
its Rec ~ittitur on the 2ern day of December, 2002, which ordered this Court to 
forthwi .h comply with the directive of the Opinion; and, 
NHEREAS, Idaho Code § 19-2715(2) mandates that upon a remittztur 
being i sued after a sentence of death has been amrrned, the district court shall 
set a n tw execution date; and, 
DEATI I WARRANT- 2 
NHEREAS, the Court is hot aware of the existence of any stay of 
execut on or other impediment to execution of the judgment; 
VOW THEREFORE, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED, pursuant to 
ldaho 4 :ode 3 19-271 6 and the Judgment of this Court, to receive said Defendant 
into yc Jr  custody, and on the 24m day of January, 2002, you shall cause t he  
execut on of said sentence of death to take place, unless said sentence is stayed 
by law and that you shall make a return upon thls Death Warrant, showing the 
time. n ade and manner in which it was executed pursuant to Idaho Code 3 19- 
2718. 
>ATE0 thls 10'" day of January. 2002. 
APPENDIX B 
t 
. I  -,, 
CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
Federal Defenders of  
,;, ,. ; 
Eastern Washington and Idaho 1 , : I ; :  j,? 
Joan M. Fisher - Idaho Bar #3854 
Bruce D. Livingston - Missouri Bar #34444 , , , .  . _  
Paula Swensen - Texas Bar #240 13 599 : -  , . L  
201 North Main 
Moscow TD 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
-P - 
Facsi~n~le: 208-883- 1472 
IN TIIE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRTCT OF IDAHO 
GENE F. STUART, 
Petitioner, i C I V O 2 -  I !ZO-S-RI_W 
1 CASE NO. 
VS. 1 
1 CAPITAL CASE 
GREG FISHER Warden of the Idaho ) 
Maximum Security Tnstitution, 1 
Department of Corrections, State of 1 STATEMENT OF ISSZrTES 
Tdaho, 1 
Respondent. 1 
) 
l h e  Capital Habeas llrlit of the Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho, on 
bchnlf of GENE F. STIJART, rcpresents to the Court that it has reviewed the decision of the 
Idaho Supreme Court in  thc matter of State of-Idaho v. Gene 1' Stuart, 2001 WL I 539142, 
(Tdaho 1999). Colicunent with this filing, GENE F. STUART has movcd for appointment of 
counscl ,and leave to proceed i~ifonnccpuicperis. To facilitate that appointnlent, GENE F. 
STIJART has authorize(1 lbe Capital H a b w  Unit to file on his behalia Statcmcnt of lssues for 
STATLMENT OF lSSllES - 1 
2 .. 
* * '  
possiblc inclusion in l i s  forthcoming petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Capital Habeas 
Unit, as the entity that would be appointed umdcr the Local Rules of this court, thmeforc 
co~llplies with the district court's rcquire~nent by filing the following statement of issues. 
Thc Capital Habeas Unit ("CKU") specifically reserves the right to add or dcfete issues as 
further review and investigation may warrant. 
The issucs wlich will f o m ~  much of the basis of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
hl wllicl~ Petitioner specifically will allege that his conviction and scntence is in violation of the 
Co~lstitrltion of the United Statcs, it~clude, but are not limited to, thc following: 
1. Stuart was denied a fair trial in Violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth hmendme~~t 's  
Llue Process Clause, whctl thc Sherifl's department recordcd confidelltial attorney-client 
conversations and used said informalion to produce evidence against him at trial and 
scn tcncing. 
2. Stuart was denied the elrectivc assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Anlendments by thc monitoring and recxjrding of convcrsatio~ls between themselves. 
3. Stuart was denied a Sair trii~l in violation of the Fifth Amendment's right agahlst self 
incrimination, Sixth Amcndmcnt's right to coniiont witnesses, and Fourteenth 
Amendment's nile Proccss Clause, when the State used evidcnce it gained from the 
il lcgal eavesdropping to sccurc his conviction. 
4. Stt~art was denied duc proccss of law and ~neaningful appellate review in violation of thc 
Filth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Alnendments by Idaho's arbitrary md capricious 
death pcnalty sentencing scheme. 
5 .  Stuart was denied a f i r  ti-iill and sentcncc in violation the Fourth, Eighth ,uld Fourteenth 
Amendments because the trial court was not at liberly to apply all thrce exceptions 
(independent origin, itlcvitnblc discovery, and attenuated basis) to the exclusionary rule to 
try to establish m indcpendellt.oriyin for the discovery of three witnesses. 
6.  Stuart was denied a fair trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by the 
trial court's denial of sufficient investigative assistance prior to trial which would have 
discovercd witnesses to contradict testimony that was offered at trial. 
7. In violation of thc l:ifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United Slbtes 
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Constitution, the trial court unco'nstitutionally denied Stuart a hearing on ncwly 
discovered evidence, not available to him at the time of trial, which created a material 
issue of fact wlich would bave allbct the conviction and/or sentence imposed on him. 
8. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on second degree murder, denicd Stuart a fair 
[rial and violated the Sixth, Eighth and 1:ourteent.h Anlendments. 
9. Stuart's deal11 senterlcc was inlposed nrbilrurily and in violation of his righls under thc 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Anlendments and only as a result of his exercisc of 
his right to a jury trial. 
10. The trial court improperly considered hcarsay testimony including the prcscntence 
invrsligativc report and prelinlinilry hearing tcstirnouy in aggravation at the sentencing 
hertring in violation of the Filih, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
1 1. The trial court failcd to properly weigh all of thc mitigating circumstances against each of 
 he aggravating circumstances in violation of thc Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
12. lilnl~o's death penalty schc~nc is nrbitrnsy and capricious and violates the Fifth and Eighth 
A~~le~ldulelils and thc L)uc Process (and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Alnendmenl. 
13. I'ctitioncr W-as denied his r i~l l t  o ajury trial on fdct tindings of statutory aggavatillg 
fnctors necessary to e n h a 1 . 1 ~ ~  thc available punishment from lifc imprisonment to death in 
violation ol' the Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Coilstitution and thc 
Due Process Clauscs of the Fifth imd Fourteenth Amendments to the United Statcs 
(:onstitution. 
14. There was not sufficient evidence to wanant ajury instruction and conviction on a 
murder hy torturc charge in violation of lhe Duc Process Clauses of the Firth and 
1;ourleenlh Atncndmcnts to the United States Constitution? 
15. I.'ct.itioner was dcnicd his right to a fair t~ial and duc process by the state court's faiIurc to 
propcrly charge the jut); on the lesser included offense of second degrcc murder by torture 
offense in violaliot~ of thc 1:ifth and Fourleenlh Amcndmcnts to the United States 
C'ons~ilulion. 
16. Pe~itioncr was denied a Sair trial by thc trial court's failure to select a fair and impartial 
collununity and jury in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the llnited 
Sl;ltes Constilutiot~. 
17. l'ctitioner was denied his right to n Speedy Trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteen 
Amendmen1 to thc Unitcd States Constitution 
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18. Idaho's "hcinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally 
vaguc and has not been meaningfully nmowed by the Idaho Supreme Court to comport 
with the eighth amendment 
19. The evidence was insufficient to support a finding of Idaho's statutory aggravating factor 
that the "murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional 
depravity." 
20. The evidence was insufficient to support a finding of Idaho's statutory agp-vating factor 
that Petitioncr, by prior co~lduct or conduct in the commission of the murdcr at hand, has 
exhibited a propensity to commit murdcr which will probably constitute a continuing 
threat to socicty.. . ." 
21. Tdaho's "propensity to cornluit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat 
to socicty" aggravating circurns~mce is unconstitutionally vague and has not been 
n~euningfully narrowed by tllc Idaho Supreme Court to comport with the Eighth 
Amendment 
22, The death imposed is so disproportionate to the crime committed that it violates the cruel 
and unusual puilishment clause o f  the eighth amendrncnt 
23. -fie proportionality review as conducted by the Idaho Supreme Court of Petitioner's 
sentencc violated due process and was not petfomcd in good faith. 
24. Admission of  evidence of prior bad acts involving Petitioner's relationships with adult 
women the to establish Petitioner's intent to conmit the murder of his four year old 
stepson and the state's argumcnt that this same evidence established an intent to torture 
unfairly prejudiced Pelilioner7s dcfcnse at trial in violation of the Due Process Clausc of 
the Fourteenth Anlenthen1 of the United Statcs Constitution. 
25. Admissioi~ of evidence of prior bai  acts involving Petitioncr7s relationships with adult 
women the to establish the statutory aggrzlvating factor of"  propensity to commit the 
murder" to support the imposition of the penally of death was in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
26. The unreasonable dsIay in rcsolving the critical constitutional issues surrounding 
Petitioner's death sentmcc resulting in eighteen years of incarcerdtion, seventeen oC 
which have been in solitary confinement without reasonable rights of visitation or access 
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to courts or counsel is cruel and unusual puilishnlent conlpelling vacation of Petitioner's 
sentence in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Arnenchlents to the United States 
Collstitution. 
27. The failure of the state of Idaho to apply the rights and guarantees of its own constitution 
and laws requiring a jury to dcterrnine all questions of fact deprived the Petitioner ofhis 
guarantees lo Equal Proteclion and Due Process of law guaranteed by the United Slsrtes 
Constiluiion 's Fi flh and Fourleenth Amendment 
The issues outlined above raise substantial questions of deprivation of Petitioner's federal 
constitutional rights which warrant relief for the Petitioner from the conviction and sentence of 
death. It is the profcssional opinion of thc undersigned counsel that these issues are non- 
frivolous and are not raised for purposes of delay. Upon further review of the record, together 
with opportunity to consult in privatc with Mr. Stuart, there may be additional issues to be 
prescntcd on Pctitioncr's bchalf 
DATED this 17th day of January, 2002. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
CAPITAL HABEAS lJNIT 
J T ~ N  M. FISHER 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES - 5 
CEHTlFlCATE OF SERVICE 
I hcrcby certifL that on ttlc 17th day of January, 2002, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicatcd bclow, postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
Alan C .  Lance 
Idal~o A.ttorney General 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney Ge~leral 
Chief, Capital Liti.gation Unit 
Statehouse Mail, Room 1 0  
PO Box 83720 
Boise ID 83720-001 0 
x -  U.S. Mail 
IImd Delivery 
x Facsimile 
Federal Express 
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APPENDIX C 
GENE F. STUART, 
REC~D- FILED & - 
CAMERON S. BURKE 
CLERK IDAHO 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
Petitioner, 1 
) CAPITAL CASE 
v. 1 
1 STAY OF EXECUTION 
GREG FISHER, Warden of the Idaho ) AND SCHEDULING ORDER 
Maximum Security Institution, ) 
Department of CorrecTions, Stare of Idaho ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
On January 17, 2002, Gene Stuart filed a Stay of Execution, Statement of Issues, 
Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and For Appointment of Counsel, and an In Forma 
Pauperis Declaration. Petitioner is seeking a stay of execution, and appuinttnent of counsel for 
the purpose of pursuing habeas corpus reiief from his conviction and capital sentence. 
1. Background. 
Petitioner was sentenced t.0 death for the for the fist degree murder by torture death of 
3 year-old Robcrt Milbr. His judgment uf conviction and sentence to death were affirmed by 
the Suprcmc Court of Idaho. See Sfate v. Stuart, 1 SO Idaho 163. 71 5 P.2d 833 (1 985) (Stuart 
I). Petitioner then filed a petition for state pastconviction relief which was denied by the 
district court. The denial of relief was upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court. See Stirart v. 
Stae, 1 18 Idaho 865, 801 P.2d 12 16 (1990) (Stuart IT). Petitioner next filed a second post- 
conviction petition, citing newly discovered evidence. The district court denied relief. The 
Idaho Supreme Court reversed thc disirict court and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. See 
Stuart v. State, 118 Idabo 932, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990) (Stclurr III) .  Following the evidentiary 
hearing, the district court denied relief. Petitioner appealcd to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
which reversed and again remanded for an evidentiary hearing. See Sfuurt v. State, 127 Idaho 
806, 907 P.2d 783 (1995) (Stuart IV) . Following a second evidentiary hearing, the district 
court denied relief on Petitioner's claims. Petitioner then appealed to the Idaho Suprerne 
Court, who a f f i e d  the district court decision. See Stuurt v. Stare, 2001 WL 1539142 (Idaho, 
Dec. 4, 2001). On January 10, 2002, a death warrant was issued setting an execution date of 
January 24, 2002. 
2. Application to proceed in forrna pauperis. 
The Court has examined the application to proceed in form pauperis and has 
determined that it adequately establishes Pctitioner's indigence. Petitioner will be allowed to 
proceed without the filing of costs or fees. 
3. Appoiniment of counsel. 
This district's Local Rules provide for the appointment of counsel in death penalty 
cases prior to the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. D.ld.LR 9.4(D). Petitioner 
has requested the appointment of the Federal Public Defenders of Eastern Washington and 
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Idaho. The Court therefore approves the appointment of the Capital Habeas Unit as Lead 
counsel. 
4. Stay of Execution, 
As the Local Rulcs further provide, a stay of exccution shall be granted during the 
pendency of a first petition in this court. Local Rule 9.4(f)(2). From the Court's review of the 
matter, it appears that this is Petitioner's first filing in this court. Awordirlgly, this Court will 
issue a stay of Petitioner's execution for the duration of the proceedings before this Court 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the court being hlly informed in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's application for a stay of execution (docker 
# ) is G W T E D  and A STAY OF EXECUTION IS [MPOSED for the duration of the 
proceedings in this court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Public 
Defender's Unit of Eastern Washington and Idaho is appointed as lcad counsel for Petitioner in 
all procediings in this court and shall be the designated attorney of record. 
1T IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's application to proceed in forma pauperis 
(dkt. # ) is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following deadlines will be imposed. 
1. Petitioner shall file a Petition for Writ of Hnbeas Corpus, raising all reasonably 
known federal constitutional issues, on or before June 18, 2002. 
2. Respondent shall file a motion and brief seeking to dismiss claims in the fid 
petition pursuant to procedural default on or before August 5, 2002. 
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3. Petitioner's response brief shall be filed on or before September 5, 2002. 
4. Respondent's reply brief shall be filed on or before October 4, 2002. 
5. Respondent's Answer shall be filed within 45 days uf a decision by this Court 
regarding the procedural default status of claims contained in the Final Petition. 
6. Petitioner's Traverse shall he tiled 10 days after the filing of the Answer. 
TT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any rcqucst for cvidcntiary hcaring shall bc madc 
witlun 60 days of the filing of the Answer. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall file ont: copy of the state court 
record with this Court pursuant to Local Rule 9.4(e)(l). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no extensions of time. shall be granted by the Court 
except upon a showing of extravrdinary circumstances. 
A DATED this Id day of January, 2002. 
GE, llNlTED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
"""V 
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F I L E  C O P Y  
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Idaho 
January 18, 2002 
* * CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING * * 
Re: 1 : 02-cv-00020 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was mailed or faxed to the 
following named persons: 
Joan M Fisher, Esq. 
FEDERAL DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
FAX (208) 883-1472 
IMS I 
FAX (208) 334-4895 
L LaMont Anderson, Esq. 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Capital Litigation Unit 
FAX (208) 334-2942 
Cameron S. Burke, Clerk 
Date: BY: 
(Deputy  Clerk) 
APPENDIX D 
YL Federal Defenders of 
Eastern Washington and Idaho 
Joan M. Fisher, ID Bar #2854 
Bruce D. Livingston, MO Bar #I34444 
Oliver W. Loewy, IL #6197093 
201 North Main 
Moscow ID 83843 
E-Mail: defenders(iZ,,turbonet.com 
Telephone: 208-883-0180 
Facsimile: 208-883-1472 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
Petitioner, 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, 
Director, Idaho Department of 
Correction, and GREG FISHER, 
Warden, Idaho Maximum Security 
Institution. 
1 
1 
1 Civil No. 02-020-S-BLW 
1 
1 CAPITAL CASE 
1 
1 
1 
1 PETITION FOR WRIT 
1 OF HABEAS CORPUS 
1 
R E C E I V E  P 
OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENEWi  
R E C E I V E D  
JUN 2 6 2002 
OFFICE OF CRlMMAL THE TTORNEY DIVISION GENERAL 
Respondents. 1 
) 
Gene Francis Stuart, through counsel and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254(d), petitions this 
Court for a writ of habeas corpus freeing him from the custody of the Respondents who hold him 
pursuant to the judgment and sentence of the Idaho state courts for first degree murder obtained 
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and affirmed in violation of the Constitution of the United States. In support of this request, 
Petitioner states as follows: 
I. CURRENT CUSTODY 
1. Petitioner is currently being held by the State of Idaho at the Idaho Maximum 
Security Institution in Boise, Idaho. 
11. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
2. Petitioner was convicted in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of 
Idaho, sitting in Moscow, Idaho, in proceedings presided over by Judge Andrew Schwam. 
Subsequently, sitting in Orofino, Idaho, Judge Schwam sentenced Petitioner to death. 
3. The date of Petitioner's judgment and sentence was December 9, - 1982. 
4. Petitioner was arrested September 19, 1981, in connection with the instant matter. 
5.  Petitioner was initially charged by a criminal complaint, filed September 21, 
198 1, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of Idaho (Orofmo), alleging injury to a 
child in violation of Idaho Code 5 18- 150 1. The complaint case was filed by the court clerk 
under case number 8458. Petitioner was arraigned on that complaint on September 2 1, 198 1. 
6. During his September 2 1 arraignment, Petitioner requested orally and in writing 
that he be represented by counsel. The court denied Petitioner's request. 
7. On October 1, 198 1, Petitioner was charged by criminal complaint with first 
degree murder by torture. The complaint was filed under case number 8495. The court set 
November 25, 198 1, for the date of arraignment on the information. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 2 
8. On October 2, 198 1, the court dismissed the injury to child complaint, case 
number 845 8. 
9. On October 13, 198 1, twenty-four days after Petitioner's arrest, counsel was 
appointed to represent him. 
10. A preliminary hearing was conducted in case number 8495 on November 2,3,4, 
6, and 10, 198 1. An order dated November 10 and filed on November 2 1, 1 98 1, directed that 
Petitioner be bound over to the District Court on the first degree murder charge. 
1 1. On November 25, 198 1, a prosecutor's information charging Petitioner with first 
degree murder by torture was filed in case number 8495. At his November 25, 198 1, 
arraignment on that information, Petitioner pleaded not guilty. 
12. On February 10, 1982, the prosecution was allowed to file an amended 
information charging Petitioner with first degree murder (Idaho Code $ 8  18-4001 & 4003) and 
being a persistent offender (Idaho Code $19-25 14). 
13. On August 12, 1982, the trial court denied Petitioner's request for defense 
investigative resources and directed that the defense counsel try to contact witnesses first by 
telephone and that he provide identifling information to local law enforcement authorities so 
they may locate the potential defense witnesses. 
14. On August 25, 1982, the trial court granted Petitioner $300--the only resources the 
court provided Petitioner for investigation, unless directing local law enforcement officials to 
locate for Petitioner identified defense witnesses somehow counts-for defense counsel to travel 
to Seattle in an effort to contact witnesses already identified. 
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15. On October 14, 1982, a jury returned a verdict against Petitioner, finding him 
guilty of first degree murder by torture. 
16. On December 9, 1982, the District Court filed a judgment of conviction 
sentencing Petitioner to death. 
17. Petitioner's conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the Idaho Supreme 
Court on May 3, 1985. State v. Stuart, 715 P.2d 833 (Idaho 1985). The Idaho Supreme Court 
later granted Petitioner's motion for rehearing. On February 20, 1986, that court issued an order 
adhering to its original opinion. @. In a twenty-nine page opinion, Justice Bistline dissented 
from the majority opinion. No petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the United States 
Supreme Court. 
18. On June 3, 1986, Petitioner filed a Petition for Postconviction Relief in the 
Second Judicial District Court of Idaho, Clearwater County, pursuant to Idaho Code 5 19-490 1. 
Petitioner alleged, in part, that newly discovered evidence showed the existence of mitigating 
circumstances critical to a reliable determination of, among other things, Petitioner's culpability 
and that the trial court had illegally precluded the defense from conducting an adequate 
investigation. On May 11, 1987, Judge Schilling denied the petition for, among other reasons, 
Petitioner's purported failure to raise an issue of material fact. On March 12, 1990, the Idaho 
Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming the lower court's decision. Stuart v. State, 1990 WL 
25768 (1990). Then, on rehearing, on October 16, 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court withdrew its 
March 12 opinion and issued a substitute decision affirming the denial of postconviction relief. 
Stuart v. State, 801 P.2d 1216 (Idaho 1990). 
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19. On September 12, 1988, Petitioner filed his Second and Subsequent Petition for 
Postconviction Relief in the Second Judicial District Court of Idaho, Clearwater County, 
pursuant to Idaho Code $1 9-4901. Petitioner alleged, among other things, that the prosecution 
obtained information critical to the prosecution of this case by monitoring attorney-client 
privileged conversations, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
United States Constitution, and that the illegal monitoring required that he be granted relief from 
his conviction and sentence. On March 28, 1990, Judge Schilling entered an order finding that 
there was no material issue of fact warranting an evidentiary hearing and denying and dismissing 
the Second and Subsequent Petition for Postconviction Relief. Subsequently, the Idaho Supreme 
Court reversed Judge Schilling's order and remanded the case for (1) an evidentiary hearing and 
(2) a determination whether the state had recorded Petitioner's attorney-client conversations and, 
if so, whether Petitioner's constitutional rights were thereby violated. Stuart v. State, 801 P.2d 
1283, 1286 (Idaho 1990). 
20. On remand, Judge Schilling found it "probably to be true ....[ that] none of Mr. 
Stuart's telephone calls with his attorneys (including Mr. Matson) were monitored or recorded" 
and ruled that the Second and Subsequent Petition for Post-Conviction Relief should be denied. 
Memorandum Decision on Remand at 33 (611 0192). 
2 1. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the destruction of phone logs was 
attributable to the Clearwater County Sheriffs Office in violation of Mr. Stuart's right to due 
process. Stuart v. State, 907 P.2d 783, 791, reh'g denied (Idaho 1996). It also found that the 
prosecution acted in bad faith by withholding evidence of Petitioner's recorded conversations. 
Id. at 793. The Supreme Court again remanded, this time with instructions that the court below 
-
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(1) determine what inference should be drawn regarding the contents of the phone logs and (2) 
reweigh the evidence to decide whether the state had recorded attorney-client privileged 
conversations. 
22. On remand, Judge Schilling entered an order finding that "Petitioner has proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence that his attorney-client conversations were monitored andlor 
recorded." Opinion And Order On Remand at 9 (816198). Subsequently, he determined that the 
prosecution independently obtained from other sources the information gained fiom those 
recordings. Findin~s df Fact. Conclusions of Law and Decision at 26 (5123100). Additionally, 
the court found that the prosecution would have inevitably obtained through other sources the 
information obtained fiom the recordings. Id. at 26-27. Finally, the court found that even if the 
prosecution used testimony obtained through exploiting the illegal monitoring of Petitioner's 
attorney-client communications, the nexus between that illegality and the testimony was 
sufficiently attenuated that suppression would have been unwarranted. The court determined that 
the Second and Subsequent Petition for Post Conviction Relief should be dismissed. a. at 29. 
23. On December 4,2001, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's 
rulings. Stuart v. State, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001). 
24. Robert Kinney was appointed to represent Petitioner on October 13,198 1, and 
continued that representation through guilt and sentencing phase trial proceedings, direct appeal, 
and several state postconviction proceedings until November 9, 1995. On that date, Mr. Kinney 
withdrew fiom proceedings pending under Idaho Supreme Court docket number 20060 and Scott 
Chapman was appointed as substitute counsel in those proceedings. On March 1 1,1996, Mr. 
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Kinney withdrew fiom proceedings pending under Idaho Supreme Court docket 21684 and Scott 
Chapman was appointed as substitute counsel in those proceedings. 
111. STATE OF THE RECORD 
25. Since its appointment in the instant proceedings, the Capital Habeas Unit has 
vigorously sought to obtain a complete record of the proceedings in this case. Critical pre-trial 
and trial proceedings have never been transcribed. In particular, undersigned counsel has 
determined that the following proceedings have not been transcribed: 
,Petitioner's arraignment on the prosecutor's first information charging first degree 
murder (1 112518 1); 
.Nine pre-trial motions hearings (211 1/82; 2/25/82; 3/25/82; 511 3/82; 611 0182; 7/29/82; 
81 12/82; 8/25/82; 9/30/82), addressing, among other things, requests concerning a state 
psychiatric evaluation of Petitioner and the preliminary hearing evidence as well as requests to 
change venue, to allow a psychiatric evaluation of Petitioner by a defense psychiatrist, to appoint 
or f h d  a defense investigator, to grant fimds for defense investigation, to dismiss for denial of a 
speedy trial, to sequester the jury panel, to compel prosecution's witnesses to attend trial, and for 
funds to conduct research for appellate purposes; 
kVoir dire proceedings, including individual voir dire of prospective jurors not selected to 
serve as actual jurors, motions proceedings to exclude particular prospective jurors for cause, 
peremptory strike proceedings, and a post-trial motion hearing (5126183); 
.The court clerk's calling the names of prospective jurors (1 01418 1); 
.The trial court's preliminary instructions to prospective jurors (1 01418 1); 
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,The court clerk's reading the information (1 01418 1); 
.The prosecution's opening statement; and 
,Defense counsel's opening statement. 
26. The Capital Habeas Unit has arranged for the transcription of the proceedings 
noted in the preceding paragraph. The court reporter estimates that the transcription will be 
complete by August 9,2002. When the transcription is complete, Petitioner will seek to make it 
part of the record in these proceedings. 
27. Undersigned counsel is reviewing postconviction records to determine whether all 
postconviction proceedings have been transcribed. If parts of those proceedings remain 
untranscribed, undersigned counsel will arrange for their transcription and, upon the 
transcription's completion, will seek to make it part of the record in these proceedings. 
28. The Clerk's Record filed with the Idaho Supreme Court on Petitioner's direct 
appeal is incomplete. In an effort to ascertain exactly which documents were filed with the 
Second Judicial District Court of Idaho, undersigned counsel has reviewed the trial court's files 
and arranged to obtain a complete copy of that court's files relating to the instant case. The trial 
court files are stored in seven "bankers" boxes. A Capital Habeas Unit staff member should be 
finished copying those files within two weeks. When the copying is complete, undersigned 
counsel will review the files in anticipation of seeking to have some of the documents included in 
the record of the instant proceedings. 
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IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
29. The central issue at Petitioner's trial was whether he intended his actions to 
torture the deceased or, alternatively and however ill conceived, to discipline him. The 
prosecution met its challenge by relying on numerous and severe violations of Petitioner's 
constitutional rights. 
30. On September 19, 198 1, after carrying the deceased in his arms to the hospital and 
pounding on its locked emergency room doors for help, Petitioner was arrested in connection 
with the deceased's death. Law enforcement officers immediately proceeded to elicit custodial 
statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In particular, law 
enforcement officers failed to advise Petitioner that if he could not afford an attorney, one would 
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. This violation continued through 
the next several days and resulted in illegally elicited statements identifying and, in some 
instances, providing information regarding the location of prior bad acts witnesses critical to the 
prosecution's proving intent to torture. Those illegally elicited statements also contained 
inculpatory admissions. 
3 1. The police failure to advise Petitioner that he was entitled to an appointed attorney 
prior to any questioning was exacerbated by the trial court's refusing at his arraignment to 
appoint defense counsel. In fact, the trial court left Petitioner without counsel for the next 
twenty-four days. 
32. During that time, the prosecution repeatedly interrogated Mr. Stuart in violation of 
his Miranda protections and his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel. 
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33. The prosecution, however, did not limit itself to these violations. Instead, as 
Idaho courts have found, it monitored Mr. Stuart's privileged attorney-client conversations 
during which Mr. Stuart sought counsel to accept his case and identified prior bad acts witnesses. 
Those witnesses later provided (1) critical trial testimony against him on the issue of intent to 
torture as well as (2) the preliminary hearing testimony necessary to the court's finding the 
aggravating circumstances it relied on in sentencing Mr. Stuart to death. 
34. The trial court denied defense counsel adequate investigatory resources. In this 
regard, the court provided defense counsel only $300 for investigation. And it, again, made 
privileged defense information readily available to the prosecution by directing that if defense 
counsel wanted investigation accomplished, he should provide the names of potential witnesses 
to the local law enforcement authorities for them to locate the witnesses and to conduct criminal 
history checks. Having thus precluded the defense from conducting meaningful investigation, 
the trial court advised defense counsel that he should conduct his investigation by telephone. 
The trial court also refused to rule pre-trial on the defense in limine motion to identify those prior 
bad acts about which the prosecution could elicit trial testimony. The defense was, then, 
subjected to an extraordinarily p o w e f i  whipsaw: Meaningful defense investigation was 
precluded while defense investigation needing completion was maximized. 
35. Petitioner did not fare better at trial. There, the court allowed lengthy and detailed 
prior bad acts testimony irrelevant to its ostensible purpose, viz., to prove Petitioner's intent to 
torture the deceased. The prosecution argued in closing that, in addition to the inference allowed 
by the court's limiting instruction, the jury should make other inferences, among which was the 
intent to cause sufEering element of the charge. 
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36. In addition to violations and errors which implicated the prosecution's proof of 
the intent to torture element, numerous other constitutional violations and errors were committed 
which rendered Petitioner's conviction and sentence unreliable. These included instructing the 
jury in a hopelessly confusing manner as well as the failure to instruct the jury on the lesser 
included offense of second degree murder by torture. 
37. Equally egregious constitutional violations and errors were committed during 
Petitioner's sentencing proceedings, including the following. Death should never have been on 
the table since it is disproportionate to the unintentional, non-felony-murder offense for which 
Petitioner was convicted. The facts necessary to (1) finding Petitioner eligible for death and (2) 
imposing the sentence were determined by the sentencing court, not a jury. The sentencing court 
relied on unconfionted preliminary hearing testimony as  well as hearsay. The sentencing court 
found that unconstitutionally vague aggravating factors existed on the basis of insufficient 
evidence and, too, irrelevant evidence. The court failed to find mitigating circumstances clearly 
supported by uncontradicted evidence before it. It sentenced Petitioner to death on the basis of 
illegally obtained evidence. Petitioner's death sentence, imposed in reliance on these and other 
violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a reliable sentence and other rights, 
must be vacated. 
3 8. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court failed to enforce what was then clear Idaho 
law mandating that trial courts instruct juries on lesser included offenses when they are supported 
by a reasonable view of the evidence. In the instant case, that court affirmed the trial court's 
failure to charge Petitioner's jury on second degree murder by torture, a charge supported by the 
evidence. , 
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39. In postconviction proceedings, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Petitioner relief 
based on the prosecution's monitoring Petitioner's pre-trial attorney-client conversations, 
egregious Fourteenth Amendment due process violations and outrageous Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to counsel violations. In upholding Petitioner's conviction and sentence, that 
wurt misapplied the exclusionary rule and its exceptions. 
40. Petitioner's conviction and sentence, obtained through multiple, severe, and 
extraordinarily harmfil constitutional violations, must be vacated. 
V. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
41. All allegations of fact contained in any part of the instant petition are hereby 
incorporated by reference into each claimed ground for relief. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE PETITIONER ADEQUATE 
INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES DENIED HIM (1) HIS RIGHTS TO 
COUNSEL AND TO CONFRONT ADVERSE WITNESSES AND OTHER 
ADVERSE EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, (2) HIS RIGHT TO A RELIABLE 
SENTENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS, AND (3) HIS RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR 
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
42. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death in reliance on testimony from 
witnesses who the defense could not adequately confront--face-to-face and via impeachment 
evidence--because the trial court had denied it adequate investigative resources, in violation of 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. That court's denial of adequate investigative resources 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 12 
0 0 0 0 0 4 2 9  
also denied Petitioner his right to a reliable sentence as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as well as his right to a fundamentally fair trial in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process guarantee. 
43. The sentencing court relied on the preliminary hearing testimony and, pursuant to 
statutory mandate that "[elvidence at trial shall be considered ... at the sentencing hearing[,]" 
Idaho Code 9 19-25 15(c) (1977)(emphasis added), the guilt phase trial testimony. Consequently, 
the trial court's precluding Petitioner from confronting the witness' testimony with impeachment 
evidence during guilt phase proceedings rendered the sentencing proceedings as well as the death 
sentence itself unreliable in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Facts Suvvorting the Claim 
44. The preliminary hearing commenced on November 2, 198 1, twenty days after 
defense counsel's appearance on the case, included testimony fkom individuals who were key 
prosecution witnesses at trial. They testified to a host of prior bad acts assertedly committed by 
Petitioner. Most of those acts were committed years before and out of state. For these and other 
reasons, the preliminary hearing bad acts testimony was unconfionted in critical ways. 
45. The remaining preliminary hearing testimony was unconfionted in critical ways 
through no fault of Petitioner. 
46. The trial court's refusal to grant funds sufficient to adequately investigate 
rendered the prosecution's case virtually unirnpeached. That case included but was not limited to 
testimony from medical personnel regarding the condition and treatment of the deceased in the 
hospital emergency room, the condition of the deceased during autopsy, and the cause of death. 
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47. The prosecution's case left virtually unimpeached also included testimony fiom 
prior bad acts witnesses. In particular, the jury was allowed, in deciding whether Petitioner 
intended to torture the deceased, to consider testimony describing numerous and severe violent 
acts allegedly committed by Petitioner remote in time. 
48. The trial court's r e h a 1  to grant sufficient for investigation prevented Petitioner 
from adequately investigating sentencing phase evidence. This prevented, among other things, 
the adequate development of mitigation evidence. 
49. On May 27, 1982, defense counsel filed a motion seeking "an Order setting forth 
the scope and extent of testimony and evidence to be presented by SHARIE LEE DALLY, 
THERESA JACOBSEN and VICKI NELSON." Clerk's Record at 22. On June 10,1982, with 
permission fiom the trial court, Petitioner amended that motion so that the requested order would 
cover evidence and testimony from Dee Adams a k l a  Delores Strong as well as the other three 
witnesses. 
50. In ruling on the motion, the trial court made clear that while it was "troubled by 
the enormity of Cprior] acts that the Prosecutor wishe[d] to present and [that it was] troubled by 
their ... claim[ed] prejudicial affect[,]" it would not advise defense counsel before trial which prior 
acts it would and would not allow into evidence. However, the trial court did advise that "in 
proving ... motive[,] it is possible that all of the Preliminary Hearing evidence may prove relevant 
and admissible." July 15 Motions Hearing Transcript at 10. Consequently, to adequately 
prepare, the defense had to seek to impeach the testimony of each of the four named witnesses. 
Indeed, defense counsel alerted the court that he intended to move "for investigative services 
assistance with regard to the credibility of these witnesses." a. at 13. 
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5 1.  The trial court responded by instructing "that the Prosecutor investigate the 
criminal records of all the witnesses he used to demonstrate the motive of this man at the 
Preliminary Hearing and any others you intend to call for that purpose who you may have 
notified the defense of[.]" Id. at 15. The trial court added that: 
I'm not anxious to allow your client to have the services of an 
investigator for no particular purpose. Simply just to fish around in 
the hopes of finding something. I don't think that that is a 
requirement of a proper defense. But if you feel there is some 
particular information you need or may exist with respect to any of 
these witnesses, all of whom are known well to your client, if you 
can guide me to any area where you need investigation I'm 
prepared to make investigative services available to your -to your 
client. 
Id. at 16. 
-
52. Having read the Preliminary Hearing transcript, the trial court necessarily was 
aware that a criminal records check, while important, would be profoundly inadequate to fully 
and fairly locate pertinent impeachment evidence. The Preliminary Hearing testimony of each of 
the four witnesses was replete with particular incidents which the defense clearly needed to 
investigate. 
53. On July 29, 1982, defense counsel filed a motion seeking an order "pennitting the 
expenditure of public funds to hire a private investigator for purposes of discovering facts and 
information which defendant believes will impeach the testimony of prosecution witnesses 
testifjring at the preliminary hearing in this cause, and which are expected to testify at trial[.]" 
Clerk's Record at 28. During a hearing on that motion, the trial court informed defense counsel 
that while it was inclined to grant the motion, it first wanted him to "submit an additional 
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Affidavit on who it will be and what the investigation is to reveal and why." Clerk's Record at 
30 (court minutes). The court minutes describe the trial court's subsequent ruling: 
Court findings were that not all these witnesses required 
investigator. Court prefers the defense attorney attempt to contact 
witnesses first by telephone. Court denies an investigator at this 
time and proposes that defendant and attorney give all the 
information possible (on the location of prospective witnesses to be 
used) to the authorities. The court will sign an order that 
authorities will cooperate to locate these individuals but their effort 
must not include any actual contact. 
Clerk's Record at 3 1. At a later hearing, the following transpired: 
Mr. Kinney advised the court he had contacted all the witnesses but 
one, who had an unlisted number. Court requested that Mr. 
Calhoun request the unpublished number on that witness. Mr. 
Kinney moved that he be allowed to travel to Seattle to personally 
contact the witnesses at court expense. No objection by the State. 
Court grants and authorizes up to $300.00 allowance for expenses 
of Mr. Kinney for a few days. 
Clerk's Record at 37. As asserted in Petitioner's first petition for post conviction relief: 
the Trial Court was unwilling to grant Petitioner the services of a 
private investigator, and instead simply authorized reimbursement 
of out-of-pocket expenses for petitioner's counsel to travel to the 
State of Washington and interview witnesses prior to Tri al.... By 
denying investigative assistance to Petitioner's attorney, the Trial 
Court rendered it nearly impossible for accurate and factual 
information concerning Petitioner's background to be obtained 
prior to sentencing. 
Petition For Post Conviction Relief at 8 (613186). Consequently, for example, defense counsel 
was unable to develop evidence of mitigating circumstances. Among those circumstances was 
that 
Petitioner as well as other family members ... sustain[ed] 
considerable physical abuse at the hands of Petitioner's father, 
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which contributed greatly to the personality makeup of Petitioner at 
the time and date of the homicide concerned herewith[.] 
Id. at 7. Also, Petitioner was raised in "an atmosphere of physical and mental abuse and neglect, 
7
[and] was impoverished." Pet. at 7. 
54. Had the trial court granted defense counsel adequate resources with which to 
investigate, he would have discovered witnesses to testify and other admissible evidence with 
which to meet the prosecution's case. That evidence would have destroyed the credibility of key 
witnesses on the intent to torture element, viz., Sharie Lee Dally, Theresa Jacobsen, Vicki 
Nelson, and Dee Adarns &a Delores Strong. 
55.  Further, had the trial court granted defense counsel adequate funds with which to 
investigate penalty phase issues, defense counsel would have discovered mitigating 
circumstances which would have outweighed the aggravating circumstances and made 
imposition of death unjust. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ALLOW PETITIONER COUNSEL 
UNTIL TWENTY-FOUR DAYS AFTER HIS ARREST, IN VIOLATION 
OF HIS SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL, HIS EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO A RELIABLE SENTENCE, AND HIS FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
56. The trial court failed to allow Petitioner counsel for twenty-four days after his 
arrest. This violated Petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel, his Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendment right to a reliable sentence, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process. 
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Facts Supporting the Claim 
57. At his September 2 1, 198 1, arraignment on the injury to a child criminal 
complaint, which arose out of the same nexus of facts which served as the basis for Petitioner's 
first degree murder by torture charge, Petitioner requested legal representation. The trial court 
denied his request and left him without counsel on the case until October 13, 198 1. Thus, for 
twenty four days, Petitioner was without counsel. 
58. During the twenty-four day period, state agents elicited custodial inculpatory 
statements and a custodial inculpatory demonstration from Petitioner. With the benefit of 
counsel, Petitioner would not have provided any statement or demonstration to any state actor. 
C. PETITIONER'S SENTENCE RESTS ON A CONVICTION OBTAINED IN 
RELIANCE ON EVIDENCE OF STATEMENTS ILLEGALLY ELICITED 
FROM PETITIONER BY STATE AGENTS IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS 
GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS. 
59. Petitioner's conviction was obtained in reliance on a law enforcement officer's 
testimony describing three pretrial statements elicited from Petitioner. The first of those 
statements was elicited in violation of Petitioner's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
counsel and against self-incrimination as well as the constitutionally based protections of 
Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 U.S. 436 (1 966). The remaining two statements were elicited in 
violation of those same rights and protections as well as Petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to counsel. 
60. In addition to the statements described to the jury, state agents elicited other 
custodial statements from Petitioner in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
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rights to counsel and the protections of Miranda. The prosecution used these statements to 
identify and locate critical prior bad acts witnesses who testified at trial. 
6 1 .  Petitioner's sentence, imposed in reliance on a conviction obtained through the 
abuse of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the 
constitutionally based Miranda protections, and his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to 
counsel, violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a reliable sentence. 
62. Because the sentencing court relied on Petitioner's illegally elicited statements in 
frnding that the defense had failed to prove a mitigating circumstance, the sentence violates the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Facts Su~porting the Claim 
63. On the evening of September 19, 198 1,  law enforcement officers escorted 
Petitioner from the hospital to the Clearwater County Sheriffs Office. 
64. Once there and over the next several hours, the officers elicited an incriminating 
custodial statement fiom Petitioner. 
A. The September 19, 198 1. Statement. 
65. At the start of the interrogation, the interrogating law enforcement officer advised 
Petitioner of some, but not all, of his rights as described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 
(1 966). In particular, Petitioner was advised: 
You have the right to a lawyer and have him present with you 
before being question[ed] if you wish[.] 
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66. He was not advised, however, that if he could not afford an attorney one would be 
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. Miranda at 479. 
67. At trial, one of the law enforcement officers who participated in Petitioner's 
interrogation described to the jury many of Petitioner's September 19 incriminatory admissions. 
See R. 369-77. 
-
B. The Post-Sedember 19. 198 1 Statements. 
68. On September 21, at 10:45 a.m, 198 1, a criminal complaint was filed against 
Petitioner based on the same factual nexus as the instant matter. Specifically, the complaint, 
charging injury to a child in violation of Idaho Code 18-1 501, alleged that on September 19, 
1981, Petitioner "did strike and hit the said Robert Miller causing unjustifiable pain, and great 
harm which caused the death of Robert Miller." 
69. At 3:30 p.m. on the same day the complaint was filed, proceedings were held 
regarding appointment of counsel for Petitioner. At those proceedings, Petitioner requested 
verbally and in writing, that the court appoint counsel. 
70. After Petitioner requested on September 21 that counsel represent him, state 
agents initiated interrogations during which they elicited various statements from Petitioner. 
Though then-officer Rears testified at trial to advising Petitioner of his Miranda rights prior to 
interrogating him on September 24 and September 25, any purported waiver by Petitioner of his 
right to counsel necessarily did not extend to his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. "F]f police 
initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his 
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right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated 
interrogation is invalid." Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,636 (1986). Consequently, law 
enforcement officers eliciting statements from Petitioner after his September 21 arraignment and 
request for counsel violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel. 
71. Additionally, Petitioner's September 2 5 ~  statement was elicited without first 
adequately advising him of his Miranda rights. In particular, Petitioner was not advised that if he 
could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so 
desired. Consequently, eliciting that statement and using it against him at trial not only violated 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as described in the last paragraph, but violated his right 
against self incrimination and his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as well. 
72. According to the trial testimony, the deceased was alone with Petitioner from 
about 2:00 p.m. to about 6:00 p.m. when Petitioner carried him into a hospital emergency room 
seeking help. The deceased and the Petitioner were, therefore, the only two witnesses to their 
interaction that afternoon. Because the prosecution had no statement fiom the deceased, 
Petitioner was the only potential source of direct incriminating evidence regarding that 
interaction. 
73. While Petitioner made incriminating admissions during the course of the 
September 19 interrogation, he did not state that he had hit the deceased. Instead, Petitioner's 
September 19 interrogation describes a small child suddenly and without apparent cause 
becoming critically ill and a panicked adult trying to help by employing unspecified resuscitative 
measures. 
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74. However, during a September 25 interrogation, a law enforcement officer elicited 
fiom Petitioner a detailed description of Petitioner's resuscitation efforts as well as a 
demonstration on a baby-sized mannequin. In particular, as the interrogating law enforcement 
officer explained in detailed testimony to the jury, Petitioner stated during his September 25 
interrogation that he tried to remove air fiom the deceased's stomach by placing his hand on the 
deceased's stomach and pushing down (as opposed to striking the stomach) and that he never 
co~npressed or struck the deceased's chest. See, e . L  RR. 387-89. 
75. Resuscitation efforts, especially when improperly applied, may lacerate the liver. 
Petitioner's September 19 statement is entirely consistent with the deceased's liver being 
damaged by Petitioner's having taken vigorous but improper resuscitation measures. However, 
this possible cause is inconsistent with Petitioner's September 25 statement and demonstration. 
Consequently, the September 25 statement was critical to the prosecution removing reasonable 
doubt that Petitioner's resuscitation efforts lacerated the deceased's liver, causing his death. 
76. The prosecution identified and located prior bad acts witnesses based on 
Petitioner's custodial statements illegally elicited by state agents. 
77. Petitioner's jury relied on Petitioner's involuntary and illegally obtained 
statements and the f i t s  of those statements in convicting him, in violation of Petitioner's right 
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial 
court relied on those involuntary and illegally obtained statements as well as the constitutionally 
infirm verdict to sentence Petitioner to death, in violation of Petitioner's Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a reliable sentence and in violation of Petitioner's right to due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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D. PETITIONER'S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE TO DEATH RESTS ON 
EVIDENCE THE PROSECUTION OBTAINED THROUGH MONITORING 
HIS PRIVILEGED PRE-TRIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONVERSATIONS, IN 
VIOLATION OF HIS FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION AND TO COUNSEL, SIXTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND TO 
CONFRONT WITNESSES, AND EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A RELIABLE SENTENCE, AND HIS 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
78. The state monitored Petitioner's privileged pre-trial attorney-client conversations 
in violation of his rights against self incrimination and to counsel under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, his rights to counsel and to confiont adverse witnesses under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 
his right to a reliable sentence under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The state's 
monitoring Petitioner's privileged attorney-client conversations and thereby gaining 
incriminating information constituted an egregious violation of Petitioner's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process. 
Facts Supportine, the Claim 
79. The Clearwater County Sheriffs Office monitored Petitioner's pre-trial privileged 
attorney client conversations, thereby gaining information inculpatory to Petitioner and used . 
against him at trial, including knowledge of witnesses who possessed the inculpatory 
information, knowledge of that inculpatory information, and knowledge of the whereabouts of 
those witnesses. That information included but was not limited to knowledge that Dee Adams 
a/Wa Delores Strong, Sharie Lee Dally, Theresa Jacobsen, and Vicki Nelson possessed 
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inculpatory information, that the inculpatory information included alleged prior bad acts testified 
to by those witnesses, and the whereabouts of those witnesses. 
80. In 1988 Petitioner filed a postconviction petition alleging that state agents had 
monitored his pre-trial attorney-client conversations and thereby, among other things, "became 
aware of evidence which it did not otherwise possess, and was ultimately used against Petitioner 
at Trial" in violation of Petitioner's rights to due process, to effective assistance of counsel, to 
fieedom fiom self-incrimination, and "fiom unreasonable intrusion upon the sanctity of the 
i 
attorney-client relationship[.]" Second and Subsequent Petition For Post Conviction Relief at 
17-1 8. The evidence at issue was the testimony of the prosecution's key witnesses on the issue 
of intent. During the course of postconviction proceedings, the trial court concluded that 
Petitioner's attorney-client pre-trial conversations "had been monitored by the Clearwater County 
Sheriffs Office." Stuart v. State, 36 P.3d 1278. Ultimately, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court's finding that there had been no constitutional violation at trial because "under the 
independent origin, inevitable discovery, and attenuated basis exceptions, the monitoring of 
telephone conversations did not lead to the discovery of witnesses." Stuart v. State, 36 P.3d 
1278, 1282 (Idaho 2001). The exclusionary rule and its exceptions address government 
violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. In the instant case, however, the Idaho 
Supreme Court addressed the violation of Petitioner's right to due process, not a violation of his 
Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments. The exclusionary rule analysis was, therefore, inapposite. 
The Idaho Supreme Court should have granted Petitioner a new trial to remedy the egregious due 
process violation and the egregious state deprivation of counsel. 
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E. ADMISSION OF PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE IRRELEVANT TO THE 
STATED PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS ADMITTED AND WHOSE 
UNFAIR PREJUDICE, CONSIDERED INDIVIDUALLY AND 
CUMULATIVELY, OUTWEIGHED ITS PROBATIVE VALUE, IN 
VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS AND RENDERED HIS DEATH SENTENCE UNRELIABLE 
IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 
THE UMTED STATE CONSTITUTION. 
8 1. The trial court admitted testimony from multiple witnesses describing prior bad 
acts allegedly committed by Petitioner against persons other than the deceased, including but not 
limited to Kathy Miller, Dee Adams alkla Delores Strong, Sharie Lee Dally, Theresa Jacobsen, 
and Vicki Nelson. The trial court admitted it "for the single purpose of attempting to show 
motive or intent on the part of the Defendant to torture the deceased." R. 488. The alleged prior 
bad acts, however, did not tend to show that Petitioner was motivated or intended to torture the 
deceased and, therefore, were irrelevant to the stated purpose. Further, even if relevant, 
considered individually and cumulatively, the unfair prejudice of the prior bad acts testimony far 
outweighed any probative value. Consequently, admitting the prior bad acts testimony violated 
Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his right to a reliable sentence as 
guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Facts Supmrting - the Claim 
82. The trial court admitted testimony from Kathy Miller, Dee Adams a/Wa Delores 
Strong, Sharie Lee Dally, Theresa Jacobsen, and Vicki Nelson regarding prior bad acts assertedly 
committed by Petitioner against them. Through their testimony, the jury heard allegations that 
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Petitioner had committed various crimes, including but not limited to assaults, rape, and a 
possible attempted murder. 
83. Many of the alleged offenses were committed, if at all, at a time remote fiom that 
of the charged offense. 
84. No reasonable inference could be drawn from prior bad acts against adults to 
intent to torture the deceased. 
85. Even if there was some inference possible fiom the alleged prior bad acts to intent 
to torture the deceased, the unfair prejudice created by the testimony far outweighed any possible 
probative value. 
F. PETITIONER'S DEATH SENTENCE RESTS ON A GUILT PHASE VERDICT 
RETURNED ON THE BASIS OF IMPOSSIBLY CONFUSING JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, IN VIOLATION OF HIS FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND RENDERED HIS SENTENCE 
UNRELIABLE IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS. 
86. Allowing the jury to convict Petitioner without frnding beyond a reasonable doubt 
each element of the charged offense violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 
Sentencing Petitioner to death on the basis of a conviction reached through jury instructions 
allowing a guilty verdict absent a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of an element of the charged 
offense, violated Petitioner's right to a reliable sentence as guaranteed by the Eighth 
Amendment. 
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Facts S u ~ ~ o r t i n ~  the Claim 
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87. In 198 1, the Idaho Code defined murder to include "the u n l a h l  killing of a 
human being with ... the intentional application of torture to a human being, which results in the 
death of a human being." I.C. $1 8-4001 (1977). That statute defined two kinds of torture. Id. 
One included intentionally causing suffering as an element. The other included no element of 
intent. In all cases of murder by torture, regardless of the kind of torture charged, the statute 
required that the application of torture be intentional. 
88. Under Idaho law, torture murder could be first degree murder only if one or more 
additional elements was proved. In particular, Idaho defined first degree murder by torture as: 
All murder which is perpetrated by means of. ..torture, when torture 
is inflicted with the intent to cause suffering, to execute vengeance, 
to extort something from the victim, or to satisfy some sadistic 
inclination[.] 
1.C . 5 1 8-4003(a) (1 977). That same statute made clear that any murder committed by otherwise 
inflicting torture was second degree murder. Id. at (g)("All other kinds of murder are of the 
second degree."). 
89. In the instant case, Petitioner was tried on an amended prosecutor's information 
which charged that he 
did then and there unlawhlly and feloniously kill a human being, 
with the intentional application of torture to said human being, to 
wit: that the said petitioner] did strike and hit [the deceased], a 
human being, repeatedly with the intent to cause suffering or to 
satisf) some sadistic inclination of the said [Petitioner], thereby 
Filling the deceased]. 
Clerk's Record on Direct.Appea1 at 14. 
90. As part of its instructions, the trial court read this inartfully drafted instrument to 
the jury. That court's immediately succeeding instructions, cryptic and apparently at odds with 
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one another, must have conlksed the jury about what facts it had to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt in order to return a conviction.' 
9 1. Instruction 17 charged that, to return a conviction of first degree murder, the jury 
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that, among other things, Petitioner had killed the deceased 
"by the intentional application of torture" and had inflicted that torture "with the intent to cause 
suffering or to satisfy some sadistic inclination[.]" Clerk's Record on Direct Appeal at 54. 
Instruction 18, however, charged that while "[tlorture is the intentional infliction of extreme and 
prolonged pain with the intent to cause suffering ...[,I [i]t shall also be torture to inflict on a 
human being extreme and prolonged acts of brutality irrespective of proof of intent to cause 
suffering." I_d. 
92. Based on these instructions, it is likely that one or more jurors voted to convict 
after rejecting as unproved a finding that Petitioner had tortured the deceased by intentionally 
inflicting extreme and prolonged pain with the intent to cause suffering but accepting as proved a 
finding that Petitioner tortured the deceased by extreme and prolonged acts of brutality 
irrespective of intent to cause suffering. There is a reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted 
Petitioner based on a theory which the prosecutor's information excluded by specifically and 
exclusively charging an alternative theory. In short, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
interpreted these instructions in a way which allowed a conviction without the requisite proof. 
'The jury instructions as read by the trial court have never been transcribed. In reciting 
the facts, Petitioner assumes that the trial court's reading of the instructions does not materially 
differ fiom the instructions as written and contained in the Clerk's Record on Appeal. Petitioner 
has arranged to have the instructions as read by the trial court transcribed. See supra at paras. 23- 
24. 
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93. Additionally, the court made no effort to distinguish the "intentional application 
of torture" element from the "torture as intentional infliction of extreme and prolonged pain" 
element. There is a reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted these instructions in a way 
which allowed a conviction without the requisite proof. 
94. Considered together the jury instruction on a kind of torture not charged and the 
absence of a jury instruction on a critical distinction between the very similarly "intentional 
application of torture" and "torture as intentional infliction of extreme and prolonged pain" 
elements created a reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted Petitioner without the requisite 
proof. Cf. State v. Stuart, 7 15 P.2d 833, 854-860, on reh'g (Idaho 1986)(l3istline, J., 
dissenting)(jury charge replete with errors). 
95. That confusion was only exacerbated by Instruction 19 which defined express and 
implied malice, neither of which terms had previously been heard by the jury since first degree 
murder by torture does not include malice as an element. I_d. at 56. While the court later 
instructed the jury on second degree murder, which charge includes malice as an element, at the 
point at which the jury heard Instruction 19 it could relate it to only the murder by torture charge. 
If, after Instruction 19 was read, there remained any juror faithfully trying to make sense of the 
charge, he or she was then bombarded with Instruction 20. That instruction suggested that there 
was an independent charge of willhl, deliberate and premeditated killing, which there was not. 
Id. at 57. 
-
96. The guilt phase jury instructions were conhing, allowed a conviction on 
uncharged theories, left key elements undefined, defined uncharged and therefore irrelevant 
elements, all, individually and together, in violation of Petitioner's right to due process as 
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guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment and his right to a reliable sentence as guaranteed by 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
G. PETITIONER'S JURY WAS INSTRUCTED AND IT CONVICTED 
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF MURDER 
BY TORTURE, IN VIOLATION OF HIS FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND HIS EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A RELIABLE SENTENCE. 
97. Petitioner's jury was allowed to convicted on the basis of insufficient evidence of 
murder by torture. This violated Petitioner's right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and his right to a reliable sentence as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Facts Supvortin~! the Claim 
98. Claim E and its factual allegations are incorporated by reference. 
99. When the irrelevant evidence is removed from consideration, see Clairn E, 
insufficient evidence remains to allow a conviction for murder by torture. In particular, 
insuflicient evidence remains to allow finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner intended 
to torture the deceased. 
100. Petitioner was sentenced on the basis of a conviction obtained without proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
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H. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON THE LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER BY TORTURE 
VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND RENDERED HIS SENTENCE 
UNRELIABLE IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS. 
10 1. The trial court's failure to instruct Petitioner's jury on the lesser included offense 
of second degree murder by torture violated his right to due process as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and to a reliable sentence as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Facts Suuporting the Claim 
102. In 198 1, I.C. $18-400 ldistinguished murder by torture fiom intentional murder: 
Murder is the unlawfd killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought or the intentional application of torture to a human 
being, which results in the death of a human being. 
I.C. 5 18-400 1 (1 977). Elsewhere, the Idaho Code distinguished between first and second degree 
murder by torture: 
18-4003. Degrees of murder. -(a) All murder which is perpetrated 
by means of. ..torture, when torture is inflicted with the intent to 
cause suffering, to execute vengeance, to extort something from 
the victim, or to satisfy some sadistic inclination..,is murder of the 
first degree. 
(g) All other kinds of murder are of the second degree. 
I.C. $18-4003 (a) & (g) (1 977). That same statute made clear that intentional murder was second 
degree murder unless accompanied by one or more enumerated circumstances. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 32 
103. Petitioner was tried on a two count prosecutor's information. Count one charged 
first degree murder by torture, in violation of I.C. $1 8-4001 & 4003. Count two charged that 
Petitioner was a persistent violator in violation of I.C. 9 19-25 14, so eligible for a sentencing 
enhanc ernent . 
104. The trial court instructed the jury on (1) first degree murder by torture, (2) second 
degree intentional murder, and (3) involuntary manslaughter. Neither the second degree 
intentional murder instruction nor the involuntary manslaughter instruction included any mention 
of torture. This absence stood in stark contrast to the prosecution's case which placed front and 
center the element of torture. 
105. The trial court did not instruct the jury on second degree murder by torture. This 
placed the jury in the untenable position of having to decide between convicting Petitioner of 
first degree murder by torture or some lesser charge which did not include any element of torture. 
Cf. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 648 (1991)(Beck is not necessarily satisfied "by instructing 
the jury on just any lesser included offense"). 
I. PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF VIOLATING AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE STATUTE, IN VIOLATION OF HIS 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT AND, THEREFORE, IN VIOLATION 
OF HIS RIGHT TO A RELIABLE SENTENCE AS GUARANTEED BY THE 
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
106. Petitioner was convicted of committing first degree murder by torture. Because 
the key element of that offense--torture--was left undefined in the statute and was not elsewhere 
defined, the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Petitioner's conviction violated his right to 
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due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and his sentence is unreliable in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Facts Supporting the Claim 
107. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder by torture in violation of I.C. $18- 
4001 & 4003. While both statutes employ the term 'torture,' neither statute defines what 
constitutes 'torture.' Nor, at the time of Petitioner's conviction, did any Idaho court decision 
defme that term. 
108. Petitioner's jury was not instructed on what it had to find in order to conclude that 
the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt the "torture" element of the charged 
murder by torture offense. 
J. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AS 
GUARANTEED BY (1) IDAHO LAW AND THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF 
PETITIONER'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
AND (2) THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
109. Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 
Additionally, the denial of his state statutory right to a speedy trial constituted a violation of his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980). 
Facts Suvportinrr the Claim 
1 10. I.C. 5 19-350 1 provides that, absent good cause, a prosecutor's information must 
be dismissed if the defendant is not brought to trial within six months of its filing date. 
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11 1. Petitioner was tried well after six months from the date the prosecutor's 
information was filed. The delay was not for good cause. 
112. None of the delay was properly attributable to Petitioner. Even if some delay was 
properly attributable to Petitioner, that part of the delay did not cause his trial to be conducted 
over six months after the prosecutor's information was filed. 
K. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT THROUGHOUT PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS VIOLATED PETITIONER'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND, THEREFORE, HIS EIGHTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO A RELIABLE SENTENCING 
PROCEEDING. 
113. Petitioner's rights to due process, a fair trial, an impartial fact finder, and a 
reliable sentence were violated by the prosecution's illegally monitoring Petitioner's privileged 
pre-trial attorney-client conversations and inflammatory and otherwise improper closing 
argument by the prosecutor, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
Facts Su~~or t inn  the Claim 
1 14. The prosecution monitored Petitioner's pre-trial privileged attorney-client 
conversations. Claim D and its factual allegations are incorporated by reference. 
1 15. The prosecutor's closing argument was riddled with misconduct, including but not 
limited to repeated vouching. 
1 16. The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses critical to a conviction 
on the top count includes: 
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Now I don't want to get into a lot of detail on what Gene Stuart did 
to ex-wives and girlfriends .... Those women would not get up in 
fiont ofyou people, infiont ofeverybody in this courtroom and 
testzfi to the type ofhumiliation, degradation andpain and 
suflering that they were put through unless that happened. They 
would not do that. 
R. 925 (emphasis added). 
The things that were testified to here are just incredible. But 
they 're all true. These people would not have gotten up and 
testzjied to this ifthey weren't true. 
R. 928 (emphasis added). Again, immediately after referencing those same 
witnesses: 
Now, it's up to you to determine the credibility of the witnesses. 
I've got my opinion. 
R. 93 1. Finally, the prosecutor urged the jury to reject Petitioner's testimony based on his 
assessment of its lack of truthfulness and, again, to adopt his opinion that the bad acts witnesses 
were credible: 
I don't know if. ..the [dlefense is going to be..that these women are 
testifying to their humiliation and acts of brutality because Gene 
Francis Stuart dumped them. But that's unbelievable. No way. 
That S not fact. They testij?ed to the truth. I don 't like to just keep 
repeating the same thing over and over again but they wouldn 't 
testzfi to what they did unless it were true. They would not. 
R. 932. 
1 17. The prosecutor's misconduct included but was not limited to telling the j u ~ y  that 
he believed the defense psychiatrist's opinion was wrong: 
w]e  stated right there on the stand ... that Gene Stuart didn't intend 
to hurt anybody. Ijust can 't believe that. 
R. 928 (emphasis added). 
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1 18. The prosecution's misconduct included but was not limited to urging the jury to 
draw inferences other than intent to torture, in direct contradiction of the court's limiting 
instruction regarding the prior bad acts testimony. The prosecution's improper remarks in this 
regard included but were not limited to urging the jury to use the prior bad acts testimony to 
reject the theory that Petitioner had fatally injured the deceased through an explosion of temper 
and that Petitioner intended the torture to cause suffering. 
L. PETITIONER'S SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT FUGHT TO A 
TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY WAS VIOLATED AND HIS SENTENCE 
WAS THEREBY RENDERED UNRELIABLE IN VIOLATION OF THE 
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
1 19. Petitioner was tried by biased jurors in violation of his right to an impartial jury 
trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... 
trial0 by an impartial jury[.]"); Duncan v. Louisiana,, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1 968)(Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial applies to state criminal proceedings through the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Muruhy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,802 (1 975)rindicia of 
impartiality might be disregarded in a case where the general atmosphere in the comm unity... is 
sufficiently inflammatory"). Petitioner's sentence, based on a conviction by partial jurors, was 
unreliable in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Facts Suvportinrr the Claim 
120. Pursuant to Idaho law, venue for Petitioner's trial was presumptively in 
Clearwater County, Idaho. See Idaho Criminal Rule 19. Petitioner moved to change venue to a 
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county outside the publication area of the Lewiston Morning Tribune, however, based on that 
paper's extensive pre-trial publicity. See Clerk's Record at 17. 
121. The trial court ordered that venue be changed to Latah County, but that county 
was within the publication area of the Lewiston Morning Tribune. 
122. The Lewiston Morning Tribune's daily circulation rate in Latah County was more 
than double its daily circulation rate in Cleanvater County. Far fiom reducing the pretrial 
publicity threat to an impartial jury, changing venue to Latah County exacerbated that threat. 
123. Of the actual jurors, only four had not been exposed to pretrial publicity. 
M. THE FAILURE TO RECORD CRITICAL PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING THE TRIAL COURT CHARGING THE JURY 
ON THE LAW, VIOLATED (1) PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL 
APPELLATE REVIEW IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
AS GUAMNTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND (2) 
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A RELIABLE SENTENCE AS GUARANTEED 
BY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
124. Critical proceedings, including the trial court charging the jury on the law, were 
not recorded. The absence of a record of these proceedings precluded meaningful direct appeal 
review in violation of Petitioner's right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. This absence of meaningful appellate review of 
Petitioner's conviction renders his sentence unreliable in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Facts Suvvortine: the Claim 
125. The trial court did not direct that critical proceedings be recorded, including but 
not limited to the trial court's instructions to the jury on the law it was to apply in deliberations. 
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126. The Idaho Supreme Court is bound to review the entire record when reviewing 
capital cases. 
N. THE FAILURE TO RECORD SUBSTANTIVE CHAMBERS CONFERENCES 
VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED 
BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND TO A 
RELIABLE SENTENCE AS GUARANTEED BY THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT. 
127. The trial court's failure to have critical chambers conferences recorded, during 
which strategic and substantive discussions between defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the 
court occurred, deprived Petitioner of his state-created liberty interest to have all capital 
proceedings recorded as guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and to a reliable sentence as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See. e.& Withers~oon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Gardner v. Florida, 
430 U.S. 349 (1977); Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1979). 
Facts Su~mrting the Claim 
128. Various proceedings before and during trial were not recorded, including the jury 
charge conference. 
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0. THE INSTANT DEATH SENTENCE IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE 
OFFENSE PETITIONER STANDS CONVICTED OF HAVING COMMITTED, 
IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
129. Petitioner's death sentence is disproportionate to his torture-murder conviction, an 
offense which was neither intentional nor classic felony-murder. The Eighth Amendment 
requires that a sentence be proportionate to the offense for which it is imposed. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1 976). Death is not "invariably disproportionate" for intentional 
murder. a. at 187. On the other hand, death is disproportionate for felony-murder unless the 
defendant either (1) killed, (2) attempted to kill, (3) intended that a killing take place, (4) 
intended that lethal force be employed, or (5) was a major participant in the felony and acted 
with reckless indifference to human life. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,797 (1982), and 
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1 987). 
Facts Su~~or t inn  The Claim 
130. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction of first degree murder 
by torture and sentence to death on May 3, 1985. Subsequently, that court granted Petitioner's 
request for rehearing. 
13 1. On February 20, 1986, in a single paragraph decision, the court adhered to its 
earlier opinion. 
132. Under Idaho law, intent to kill is not an element of first degree murder by torture. 
One or more mental states is necessary to be guilty of first degree torture-murder, however, each 
mental state is defined in terms of the torturer's purpose and none is defined in terms of intent to 
kill. In the instant case, Petitioner was charged with intentionally torturing the deceased and 
intending that the torture "cause suffering or ... satisfy some sadistic inclination[.]" Clerks' Record 
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on Appeal at 14 ("Information Amended"). Petitioner was charged with and convicted of having 
committed an unintentional killing. 
13 3. The proportionality holding in Gregg does not extend to the instant case because 
Petitioner stands convicted of an unintentional killing. Nor does the Enmund-Tison rule make 
the instant death sentence proportionate to the offense: Petitioner was convicted of torture- 
murder, not felony-murder in the sense that 'felony murder' was used by the Enmund court. 
134. In Enmund, the court did not define 'felony murder', but it plainly used that term 
to denote the classic understanding, i.e.- that a person commits felony murder when, during the 
commission of a felony, he causes another's death without specifically intending to do so. Cf. 
Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law $7.5 (describing felony- 
murder rule at common law). 
135. Under Idaho law, torture-murder is distinct from felony-murder. It and felony- 
murder are defined in distinct statutory sub-sections. % Idaho Code #18-4003(a) & (d). More 
important, felony-murder in Idaho consists of a murder perpetrated during the commission of a 
felony. Remove the murder and the other felony remains. 
136. Under Idaho's statutory scheme in 198 1, torture-murder stood in stark contrast to 
felony-murder. In particular, no felony offense remained outstanding after the murder was 
removed fiom a murder by torture. 
137. The Idaho Supreme Court distinguishes between felony-murder and torture- 
murder. In Idaho v. Luke, 1 P.3d 795,801 (2000), for example, the court addressed whether 
there is .a crime of attempted first degree murder by torture. Citing to State v. Pratt, 873 P.2d 800 
(Idaho 1993), it noted that there is no crime of attempted felony-murder. However, the court did 
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not identify torture-murder as a kind of felony-murder. Instead, recognizing torture-murder as 
distinct fiom felony-murder, the court noted that the rationale is equally strong in the first 
degree torture-murder context because neither first degree felony-murder nor first degree torture- 
murder require proof of intent: 
Therefore, leads to the conclusion that attempted fmt degree 
murder by torture, absent a specific showing of intent, is not a 
crime in Idaho. This is because, like first degree felony murder, 
first degree murder by torture does not require a specific showing 
of intent to sustain a conviction. However, as pointed out in Pratt 
the crime of attempt does require a specific showing of intent to 
commit the underlying crime. 
Luke, 1 P.3d at 801. 
13 8. Petitioner was not convicted of 'felony-murder' in the classic sense employed by 
the Supreme Court in Enmund and Tison and because he was not convicted of intentional 
murder. Consequently, neither Grem nor Enmund and Tison govern whether his sentence was 
disproportionate to his offense of conviction, an unintentional and non-felony-murder homicide. 
139. Objective evidence of the standards of decency demonstrates that death was a 
disproportionate sentence for Idaho's unintentional murder by torture in 198 1 and that it remains 
so today. 
140. Petitioner's death sentence was disproportionate to his offense of conviction in 
1 98 1 and it remains so today. 
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P. PETITIONER'S DEATH SENTENCE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM 
BECAUSE A JURY DID NOT FIND THE FACTS NECESSARY TO FIND 
HIM ELIGIBLE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY. 
141. The Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee as applied to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment require that a jury decide whether facts exist which are necessary to 
make a defendant eligible for a death sentence. See, e.g, A ~ ~ r e n d i  v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000). The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as applied 
to the state by the Fourteenth Amendment requires the same jury determinations. See. G, 
Withers~oon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 5 10,520 n. 15 (1 968). Finally, independent of the Sixth and 
Eighth Amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause also requires those same 
jury determinations. See, e.g, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. 
Arizona, - U.S. ,2002 WL 1 3 57257 (6124102). 
Facts Sumorting the Claim 
142. In the instant case, the facts necessary to render Petitioner eligible for a death 
sentence included (a) the factual fmdings the sentencing court relied on in concluding that the 
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance existed, (b) the factual finding itself that 
the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance existed, (c) the factual findings the 
sentencing court relied on in concluding that the "propensity to commit murder" aggravating 
circumstance existed, and (d) the factual finding itself that the "propensity to commit murder7' 
aggravating circumstance existed. See, u, Sentencing Transcript at 95- 10 1, I.C. 6 19-25 15 
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Findings at 2 13-16. A jury found none of these facts necessary to render Petitioner eligible for a 
death sentence. 
Q. PETITIONER'S DEATH SENTENCE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM 
BECAUSE, ONCE PETITIONER WAS DETERMINED ELIGIBLE FOR A 
DEATH SENTENCE, A JURY DID NOT FIND FACTS NECESSARY TO ITS 
IMPOSITION. 
143. The Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee as applied to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that a jury decide not only whether facts exist which make a 
defendant eligible for a sentence of death, but, as well, to determine facts relied on in moving 
fiom the eligibility determination to the conclusion that a sentence of death should be imposed. 
"One of the most important functions any jury can perfo rm... is to maintain a link between 
contemporary community values and the penal system-a link without which the determination of 
punishment would hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society."' Withers~oon v. Illinois, 39 1 U.S. 5 10, 520 n. 15 (1968)(citation omitted). 
See also A~vrendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
-- - -  
against cruel and unusual punishment as applied to the state by the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires the same jury determinations. a, m, Withers~oon. Finally, independent of the Sixth 
and Eighth Amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause also requires those 
same jury determinations. See, e.g, A ~ ~ r e n d i  v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Rina v. 
Arizona, U.S.. 2002 WL 1357257 (6124102). 
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Facts Supportinn Petitioner's Claim 
144. After finding Petitioner eligible for a death sentence, the trial court made 
additional factual determinations on the basis of which it sentenced Petitioner to death, including 
but not limited to the finding that there was no mitigating circumstance favoring a non-death 
sentence, and the finding, in addition to the mitigation not outweighing the aggravating 
circumstance, that the death sentence was "appropriate." Sentencing Transcript at 1 1 1 .  
Consequently, Petitioner's death sentence violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
R. PETITIONER'S DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATES HIS RIGHTS TO EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS BECAUSE A JURY DID NOT FIND 
THE FACTS RELIED ON IN IMPOSING THE SENTENCE. 
145. In non-capital cases, Idaho constitutional and statutory law uniformly mandates 
that a jury must decide whether sentencing enhancement factors exist. In capital cases, however, 
Idaho statutory law mandates that the trial court decide whether sentencing enhancement factors 
exist. Because Petitioner's sentence was imposed in accord with these statutory requirements, it 
violates his rights to equal protection and due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U. S. 343 (1 980), as well 
as his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable sentence. 
Facts Su~porting the Claim 
146. At every relevant stage of proceedings Petitioner had a right to a jury trial and or 
jury fact-finding at sentencing. See, e.g, I.C. $19-1902. 
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147. The trial judge made the findings regarding the aggravating circumstances without 
jury involvement or participation. 
148. Idaho's Constitution and statutory scheme require a jury to determine facts 
necessary to enhance sentences. Idaho Const. Art. I, $13 & Art. V, 9 1. 
149. In all but the fact-finding requirement of a statutory aggravating factor in a capital 
case, Idaho's sentencing enhancement statutes require a jury trial. See, e.g., Idaho Code $$19- 
25 14; 19-2520; 19-2520B; 19-2520C. Failure to give a jury trial on the statutory aggravating 
factors, denied Petitioner a substantial liberty interest created by the state constitutional and 
statutory guarantees. 
S. THE SENTENCING COURT'S USE OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 
TESTIMONY TO FIND THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHTS TO A RELIABLE AND FAIR 
SENTENCE AS GUARANTEED BY THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND HIS 
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
150. The trial court relied on preliminary hearing testimony to find the aggravating 
circumstances it used to impose a death sentence on Petitioner. Defense counsel had no advance 
notice that the trial court would rely on the unconfronted preliminary hearing testimony in 
sentencing proceedings. These sentencing procedures violated Petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to confront adverse witnesses and infected the sentencing proceedings, 
allowing a sentence based on potentially inaccurate, prejudicial, or otherwise unreliable evidence. 
See, e.a, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 
-
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Facts Supporting the Claim 
15 1 .  The trial court relied on the preliminary hearing testimony in finding each of the 
two aggravating circumstances on which it based Petitioner's death sentence. Indeed, in finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner had attempted to drown a woman as a means of torture 
and that he raped his second wife while she was in the hospital recovering fiom an automobile 
accident, the trial court relied exclusively on the preliminary hearing testimony. 
152. The trial court denied Petitioner adequate investigative resources to assist in 
preparing for trial. Similarly, rather than accord Petitioner adequate resources to prepare for the 
sentencing proceedings, the court assigned the presentence report investigator the task of finding 
mitigating evidence. 
153. The trial court blocked Petitioner fiom fully and fairly preparing for the 
sentencing proceedings. Then, relying on preliminary hearing testimony unconli-onted in the first 
instance and which the court later prevented Petitioner fiom confronting for sentencing purposes, 
the court imposed a sentence of death. 
T. PETITIONER'S DEATH SENTENCE RESTS ON AN AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCE PURPORTING TO NARROW THE SENTENCER'S 
DISCRETION BUT WHICH, IN FACT, DID NO SUCH THING, IN 
VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
154. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to death based on its unreliable factual 
determination that he had "a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a 
continuing threat to society." Because that fact finding was unreliable, Petitioner's sentence is 
'"cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightening is cruel and unusual .... [qhe 
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Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under 
legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." 
Grem v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1 976)(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 
(1972)(Stewart, J., concurring)). Further, a death sentence based on an unreliable determination 
of fact flies in the face of the Eighth Amendment's heightened reliability requirement. See, a, 
Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976)(because death is qualitatively different 
from any sentence of imprisonment, "there is a corresponding difference in the need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"). 
Facts Sup~orting; the Claim 
155. In 198 1 there was no way to reliably predict whether any particular individual 
would engage in a future act of violence. Cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920 
(1 9 8 3)(B lackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.)(the American Psychiatric 
Association's "best estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-term future violence 
made by psychiatrists are wrong"). 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 48 
U. THE SENTENCING COURT IMPOSED A DEATH SENTENCE IN 
RELIANCE ON A PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION CONDUCTED IN 
VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED 
BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S 
RIGHT TO FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND HIS RIGHT 
TO RELIABLE SENTENCE AS GUARANTEED BY THE EIGHTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
156. The sentencing court imposed a death sentence on Petitioner in reIiance on a 
presentence investigation report which contained a summary of a psychiatric evaluation and, as 
an attachment, the psychiatric evaluation report itself. That psychiatric evaluation was conducted 
in violation of Petitioner's rights to counsel, against self-incrimination, against cruel and unusual 
punishment, and to due process as guaranteed the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
157. The Fifth Amendment, applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
requires that before questioning a suspect in custody state actors must inform him that he is 
entitled to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used against him at trial, that he has 
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be 
appointed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426,478-79 (1966). It is settled that this Fifth 
Amendment guarantee operates to exclude evidence as much fiom penalty proceedings as from 
guilt phase trials. "Just as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal defendant fiom being made 
the deluded instrument of his own conviction, it protects him as well &om being made the 
deluded instrument of his own execution." Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,462 (1 98 1) (quotation 
marks and citations omitted). Petitioner's psychiatric evaluation was conducted without first 
advising him of his rights as required by Miranda and, therefore, violated his Fifth Amendment 
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rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. Petitioner's sentence violates these same rights 
because it was imposed in reliance on the psychiatric evaluation. 
158. The Sixth Amendment, applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
guarantees defendants an opportunity in advance of a state mandated psychiatric examination to 
consult with defense counsel about whether to submit to that examination. As important, the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to know the scope of the proposed psychiatric 
examination as well as its purposes and potential uses before consulting with counsel about 
whether to submit to that examination. Estelle, 45 1 U.S. at 470-7 1. Petitioner's psychiatric 
evaluation was conducted without first according him an opportunity to consult with defense 
counsel and, as well, without first advising him of the scope, purposes, and potential uses of the 
proposed examination. The evaluation, therefore, violated Petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to counsel, and the imposition of his sentence in reliance on that evaluation 
also violated that Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee. 
159. The Eighth Amendment guarantees defendants a reliable sentence. Petitioner's 
sentence, imposed in reliance on statements obtained through violations of his Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights, violates this guarantee. 
Facts Suvvorting the Claim 
160. In imposing the death sentence, the sentencing court relied on the Presentence 
Report. Attached to the Presentence Report were two mental health evaluations, one of which 
was written by a state psychiatrist pursuant to a court ordered evaluation of Petitioner. The 
Presentence Report also summarizes the state psychiatrist's report. 
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161. That state psychiatrist's evaluation was based on statements elicited from 
Petitioner by state agents as well as testing conducted on Petitioner by state agents, all in 
violation of Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel. 
162. On December 9, 198 1, defense counsel filed a pleading entitled 'motice Of Intent 
To Rely On The Defense Of Mental Disease Or Mental Defect." Clerk's Record at 8. The trial 
court issued a written order noting that, pursuant to Idaho Code 8 18-2 1 1, et seq., the defense 
Notice triggered an obligation that the court appoint a state psychiatrist to evaluate Petitioner, 
and, therefore, the court ordered that an evaluation be conducted. Clerk's Record at 9 (defense 
Notice filed, therefore state psychiatric examination ordered). The trial court's order is cast in 
terms of the mental disease or defect defense and competency to stand trial. 
163. Neither Petitioner nor defense counsel was on notice in advance of the state 
psychiatric evaluation that the trial court would rely on the report in any potential sentencing 
proceedings. 
164. The sentencing court found that none of the mitigating circumstances proffered by 
the defense existed, including defendant's psychological make up and background. It went 
further, however, and found nothing in mitigation at all. 
165. The state psychiatric evaluation report, attached to the Presentence Report and 
relied on by the sentencing court, made assertions directly relevant to whether mitigation existed. 
For example, it asserted (1) that "[tlhere is no family history of mental illness; although there is 
an uncle that apparently had a problem with alcohol" and that Petitioner's "background history 
and early developmental circumstances" were unremarkable and (2) that no evidence suggested 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 51 
that Petitioner suffered from organic brain damage, mental disease or defect, or mental illness. 
Id. at 2. 
-
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON HEARSAY IN SENTENCING 
PETITIONER TO DEATH VIOLATED PETITIONER'S SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION, HIS EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A 
RELIABLE SENTENCE, AND HIS FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
TO DUE PROCESS. 
166. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to death based on hearsay statements from 
trial and contained in the Presentence Report, in violation of Petitioner's Sixth AmendGent right 
to confkontation, his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable sentence, and his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process. 
Facts Suvvorting the Claim 
167. The hearsay statements relied on by the trial court in sentencing Petitioner 
included but were not limited to hearsay statements reported in the Presentence Report, including 
but not limited to (1.) descriptions ascribed to a hospital emergency room doctor recounting 
statements Petitioner assertedly made, (2) statements made by Donald T. Reay, M.D., regarding 
the deceased's cause of death in a report attached to the Presentence Report, (3) statements 
ascribed to Petitioner's mother and used to reject one or more mitigating circumstances, (4) 
descriptions of a taped interview with one of Petitioner's former wives, Vicki Nelson, describing 
prior violent acts by Petitioner, (5) descriptions of reports fiom King County law enforcement 
personnel regarding Ms. Nelson's allegations of assaults by Petitioner, and (6) descriptions of 
various additional allegations by several witnesses of Petitioner's prior bad acts. 
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W. THE SENTENCING COURT IMPOSED A DEATH SENTENCE IN 
RELIANCE ON STATEMENTS MADE TO THE PRESENTENCE REPORT'S 
AUTHOR IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL AS 
GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, IN 
VIOLATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A RELIABLE SENTENCE 
AS GUARANTEED BY THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
168. The sentencing court sentenced Petitioner to death in reliance on a presentence 
investigation report which contained statements elicited fiom Petitioner by the report's author, in 
violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel. 
169. The Fifth Amendment, applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
requires that before questioning a suspect in custody state actors must inform him that he is 
entitled to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used against him at trial, that he has 
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be 
appointed. Miranda v, Arizona, 384 U.S. 426,478-79 (1 966). It is settled that this Fifth 
Amendment guarantee operates to exclude evidence as much from penalty proceedings as from 
guilt phase trials. "Just as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal defendant from being made 
the deluded instrument of his own conviction, it protects him as well from being made the 
deluded instrument of his own execution," Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,462 (1981) (quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
Facts Su~vorting the Claim 
170. In sentencing Petitioner to death, the trial court relied on a Presentence Report 
which included descriptions of statements purportedly made by Petitioner in response to 
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questions from the report's author, a probation officer. Indeed, a copy of Petitioner's written 
responses was attached to the Presentence Report. 
171. The Presentence Report attributes various statements to Petitioner. In concluding 
that there was nothing mitigating in Petitioner's background, the sentencing court expressly 
relied on Petitioner's illegally elicited statements included in the Presentence Investigation 
Report: 
e. WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MAKE UP AND HIS BACKGROUND OFFER SOME 
MITIGATION FOR THE EVENTS WHICH TRANSPIRED. 
The Court found from defendant's own statements in the pre- 
sentence report that he had a good father and a good mother and a 
proper upbringing, not in any way characterized by emotional or 
economic deprivation. The Court could find nothing in the 
defendant's background which would mitigate this occurrence. 
Findings Of The Court In Considering Death Penalty at 3 (1219182). 
X. PETITIONER'S DEATH SENTENCE RESTS ON IDAHO'S "PROPENSITY 
TO COMMIT MURDER AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IN 
VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
172. Petitioner's death sentence was imposed in reliance on a sentencing court finding 
that "[tlhe defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has 
exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to 
society." I.C. 19-25 15 (f)(8) (1977). This aggravating circumstance fails to meet the Eighth 
Amendment's requirement that in capital cases, states must "channel the sentencer's discretion 
by 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that 'make 
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rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."' Godfrev v. Georgia, 446 
U.S. 420,428 (1 980)(citations and footnotes omitted). Additionally, it fails to meet Eighth 
Amendment requirements because it contains "no inherent restraint on the arbitrary and 
capricious infliction of the death sentence." Id. See Mavnard v. Cartwight, 486 U.S. 3 56,363- 
64 (1988). 
Facts Suuuorting the Claim 
173. Mr. Stuart stands sentenced to death based in part on a finding that "[tlhe 
defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a 
propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society." 
Idaho Code 9 19-25 15 (f)(8) ( 1977). 
174. This aggravating circumstance no more guides the sentencer's discretion than that 
in Godfrev and Maynard. Like the circumstances under consideration in those cases, this 
aggravating circumstance contains "no inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction 
of the death sentence." Godfrev, 446 U.S. at 428. 
175. While the instant death sentence rests on two aggravating circumstances, the error 
from the use of the 5 19-25 15(f)(5) circumstance is not harmless. 
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Y. IN FINDING THAT THE (f)(8) "PROPENSITY TO MURDER 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE EXISTED, THE SENTENCING COURT 
RELIED ON ITS FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED 
MURDER, RAPE, AND AN INDETERMINATE NUMBER OF ASSAULTS, 
CRIMES FOR WHICH HE HAD NEVER BEEN TRIED, IN VIOLATION OF 
THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
176. Based on the evidence in the instant case, the sentencing court concluded that 
Petitioner was guilty of various prior violent crimes. The court did this without first according 
Petitioner the information and tools constitutionally guaranteed every criminal defendant under 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and without first eliciting from Petitioner a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of trial. That court then relied on its convicting Petitioner of 
these crimes to find that the (f)(8) "propensity to murder" aggravating circumstance existed. 
Petitioner's death sentence rests on the court's conclusions reached through this constitutionally 
flawed procedure and, therefore, can be squared with neither the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment's requirement that capital sentences be reliable nor the Fourteenth Amendment right 
to due process. 
Facts Su~portiner the Claim 
177. In finding that the I.C. 5 19-25 15 (f)(8) "propensity to murdery' aggravating 
circumstance existed, the sentencing court relied on its conclusion that "[tlhe evidence 
demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant attempted to drown a woman as a 
means of torture and that this defendant inflicted brutal beatings upon his second wife and raped 
her while she was in the hospital recovering fiom an automobile accident." Direct Appeal 
Clerk's Record at 2 15. Thus, the sentencing court found Petitioner guilty of an indeterminate 
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number, but more than three, violent crimes: (1) attempted murder, (2) an indeterminate number 
of assaults and (3) rape. 
178. Claim EE and its factual allegations are incorporated by reference. 
179. Before making this determination, the sentencing court failed to accord Petitioner 
the full panoply of trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, including the right to trial, to trial by an impartial jury, to counsel, to 
codiontation, and to the presumption of innocence. 
Z. IN SENTENCING PETITIONER TO DEATH, THE TRIAL COURT FOUND 
THE (f)(8) "PROPENSITY TO MURDER" AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCE EXISTED BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, IN 
VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS AND HIS EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
RIGHTS TO A RELIABLE SENTENCE. 
180. In sentencing Petitioner to death, the trial court found without sufficient evidence 
that the (f)(8) "propensity to murdery' aggravating circumstance existed, in violation of 
Petitioner's right to Fourteenth Amendment due process, see. e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, and his 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a reliable sentence, see, e.g., Grem v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153 (1976). 
Facts Supporting: the Claim 
1 8 1. The trial court found that the (f)(8) "propensity to murder" aggravating 
circumstance existed. The evidence before the trial court was insufficient to support this finding. 
This insufficiency is supported by Petitioner having been a model prisoner for the past two 
decades. 
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AA. THE SENTENCING COURT RELIED ON ITS FINDING THAT AN 
OFFENSE-SPECIFIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE--(f)(5), IDAHO'S 
"HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, OR CRUEL" FACTOR--EXISTED ON THE BASIS 
OF PURPORTED ACTS WHICH WERE NOT PART OF THE OFFENSE AND 
WHICH WERE COMMITTED BEFORE THE OFFENSE, IN VIOLATION OF 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
182. In finding the (Q(5) "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance to 
exist, I.C. 8 19-25 15(f)(5), the sentencing court relied on its conclusion that Petitioner had 
engaged in "systematic months long torture" of the deceased. The (Q(5) factor, however, is 
limited by its terms to the offense itself. Consequently, the ( f ) ( 5 )  factor as applied in the instant 
case was applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner, making the imposition of the death 
sentence likewise arbitrary and capricious. Because the Idaho capital sentencing scheme 
contemplates that the aggravating factors will fulfill the Eighth Amendment's channeling 
requirement, the (f)(5) factor's arbitrary and capricious application in the instant case did not 
satisfl that requirement. 
Facts Su~porting the Claim 
183. The Idaho statutory capital scheme contemplates that the sentencing aggravating 
factors satisfy the Eighth Amendment requirement that in capital cases, states must "channel the 
sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed 
guidance,' and that 'make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."' 
Godfiev v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,428 (1980)(citations and footnotes omitted). 
184. At the time of the offense, the statutory aggravating circumstances were provided 
in I.C. 9 1 9-25 15 (Q(1977). The (f)(5) circumstance read: 
(5) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 
manifesting exceptional depravity. 
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Facially, this circumstance does not extend beyond the offense itself, either in subject matter or 
in time. 
185. In finding the (Q(5) circumstance to exist in the instant case, the sentencing court 
relied on its finding that Petitioner had engaged in "a systematic months long torture of," which 
the court went on to describe in detail. R. 214. 
BB. THE SENTENCING COURT FOUND THE (f)(5) "HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, 
OR CRUEL" AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE EXISTED ON THE BASIS 
OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT 
TO FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND HIS RIGHT TO A 
RELIABLE SENTENCE UNDER THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS. 
,186. There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the 
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor existed, in violation of his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process, see, e.g, Jackson v. Virginia, and his Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a reliable sentence. 
Facts Su~~ortinp; the Claim 
187. By its terms, Idaho's "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance is 
limited in time and subject matter to the offense of conviction. There was no evidence that the 
homicide and any accompanying acts sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
ccheinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance existed in the instant case. 
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CC. PETITIONER'S DEATH SENTENCE RESTS ON IDAHO'S "HEINOUS, 
ATROCIOUS OR CRUEL" AGGRAVATING FACTOR, IN VIOLATION OF 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT' S VAGUENESS PROHIBITION. 
188. Petitioner's death sentence was imposed in reliance on the trial court's finding 
that "[tlhe murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional 
depravity." I.C. $19-25 15(f)(5)(1977). 
189. This aggravating circumstance fails to meet the Eighth Amendment's requirement 
that in capital cases, states must "channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective 
standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that 'make rationally reviewable the 
process for imposing a sentence of death."' Godkey v. Georgia, 446 US.  420,428 
(1 980)(citations and footnotes omitted). It also fails to meet Eighth Amendment requirements 
because it contains "no inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death 
sentence." Id. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S - 3  56,363-64 (1 988). 
Facts Sup~orting the Claim 
190. Mr. Stuart stands sentenced to death based in part on a finding that the offense 
"was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity." I.C. $1 9- 
25 15(f)(5). 
191. While the Idaho Supreme Court has purportedly adopted the Florida and Nebraska 
judicial constructions of the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance, State v. 
Osborne, 63 1 P.2d 187 (Idaho 198 1)' these purported adoptions do not save the Idaho statute. 
192. The construction purportedly adopted from Nebraska concerns the phrase 
''exceptional depravity." The Eighth Circuit, however, has rejected Nebraska's judicial 
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construction, holding that it provides insufficient guidance and is as vague as the unconstrued 
word "especially" which the Supreme Court has rejected on Eighth Amendment vagueness 
grounds. Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226, 1230-31 (1990). The Eighth Circuit's holding is 
factually accurate. 
193. The construction purportedly adopted fiom Florida concerns the phrase "heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel." In particular, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the following judicial 
construction fi-om Florida: 
'What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the 
actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such 
additional acts as to set the crime apart fiom the norm. of capital 
felonies the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victim.' 
State v. Osborne, 63 1 P.2d 187,200 (Idaho 198l)(quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 
1973)(italics added). A review of Idaho Supreme Court cases involving the HAC aggravating 
circumstance, however, demonstrates that nearly one-third involved no suffering on the part of 
the victim. Consequently, the Idaho Supreme Court's purported judicial construction did not 
remove the vagueness inherent in the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" phrase of the HAC 
aggravating circumstance. 
194. Petitioner's death sentence, therefore, violates his right against cruel and unusual 
punishment as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and, independent of the 
Eighth Amendment violation, due process a s  guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
195. While the instant death sentence rests on two aggravating circumstances, the error 
fiom the use of the § 19-25 15(f)(5) circumstance is not harmless. 
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DD. CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE SENTENCING COURT'S USE OF 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY IN SENTENCING PETITIONER; 
ITS ORDERING THE PRESENTENCE REPORT INVESTIGATOR, AN 
EMPLOYEE OF THE STATE DIVISION OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, TO 
CONDUCT A MITIGATION INVESTIGATION; ITS ORDERING THE 
CLEARWATER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE TO DEVELOP OR ASSIST IN 
DEFENSE WESTIGATION; ITS ALLOWING THE GUILT PHASE TRIAL 
USE OF STATEMENTS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS; ITS DENIAL OF TIMELY 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; ITS DENIAL OF ADEQUATE 
INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES; ITS DENIAL OF ADEQUATE 
COMPENSATION TO DEFENSE COUNSEL; ITS REh4AINING GUILT 
PHASE VIOLATIONS OF PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; 
AND ITS RELIANCE ON THESE VIOLATIONS IN SENTENCING 
PETITIONER TO DEATH CAUSED A TOTAL BREAKDOWN IN THE 
ADVERSARIAL PROCESS DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF A FAIR GUILT 
PHASE TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND RESULTED IN AN UNRELIABLE 
SENTENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
196. The cumulative impact of all the errors set out elsewhere in this petition caused a 
total breakdown in the adversarial process, in violation of Petitioner's right to a fair guilt phase 
trial as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, as  well, resulted 
in an unreliable sentence in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
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Facts Suvportine: the Claim 
197. Claims A through and including CC and their factual allegations are incorporated 
by reference. The cumulative impact of those errors resulted in a complete breakdown of the 
adversarial process, in violation of Petitioner's right a fair guilt phase trial as guaranteed by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, as well, resulted in a wholly unreliable 
sentencing determination in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
EE. THE TRIAL COURT SENTENCED PETITIONER TO DEATH IN RELIANCE 
ON PETITIONER'S ILLEGAL GUILTY PLEA TO BEING A PERSISTENT 
VIOLATOR, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A RELIABLE SENTENCE 
UNDER THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
198. Petitioner was tried on a two count prosecutor's information. The second count 
charged Petitioner with being a persistent violator (I.C. $19-2514) on the basis of three alleged 
prior felony convictions, viz., rape (Montana), theft of telephone services (Montana), and 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act offense (Washington State). The prosecution did not file 
copies, certified or otherwise, of the judgments fiom these alleged convictions. Petitioner's 
guilty plea to the second count was illegal. Consequently, Petitioner's sentence, imposed in 
reliance on that guilty plea, was unreliable in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
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Facts Su~porting the Claim 
199. Immediately after the jury returned the guilty verdict against Petitioner on the first 
count, the trial court accepted a guilty plea fiom Petitioner to the second count of the 
prosecutor's information. The trial court's colloquy consisted of the following: 
The Court: Okay. Mr. Stuart, as I explained to you[,] you were 
charged with a totally separate matter of being a persistent violator 
under the Idaho Code and that is a separate matter which carries a 
separate penalty as I indicated to you this afternoon, a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment independent of the crime for which 
you are or were just convicted of. And the basis of that charge is 
that in addition to this felony conviction there were at least two 
others in your past. Now, I'm going to read the part two allegation 
of the information to you and then at the end after I've read it all 
I'll ask you how you plead to it. 
R. 969-70. The trial court then read count two, after which engaged Petitioner in the following 
colloquy: 
The Court: How do you plead to the charge that you come under 
the persistent violator statute? 
The Defendant: Guilty. 
The Court: Okay. I'll accept that plea of guilty. 
R. 971. 
200. Petitioner's guilty plea was illegal because the colloquy failed to elicit from him a 
constitutionally valid waiver of his right against compulsory self-incrimination under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, his right to trial by jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. This 
constitutionally inadequate colloquy precluded the trial court from reliably determining that 
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Petitioner--who had only moments before been convicted of first degree murder by torture-- was 
entering his guilty plea voluntarily. Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242 (1 969). 
201. In sentencing Petitioner to death, the sentencing court relied on his guilty plea to 
the persistent violator count of the prosecutor's information. In addition to its non-express 
reliance, the court expressly relied on Petitioner's illegal guilty plea as a ground to reject 
Petitioner's criminal history as a mitigating circumstance. See Clerk's Record on Direct Appeal 
at 21 1 ($19-25 15 findings)("The Court found ... that the defendant pled guilty in this case to being 
a habitual criminal."). 
FF. THE SENTENCING COURT APPLIED AN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
NARROW UNDERSTANDING OF MITIGATION IN CONSIDERING 
WHETHER MITIGATTNG FACTORS EXISTED, IN VIOLATION OF 
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS TO INDIVIDUALIZED AND RELIABLE 
SENTENCING AS GUARANTEED BY THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
202. In determining that it could find nothing in mitigation, the sentencing court 
employed an unconstitutionally narrow definition of 'mitigation' and, therefore, failed to 
consider certain mitigating factors, in violation of Petitioner's right to an individualized and 
reliable sentence as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
Facts Suw~orting. the Claim 
203. According to the sentencing court, it searched the evidence for any mitigation 
"with respect to this occurrence." Clerk's Record on Direct Appeal at 2 12 (I.C. 5 19-25 15 
findings). Having conducted that review, the court determined that "[aln examination of this 
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defendant's adult life reveals no particular good and no particular contribution to society which 
in any way would mitigate the acts involved in this case." Id. at 2'13. 
204. By limiting its search of the evidence for mitigating circumstances to only any 
good or contribution to society, the sentencing court was blinded to other mitigation before it. 
While mitigation includes any good or contribution to society, it is far fiom limited to those 
factors. See. e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 n.12 (1978)(mitigating evidence may 
include evidence bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his 
offense), and Skiuper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1 986)(mitigating evidence includes post- 
offense adjustment to incarceration). 
205. The sentencing court's unconstitutionally narrow defmition of mitigation 
precluded its considering mitigating factors plainly supported by uncontradicted evidence: 
a. Petitioner brought the deceased to the hospital and sought medical help there for 
the deceased. Presentence Report at 1. 
b. Petitioner had tried to revive the deceased. Id. 
c. Petitioner accepted responsibility for the deceased's death. u. at 1 & 5. 
d. Petitioner was raised in a family which included a father and grandfather with 
explosive tempers. Id. at 3. 
e. Petitioner left home at age sixteen. a. at 3. In January, 1970, during his senior 
year of high school, Petitioner married his then-pregnant girlfiend. Id. Despite 
these daunting challenges, Petitioner had sufficient ambition and discipline to 
graduate high school in May, 1970, enroll in Western Technical College in 
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Denver, Colorado, and attend that college for three quarters until the school went 
bankrupt. Id. at 4. 
f. In May, 197 1, the technical college having gone bankrupt, Petitioner enlisted in 
the Montana Army National Guard. He was trained as a motorman at Ft. Lewis, 
Washington and qualified as a first class gunner. Id. at 4. 
g. Petitioner ran his own auto body repair business. When working for others, 
Petitioner was a valued employee. Id. 
h. Petitioner had maintained a loving and entirely non-violent relationship with a 
woman and her children in the Seattle area. Id. at 6. 
GG. THE SENTENCING COURT FAiLED TO FIND MITIGATING FACTORS 
SUPPORTED BY UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF 
THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
206. Independent of whatever definition of 'mitigation' the trial court used i n  
determining what mitigating factors to consider, the trial court failed to find that certain 
mitigating circumstances existed which were apparent from the evidence before it. This violated 
Petitioner's right to a reliable sentence as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
See. e.gt, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
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Facts Su~vorting the Claim 
207. Claim FF and its factual allegations are incorporated by reference. 
HH. THE SENTENCING COURT WEIGHED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
AGAI[NST THE CUMULATIVE WEIGHT OF THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES FOUND, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO 
A RELIABLE SENTENCE AS GUARANTEED BY THE EIGHTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
208. In sentencing Petitioner to death, the trial court weighed the mitigation against the 
cumulative weight of the aggravating circumstances found. This violated Idaho's capital 
sentencing statute, I.C. 9 19-25 15(b), "[tlhe plain meaning of [which] dictates" that a death 
sentence may be imposed "only if the trial court finds that all the mitigating circumstances do not 
outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances found and make imposition of 
death unjust." State v. Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299,323 (Idaho 1989). The sentencing court's 
weighing the mitigation against the gravity of the aggravating circumstances as a group rather 
than individually violated Petitioner's right to a reliable sentence. Fetterlv v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 
1295, 1299-1300 (1993). Additionally, the sentencing court's failure to weigh the mitigation 
against the aggravating circumstances individually in accord with the plain meaning of I.C. 9 19- 
25 15, violated Petitioner's liberty interest in the sentencing court's abiding by the state's 
statutory demands and, therefore, violated his right to due process as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Fetterly at 1300-01. 
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Facts Supporting the Claim 
209. During the course of the sentencing hearing, the trial court repeatedly stated that it 
weighed the mitigation against the gravity of the aggravating circumstances found as a group. 
Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 10 1 ("... I am required to examined all possible mitigating 
circumstances to see whether or not they outweigh the aggravating circumstances."), 109 ("... I 
find no meaningful mitigating factors that could possible [sic] outside the aggravating factors."), 
and 1 11 ("...the Statute implies that if the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances I should proceed to pronounce death."). In its written findings, too, 
the trial court expressed its flawed view that I.C. $1 9-25 15 required it to weigh the mitigation 
against the gravity of the aggravating circumstances found as a group: It could, the trial court 
wrote, "find nothing in mitigation which would outweigh the aggravated circumstances of this 
crime and this defendant." Clerk's Record on Direct Appeal at 2 16 (I.C. $ 19-25 15 findings). 
11. THE SENTENCING COURT'S FINDINGS WERE FATALLY AMBIGUOUS 
REGARDING WHETHER IT FOUND MITIGATION AND, IF SO, WHAT 
PARTICULAR MITIGATION IT FOUND AND, THEREFORE, PRECLUDED 
MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S 
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THAT REVIEW 
AND HIS FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
2 10. The sentencing court did not make clear whether it found mitigation and, if so, 
what particular mitigation it found. This denied Petitioner's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to meaningful appellate review because it precluded the Idaho Supreme Court fiom fairly 
determining whether the sentencing court violated or complied with Idaho's mandate that 
mitigating circumstances be weighed against each of the aggravating circumstances found 
individually. 
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Facts Sup~ortinn the Claim 
21 1. In sentencing Petitioner to death, the sentencing court left unclear whether it 
weighed found mitigation and, if so, what particular mitigation it found. In its I.C. $1 9-25 15 
findings, the sentencing court examined whether the evidence supported a mitigating 
circumstance described as "whether or not defendant's psychological make up and his 
background offer some mitigation for the events which transpired." Findings of the Court in 
Considering Death Penalty Under Section 19-25 15, Idaho Code at 2 12 (upper case converted to 
lower case). In the course of that examination, the sentencing court noted that it "could find 
nothing in the defendant's background which would mitigate this occurrence." I_d. When 
examining another possible mitigating circumstance, the sentencing court noted that, "[aln 
examination of this defendant's adult life reveals no particular good and no particular 
contribution to society which in any way would mitigate the acts involved in this case.'' B. at 
2 13. Finally, in examining a group of other possible mitigating factors, the sentencing court 
noted that, "[als the above analysis indicates, the court could find nothing in mitigation and i n  
fact analyzing this defendant in a search for mitigation produces a negative history with respect 
to this defendant." u. 
2 12. In sentencing Petitioner to death, the Court wrote: 
As the Court indicated, it could find nothing in mitigation which 
would outweigh the aggravated circumstances of this crime and 
this defendant. 
Id. 2 16. Here, the Court suggests that it engaged in weighing mitigation, and that the mitigation 
-
does not outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 
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JJ. THOUGH PETITIONER'S POSTCONVICTION PETITION RAISED 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WHICH WOULD HAVE AFFECTED 
PETITIONER'S CONVICTION AND/OR SENTENCE, THE TRIAL COURT 
DISMISSED IT WITHOUT FIRST GRANTING AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING, IN VIOLATION OF FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
213. Pursuant to I.C. $19-4901, Petitioner filed with the trial court a petition seeking 
postconviction relief. The petition raised various claims entitling Petitioner to a hearing and 
relief, including the existence of compelling and newly discovered mitigating evidence. The trial 
court's dismissing the petition without first conducting a hearing on disputed issues of fact, and 
the Idaho Supreme Court's affirmance violated Petitioner's right to due process as guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment and his right to a reliable and rational sentence as guaranteed by the 
Eighth Amendment. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980). 
Facts Supporting the Claims 
214. Petitioner timely filed a postconviction petition seeking relief based on newly 
discovered evidence of mitigating circumstances. The petition, supported by affidavits, alleged 
that 
Petitioner as well as other family members ... sustain[ed] 
considerable physical abuse at the hands of Petitioner's father, 
which contributed greatly to the personality makeup of Petitioner at 
the time and date of the homicide concerned herewith[.] 
Petition for Postconviction Relief at 7 (613186). 
21 5. Petitioner also alleged that a supporting affidavit from one of Petitioner's former 
girlfriends and another supporting affidavit fiom the daughter of that girlfriend provided 
additional mitigation. Those &davits describe a loving, nurturing, and entirely non-violent 
relationship between Petitioner and his former girlfiiend and her daughter. In addition to 
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asserting that this proved a mitigating circumstance, Petitioner alleged that it contradicted the 
trial court's finding that the (f)(8) aggravating factor existed. 
21 6. Consistent with its precluding Petitioner's discovering and presenting mitigation 
at his sentencing proceedings by denying his pre-trial request for sufficient investigative 
resources to adequately prepare for those proceedings, see Claim DD, the trial court again 
blocked the consideration of mitigation by dismissing the postconviction petition without a 
hearing. That court dismissed the petition without a hearing and the Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed that dismissal and denial. 
KK. THE LENGTH OF CONFINEMENT OF PETITIONER BY THE STATE OF 
IDAHO IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL AND VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS OF PETITIONER BY INFLICTING PROLONGED, EXTREME, AND 
EXTRAORDINARY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL INJURY ON HIM 
AND IMPOSES ON PETITIONER AN ADDITIONAL SENTENCE NOT 
PROVIDED BY STATUTE. 
21 7. The length of confinement by the State of Idaho under a pending death sentence is 
cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and violates the 
due process rights of Petitioner as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution as interpreted by In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1 890), Brooks v. 
Florida, 389 US. 4 13 (1 967), and Lackev v. Texas, 5 14 U.S. 1045 (1995)(Stevens, J. dissenting), 
and standards of international law and treaties to which the United States is subject, by inflicting 
prolonged, extreme, and extraordinary physical and psychological harm on Petitioner and 
imposes on him an additional sentence not provided by statute. 
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218. The sentence as now imposed also constitutes an ex post facto punishment in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee, Article 1, 910, of the United 
States Constitution. In re Medley. 
Facts Supporting the Claim 
219. The application of I.C. 9 19-2705 by the Idaho Department of Correction to 
persons sentenced to death results in the barbaric, intentional infliction of extreme emotional 
distress in the execution of a sentence to which Petitioner was not sentenced. 
220. Pursuant to statute and the statutory scheme including the postconviction and 
appellate procedures governing Petitioner's case creates a system which, through no fault of 
Petitioner, subjects death sentenced individuals to solitary confinement for years with the 
uncertainty of being killed by the state. 
22 1. The state of Idaho has interpreted I.C. 9 19-2705 in a manner which subjects death 
sentenced individuals to unreasonably harsh and isolated conditions, creating significant 
psychological and physical abuse and condemning death row inmates to a punishment far more 
barbaric and inhumane than the death sentence alone. 
222. Petitioner is held in isolation and permitted out of his cell less than one hour, five 
days a week and not at all for two consecutive days per week. 
223. When out of his cell, Petitioner is kept in full restraints. 
224. Petitioner is permitted no lay visitors except from immediate family. 
225. No religious services with inmate participation, fellowship, or communion are 
conducted for death row inmates. 
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226. Petitioner suffers fiom other deleterious psychological and physical affects fiom 
his lengthy incarceration under these unconstitutionally harsh conditions, now nearly twenty 
years, in solitary confinement with the uncertainty of his execution. 
227. There have been numerous changes in policy and statutory provisions regarding 
the nature of the confinement pending execution since the time Petitioner was sentenced to death. 
LL. IN DENYING DIRECT APPEAL RELIEF FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FAILURE TO CHARGE PETITIONER'S JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF MURDER BY TORTURE, THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
FAILED TO ENFORCE IDAHO'S STATUTORY COMMANDS AND IDAHO 
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THEREBY DENIED PETITIONER 
DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO A RELIABLE SENTENCE AS 
GUARANTEED BY THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
228. On direct appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that because trial counsel had 
accepted the trial court's jury instructions and stated that he had no objection to them, any error 
in those instructions was invited. State v. Stuart, 7 15 P.2d 833, 839-40, reh'g (Idaho 1 986). This 
ruling directly conflicted with Idaho Code 5 19-2 132 as well as State v. Lo~ez,  593 P.2d' 1003, 
1 006 (Idaho 1 979)("I.C. 5 1 9-2 1 32(b) makes it a duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on 
lesser included offenses when they are supported by a reasonable view of the evidence, even if 
the court is not requested to do so.") Consequently, the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of direct 
appeal relief to Petitioner violated his right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980). 
Facts Suu~orting the Claim 
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229. In reviewing Petitioner's case on direct appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court declined 
to reach the merits of his claim that Idaho statutes 
contemplate[d] the existence of a second degree murder by torture 
offense, and thus the trial court should have instructed the jury on 
second degree murder pursuant to its duty to instruct on lesser 
included offenses. (FN2- See I.C. $19-21 32(b).) 
Stuart 715 P.2d at 839. 
-> 
230. The Court declined to reach the merits of that claim because trial counsel 
had 
accepted the instructions as given by the court, and noted that he 
had no objection to the instructions the court intended to give[,] 
...any error in failing to instruct on [second degree murder by 
torture], if indeed one exists, was invited error and will not be 
considered on appeal. State v. Lo~ez,  593 P.2d 1003 (Idaho 1979). 
Stuart, 71 5 P.2d at 840. 
23 1. The Idaho Supreme Court's refusal to reach the merits of the claim flew in the 
face of Idaho statutory and decisional law. Stuart, 71 5 P.2d at 858-60. As that Court ruled in the 
very case it cites, Lo~ez:  
Prior to 1977, the law was clear in Idaho that the burden was upon 
the defendant to request the court to instruct on lesser included 
offenses .... The case law was clear that no error could be predicated 
upon the failure of the trial court to give an instruction on a lesser 
included offense where defendant did not request such or as in the 
instant case withdraws such request. 
However, in 1977 the Idaho legislature enacted I.C. $ 19-2 132(b) 
which states: "The court shall instruct the jury on lesser included 
offenses when they are supported by any reasonable view of the 
evidence." This Court on several occasions has construed the word 
"shall" as being mandatory and not discretionary. It is clear that 
I.C. $ 19-2132(b) makes it the duty of the trial court to instruct the 
jury on lesser included offenses when they are supported by a 
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reasonable view of the evidence, even if the court is not requested 
to do so. To the extent that prior Idaho cases held that no error 
could be predicated upon the failure of the trial court to instruct the 
jury on lesser included offenses unless defendant requested such 
instructions, they are no longer applicable. 
Id. at 1006 (citations omitted). 
-
232. The plain language of I.C. $19-2132(b) made clear that trial courts were to 
instruct juries on lesser included offenses when supported by any reasonable view of the 
evidence. 
"[Tlhis Court has consistently adhered to the primary cannon of 
statutory construction that where the language of the statute is 
unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be 
given affect and there is no occasion for construction." Worlev 
Hinhwav District v. Kootenai County, 576 P.2d 206,209 (Idaho 
1978). 
Ottesen on behalf of Edwards v. Board of Commissioners of Madison County, 695 P.2d 1238, 
1239 (Idaho 1985). 
23 3. Even if I.C. § 19-2 132(b) is ambiguous in meaning, that ambiguity is removed by 
the tools of statutory construction. These tools include the legislative history as provided in 
L o ~ e z  as quoted above which would remove any perceived ambiguity and make clear 
legislature's intent that trial court were obligated to instruct on lesser included offenses when 
supported by a reasonable view of the evidence. 
234. The Idaho Supreme Court's refusal to reach the merits of Petitioner's claim 
violated clear Idaho statutory and decisional law. This refusal violated Petitioner's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process. 
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235. Petitioner should have prevailed on the merits of his claim. It is clear from the 
Idaho statutes under which Petitioner was convicted that second degree murder by torture was an 
offense. In particular, in 198 1, I.C. 5 18-4001 (1 977) distinguished murder by torture fiom 
intentional murder: 
Murder is the unlawfkl killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought or the intentional application of torture to a human 
being, which results in the death of a human being. 
I.C. 5 18-4001 (1977). Elsewhere, the statutes distinguished between first and second degree 
murder by torture: 
18-4003. Degrees of murder. -(a) All murder which is perpetrated 
by means of. ..torture, when torture is inflicted with the intent to 
cause suffering, to extort something from the victim, or to satis@ 
some sadistic inclination ... is murder of the first degree. 
(g) All other kinds of murder are of the second degree. 
I.C. 5 1 8-4003 (1 977). That same statute made clear that intentional murder was second degree 
murder unless accompanied by one or more enumerated circumstances. Thus, second degree 
murder by torture was murder by torture where the torture was not "inflicted with the intent to 
cause suffering, to extort something fiom the victim, or to satism some sadistic inclination." a. 
Second degree murder by torture included torture murder by torture through the infliction "on a 
human being [ofl extreme and prolonged acts of brutality irrespective of proof of intent to cause 
suffering." Indeed, using only unambiguous statutory language in existence at the time of 
Petitioner's trial, in 1993 the Idaho Supreme Court decided that Idaho statutes contemplated a 
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second degree murder by torture offense. State v. Tribe, 852 P.2d 87, 91-2 (Idaho 1993). In 
Tribe the Idaho Supreme Court reversed a first degree murder by torture conviction. 
-9 
236. In the instant case, a reasonable view of the evidence supported a guilty verdict on 
second degree murder by torture. 
MM. THE SENTENCING COURT'S USE OF STATEMENTS AND OTHER 
INFORMATION ELICITED FROM PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF HIS 
FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS RIGHTS TO 
COUNSEL AND IN VIOLATION OF THE PROTECTIONS OF MIRANDA V. 
ARIZONA AND ITS RELIANCE ON TESTIMONY FROM A WITNESS WHO 
HAD BEEN IMPLICITLY FOUND TO HAVE LIED UNDER OATH TO 
PROVE AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ( I )  VIOLATED 
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, (2) CONSTITUTED AN ADDITIONAL 
VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND THE PROTECTIONS OF 
MRANDA V. ARIZONA, AND (3) RENDERED PETITIONER'S DEATH 
SENTENCE UNRELIABLE IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
237. In addressing Petitioner's claim that he was entitled to postconviction relief on the 
ground that state agents had monitored his conversations with counsel in violation of his 
constitutional rights, the trial level postconviction state court ruled that the exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule precluded relief. To reach its conclusion, that court relied on Petitioner's 
pretrial statements. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the ruling that the exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule precluded relief. Because the pretrial statements relied on by the trial level 
postconviction court were elicited from Petitioner in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to counsel and the protections of Miranda 384 U.S. 436 (1966)' 
the trial court's ruling and the Idaho Supreme Court's affirmation violated Petitioner's right to 
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due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. For that same reason, the trial court's 
ruling and the Idaho Supreme Court's affirmation violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel and the protections of Miranda. Finally, and for t h e  
same reason, the trial court's ruling and the Idaho Supreme Court's affirmation violated 
Petitioner's right to a reliable death sentence in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Facts Sup~ortinrr the Claim 
238. Claim C and its factual allegations are incorporated by reference. 
239. In addition to the statements illegally elicited by law enforcement officers Rears 
and Harrelson in violation of Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
counsel and the protections of Miranda, one or more statements were illegally elicited fiom 
Petitioner by Ms. Joan Pare, an agent of law enforcement officers. 
240. Each of Petitioner's statements to Ms. Pare after his arraignment on the injury to 
child criminal complaint (Second Judicial District Court, County of Clearwater, Case No. 8458) 
was made during interrogations Ms. Pare initiated. Because Petitioner had asserted his right to 
counsel at his arraignment, his statements to Ms. Pare were elicited in violation of his Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,636 (1986). 
241. Additionally, Petitioner's custodial statements elicited by Ms. Pare after his 
arraignment were made without his having first been adequately advised of his Miranda rights. 
Consequently, Petitioner's post-arraignment statements to Ms. Pare were elicited in violation of 
his rights against self incrimination as well as his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and violated the protections of Miranda. 
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242. Ms. Kathy Miller, the deceased's mother and live-in girlfriend of Petitioner at the 
time of the deceased's death, provided information to law enforcement authorities from 
Petitioner's address book. This information included leads to Vicki Nelson as well as Sharie Lee 
Dally. When Ms. Miller obtained the information fiom Mr. Stuart's address book, she was 
acting under the direction of and at the request of state law enforcement officials and their agents 
and had, therefore, been transformed into a state agent. Ms. Miller's seizing the address book 
from Mr. Stuart's home and reading its contents encompassed multiple unreasonable searches 
and seizures independent of one another, including but not limited to (a) Ms. Miller's entry, a s  a 
state agent, into Mr. Stuart's home, (b) Ms. Miller's search, a s  a state agent, of Mr. Stuart's home 
for the address book, (c) Ms. Miller's physically seizing, as a state agent, the address book, (d) 
Ms. Miller's opening, as a state agent, the seized address book, (e) Ms. Miller's reading, as a 
state agent, the contents of the address book, and (f) Ms. Miller's providing, as a state agent, the 
information obtained by reading the address book contents to one or more third parties. Ms. 
Miller's obtaining information from Petitioner's address book and providing it to one or more 
third parties violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and, therefore, violated his Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
243. In reaching its conclusion that the state had met its burden of proving the 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the trial level postconviction court relied on information 
Petitioner provided state agents in statements elicited from him in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel and the protections of Miranda. 
244. Similarly, in finding that the state had met its burden of proving the exceptions to 
the exclusionary rule, the trial level postconviction court relied on information seized in violation 
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of Petitioner' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
245. In finding that the state had met its burden of proving the exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule, the trial level postconviction court relied on information provided by Sheriff 
Albers. 
246. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial level postconviction court's findings 
of fact and legal conclusions. 
247. The fact findings contained in the trial level postconviction state court's order 
denying Petitioner postconviction relief are replete with descriptions of evidence relied on, the 
source of which, as the court expressly notes, was (a) Petitioner's statements to state agents, 
which Petitioner now contends were elicited from him in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel and the protections of Miranda, (b) Petitioner's address 
book which was, Petitioner now contends, obtained by a state agent (Kathy Miller) in violation of 
his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and (c) 
Sheriff Albers, whose testimony , Petitioner now contends, was at a minimum rendered highly 
suspect by his admissions and Idaho state court findings regarding his actions in the instant 
matter, including but not limited to his direct involvement in and responsibility for the 
Cleanvater County Sheriffs Office recording and monitoring of Petitioner's conversations with 
counsel as well as the Idaho Supreme Court's finding that the Clearwater County Sheriffs Office 
intentionally destroyed the jail phone log for the years 1981 and 1982. Stuart v. State, 907 P.2d 
at 789-92. 
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NN. ALTERNATIVE TO CLAIM MM, THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT 
THE EVIDENCE AT ISSUE WAS COVERED BY EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND HIS EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A RELIABLE SENTENCE. 
248. The trial court's finding and the Idaho Supreme Court's affirming that the state 
proved that the evidence discovered through the illegal monitoring of Petitioner's attorney-client 
conversations were not subject to the exclusionary rule was not supported by the evidence, i n  
violation of the Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Eighth 
Amendment right to a reliable sentence. 
Facts Sup~orting the Claim 
249. Claim MM and its factual allegations are incorporated by reference. 
250. The trial court's finding and the Idaho Supreme Court's affirming that the state 
proved that the evidence at issue would have been inevitably discovered by state agents and that 
the evidence at issue was not the fruit of the illegal monitoring because its attenuation from the 
illegal conduct purged the taint is not supported by the evidence. Cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307,3 14 (1 979)(Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee prohibits conviction absent 
sufficient prove). To the extent that the Idaho Supreme Court found that the state proved that the 
state obtained the evidence at issue through independent sources, that finding, too, is unsupported 
by the evidence. Consequently, these findings violated Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right 
to due process and his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable sentencing proceedings. 
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00. THE PROSECUTION'S PLEA BARGAIN OFFER TO NOT SEEK A DEATH 
SENTENCE IN EXCHANGE FOR A GUILTY PLEA VIOLATED 
PETITIONER'S FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
25 1. The prosecution offered Petitioner that in exchange for a guilty plea, it would 
agree not to seek a death sentence. The plea offer violated Petitioner's Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to trial, his 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a reliable sentence, and his Fourteenth Amendment 
right to due process. 
2. 
Facts Sup~ortinn the Claim 
252. The prosecution extended an offer to Petitioner providing for his guilty plea in 
exchange for the prosecution's not seeking a death sentence against him. 
VI. NOTICE OF EXISTENCE OF 
OF UNEXHAUSTED CLAIMS 
253. Petitioner is now investigating and developing as yet unexhausted claims in 
anticipation of prosecuting them in state courts. These claims include but are not limited to: 
(a) ineffective assistance of trial counsel with regard to guilt phase investigation 
concerning potential defenses and concerning the prosecution's case, 
(b) ineffective assistance of trial counsel with regard to sentencing phase investigation 
concerning mitigation and aggravation, 
(c) ineffective assistance of trial counsel in preparing for the guilt phase and sentencing 
phase trials, including but not limited to pretrial motions, 
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(d) ineffective representation of trial counsel at pretrial, trial, and sentencing proceedings, 
(e) ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel with regard to developing and raising 
claims, and 
( f )  prosecutorial misconduct under Bradv v. Marvland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner asks that this Court: 
1. Require Respondents to lodge with this Court accurate and complete copies of all 
documents and proceedings relating to Petitioner's conviction and sentence. 
2. Require Respondents to file an Answer to the Petitioner in the form prescribed by 
Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court, 
identifying all state proceedings conducted in Petitioner's case, including any which have not 
been recorded or transcribed, and specifically admitting or denying the factual allegations set 
forth above; 
3. Permit Petitioner to file a traverse to the Respondents' answer, responding to any 
affirmative defenses raised by the Answer; 
4. Permit Petitioner to utilize the processes of discovery set forth in Federal Rules of 
civil Procedure 26-37, to the extent necessary to fully develop and identify the facts supporting 
his petition, and any defenses thereto raised by Respondents' Answer; 
5.  Permit Petitioner to Amend this Petition to include any additional claims or 
allegations not presently known to him or his counsel, which are identified or uncovered in the 
course of discovery, investigation, and litigation of this Petitioner; 
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6. Conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any factual disputes raised by 
Respondents' Answer to this Petition, or by Petitioner's response to any affirmative defenses 
raised by Respondent; 
7. Order the Respondents to release Petitioner fiom custody, unless he is retried or 
new proceedings are conducted to cure any constitutional defects in the state proceedings which 
resulted in Petitioner's instant conviction and sentence; and 
8. Grant such further and additional relief as may be just. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisz? day of June, 2002. 
CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho 
Olive OewY 
VERIFICATION 
I, Gene Francis Stuart, Petitioner in this matter, declare under penalty of perjury that the 
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and ability. 
Dated this d day of June, 2002. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thd.  3 day of June, 2002,I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus upon the attorneys named below by 
placing it in an envelope and mailing it, first class postage prepaid, via the United States Postal 
Service to: 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise ID 83720-00 10 
APPENDIX E 
GREG FISHER, Warden of the Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution, 
Department of Correctian, State of 
Idaho, 
U.S. COURTS 
IN THE UNITED STATlES DISTRICT COUKT 
.-- . 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO NOY 1 4 2002 
R f c l L  FILED& 
S. BURKE 
Respondent, I 
GENE RUNCIS STUART, 
Petition=, 
v. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS AND STAY 
rnDEl2A.L PROCEEDINGS 
CLERK IDAHO 
Case No. CV-02-020-S-BLW 
CAPITAL CASE 
The Court has before it Petitioner's Motion to Hold in Abeyance Petition for Writ I 
of Habeas Corpus and Stay Federal Pmeedmgs Wcket No. 26). Petitioner roquests I 
that the Court hold his petition in abeyance and stay federal proceedings pending a final I 
determination by the Idaho state cowts of a successive state court postccmviction I 
proceeding that he will file on or about December 2,2002, The state postconviction I 
petition will raise claims that, as Petitioner noted h his pending Petition for Writ of I 
Habeas Corpus, are unexhaustcd, including his claim that his trial and direct appeal I 
counsel were ineffective. The same lawyer represented Petitioner at his 1982 trial, on I 
direct appeal, and in original and successive state postconviction proceedings wtil1995. 
NOV. 14.2002 12: 8 9 P M  cl ! IURTS 
-Le- 
Respondents have filed a notice of non-objection to Petitioner's motion. The 
- 
Court finds good cause exists for granting the motion. 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY O R D E W  rha t Petitioner's Motion to 
Mold in Abeyance Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Stay Federal Proceedings 
(Docket No. 26) is GRANTED. Petitioner's petition for writ of habas corpus shall be 
held in abeyance and the federal habeas proceeding shall be stayed pending final 
detmnination of his Idaho state court successive postconviotion petition. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petition= shall file his postconviction petition 
in Idaho state court on or about Docember 2,2002. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner hall file with the Court every ninety - .  
(90) days a report on the atatus of state court postconviction proceedings. 
DATED this Jw day of November, 2002. 
chief ~&e,  United States District Court 
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Attorney for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
M THE DISTRICT COURT OF TBE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, LV A !  FOR TEE COtWTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) Case No. SP-OZ151 
Petitioner, 1 
1 
? 
V. 1 MOTIOY FOR ENLARGEMENT OF 
1 TIME IN WHICK TO FILE BRIEF IN 
STATE OF IDAEO, 1 OPPOSITION TO RESI'ONDENT'S 
Respondent. ) MOTION FOR SUMMbLRY DISMISSAL 
Mr. Stuai-t moves for e. thirty day enlargement of ;time in which to me his response to 
Respondent's Motion For Summary Dismissal and supporting brief, changing .is response due 
date &on? November 14,2003, to December 14,2003, This mtion is brought pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 6@). In suppoi? of tbis motion, undersigned counsel stales as follows: 
1. In a telephone conversation today with an a m e y  with t h i s  office, Oliver W. Loewy, 
c o w l  for Respondent, L. LaMont Andenon, stipulated to the Corut's mtir lg  Mr. Stuart a 
tturty day enlargement in time in which to file his response to Re,spndent2s summary dismissal 
motion and suppo.rthg brief. 
Motion For Enlargcmcnt Of Time In Which To File Brief 
In Opposition To Respondent's Motion For Summary Dismissal -1 
2. Undersigned wunsel has recently completed a variety of previously scheduled and 
substantial pleadings, and she has additional pleadings due in the near future. 
3. Undersigned counsel anticipates no muble in filing the resporse u.jlhia the req~ested 
time. 
4. Undersigned counsel's request for an enkugemeat is made solely in .&e interests of her 
client and justice, and not for purposes of delay. 
5 .  No previous request has been made for an enlargement of time for filing the response. 
W-ORE, Mr. Stuart respectllly quests that the Court enter an Order granting 
him a thirty day enlargement in which to file his response to Respondent's Motion For Summary 
Dismissal and supportitig brief, making it due on December 14,2003. 
Dated this /1 Jb day of November, 2003. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Motion For Enlargement Of T i h e  In Which To File Brief 
In Opposition To Respondent's Motion For Summary Dismissal -2 
CERTIFTCATE OF SERVICE 
* I that on the 12day of November, 2W3,I caused to be send a tnr. and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, first clius postage 
prepaid where applicable, addrcsstd to: 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
L. W o n t  Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Capital Litigation U L I ~  
F.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldabo 83720-0010 
- 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
- Overnight Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL I)ISTI$IfF w-, , . ,- , 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND ROR m COUNTY OF CLEAR%VAT~R . -, . - -4 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) Case No. SP-02-151 . 
1 r zr --- - . . 1 .  -. Petifhner, 
1 
1 i 
V. 1 ORDER 
) 
STATE OF IDABO, ) 
Respondent 1 
Having considered Petitioner's Motion For Enlargement Of Time h Wllich To File Brief 
In Opposition To State's Motion For Summary Dismissal and all  its premises, :.t is hereby 
ORDERED: 
Petitioner's Motion For Enlargement Of Time In Which To File Brief I n  Opposition TO 
State's Motion For Summary Dismissal is  GRANTED; I 
Petitioner shall file his Response to  Respondent's Motion For Summqr Dismissal otl or 
by December 14,2003. 
DATED this /b ' day o f  November, 2003. I 
Prtsia&g ~udge 1 
Order -1 
I hereby certifj tbat a true and wmct copy of the foregoing Order was hand-delivered or 
mailed, postage prepaid, on the /q*2ay ofNovcmbcr, 2003, to the following:: 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Special Prosecutor/Deputy Attorney General 
Capital Li-on Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 
i i  mailed 
Joan M. Fisher 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
201 North Main Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
mailed 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN 
Clerk of t h e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  
Order -2 
JOAN M. FISHER 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
20 1 North Main Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Facsimile: 208-882- 1492 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
Gene Francis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution. 
Respondent. 
CAPITAL CASE 
CASE NO. SP02-151 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION 
RELIEF AND PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Respondent's ("the State's") reply to Petitioner's Response In Opposition To [First] 
Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Petition For Postconviction Relief And Petition For Writ Of 
Habeas Corpus ("Petitioner's Response") takes the form of a new summary dismissal motion and 
supporting brief ("State's Brief '). While the State's Brief includes replies to Petitioner's 
Response, the State also includes various claims for the first time, including, for example, that 
there is no issue of material fact regarding Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 
Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Second Motion For Summary Dismissal 
Of Petition For Postconviction Relief And Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus -1 
counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims. For this reason, Petitioner asks leave to file an 
additional responsive pleading limited to addressing the State's replies to his responses to the 
State's new claims. This request is in keeping with the Court's June 12,2003, briefing order 
which contemplates a final response from Petitioner to the State's responsive pleadings. 
Petitioner continues to rely on the arguments he has made in his earlier pleadings in this 
matter, including his July 14,2003, response to the State's initial summary dismissal motion. In 
what follows, he demonstrates that the State's arguments that Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 apply 
to his non-capital first degree murder case fail. See Sections I & 11. Section I11 shows why, 
despite the State's arguments, Idaho Code Section 19-4901's manifest injustice exception applies 
to the instant case. Section IV shows that the Court should reject the State's arguments in 
support of its summary dismissal of the ineffective assistance claims. Finally, Section V 
demonstrates that the State's contention that Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claims should 
be dismissed fail. 
I. Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 Does Not Govern These Postconviction Proceedings 
Because Petitioner's Death Sentence Is Void For Want Of Jurisdiction. 
Petitioner's contention that Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 has no application here relies on 
his arguments that Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002), must be retroactively applied to his 
case. Those arguments are made in another pleading already incorporated by reference in these 
proceedings. See Petitioner's Response at 4 (incorporating by reference Petitioner's Response In 
Opposition To Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Petition For Postconviction Relief And/or 
Writ of Habeas Corpus, Clearwater County Case Number SP02-00109 (31612003)). To this 
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extent, then, disposition of Respondent's motion for summary dismissal depends on a ruling on 
whether Ring is retroactively applicable. 
The State lodges three arguments against Mr. Stuart's contention that Idaho Code Section 
19-2719 has no application to his case. First, it argues that because Petitioner brought the instant 
petition pursuant to that statute, among others, the statute must apply. However, Petitioner relies 
on that statute only to the extent that this Court rejects his arguments that the Uniform 
Postconviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA") exclusive of Section 19-271 9 should govern. See, 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144, 149 (Idaho 1999) ("I.C. $ 19-271 9 does not 
eliminate the applicability of the UPCPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the 
extent that their provisions conflict."). 
Second, the State argues, because Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 contemplates its 
application to any case in which a judgment imposing a death sentence is filed and because this is 
such a case, the statute applies here. "All capital defendants," the State continues, "contend their 
convictions and death sentences are invalid or otherwise illegal. Following Stuart's logic would 
result in I.C. $1 9-271 9 never applying to any case and completely thwart the legislative intent 
behind the statute." State's Brief at 19-20. This argument is contrary to long established legal 
principles regarding attacks on a court's subject matter jurisdiction as well as the UPCPA itself. 
"The issue of whether a court has exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction is never waived 
and purported judgments entered by that court, acting without subject matter jurisdiction, are 
void and subject to collateral attack. Sierra Life Insurance Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624,626, 
586 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1978); see Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,459,680 P.2d 1355, 1359 
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(1984)[void judgment is nullity and "can be collaterally attacked at any time"]." State v. 
Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568,571,929 P.2d 744,747 (Ct. App. 1996). Whether a court had subject 
matter jurisdiction, then, is not subject to waiver. Consequently, Section 19-2719 waiver 
provisions do not apply to Petitioner's claim that the sentencing court was without jurisdiction to 
impose a death sentence. Further, even where the UPCPA, Idaho Code Section 19-490 1-49 1 1, 
is generally unavailable as an avenue to relief, "it is available to cure fundamental errors 
occurring at the trial which affect either the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the 
judgment, even though these errors could have been raised on appeal." Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 
469,474,491 P.2d 733, 738 (Idaho 1971). 
That the sentencing court imposed a punishment outside its jurisdiction is clear from 
the application of recent United States Supreme Court decisions to the facts of this case. 
Specifically, the recent Supreme Court decisions clarify that because aggravating circumstances 
must be found to exist before a defendant may be sentenced to death, those circumstances are 
elements of the offense for which death is a permissible penalty. As Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, 
and Thomas recently agreed: 
Our decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 
clarified what constitutes an "element" of an offense for purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee. Put simply, if the 
existence of any fact (other than a prior conviction) increases the 
maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defendant, that 
fact ... constitutes an element, and must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id., at 482-484,490. 
[Flor purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, the 
underlying offense of "murder" is a distinct, lesser included 
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offense of "murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances": 
Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of 
life imprisonment, the latter increases the maximum permissible 
sentence to death. Accordingly, we held that the Sixth Amendment 
requires that a jury, and not a judge, find the existence of any 
aggravating circumstances, and that they be found, not by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[Ring], at [2443] (slip op. at 22-23). 
Sattazahn v. Pennsvlvania, 123 S.Ct 732, 739 (2003)(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & 
Thomas, J.). See Harris v. United States, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2409 (2002)("those facts setting the 
outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for 
the purposes of the constitutional analysis")(Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and 
07Connor & Scalia, JJ.) and at 2323-24 ("[Ilf the legislature, rather than creating grades of 
crimes, has provided for setting the punishment of a crime based on some fact . . . that fact is also 
an elementn)(Thomas, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsberg, JJ.); Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 
2428,2443 (2002)(because aggravating factors necessary to the imposition of a death sentence 
"operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense' the Sixth Amendment 
requires that they be found a juryV)(citation omitted). Acknowledging this, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that death is a constitutionally permissible sentence only after a jury "make[s] the 
factual findings of the aggravating factors." Fetterly, 137 Idaho at 730,52 P.3d at 875. 
Consequently, the aggravating circumstances are elements of the offense-whatever its label-for 
which an Idaho defendant may receive a death sentence. 
Applied to Petitioner's case where the jury did not find any aggravating circumstance to 
exist, this means that Petitioner was not convicted of an offense for which death was a 
permissible penalty. For this and related reasons, considered cumulatively and severally, the trial 
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court was without subject matter jurisdiction to impose a death sentence.' Hays v. State, 1 13 
Idaho 736,739,747 P.2d 758,761 (Ct.App. 1987)("A jurisdictional defect exists when the 
alleged facts are not made criminal by statute, or where there is a failure to state facts essential to 
establish the offense charged. State v. Grady, 89 Idaho 204,404 P.2d 347 (1965); State v. Cole, 
3 1 Idaho 603, 174 P. 13 1 (198 1); I.C.R. 7(b)."), aff'd, 11 5 Idaho 3 15,3 16 766 P.2d 785, 786 
(Idaho 1988)("we concur with the decision of the Court of Appeals"). Where jury instructions 
omit an essential element of a crime, a guilty verdict is not a conviction for that offense. State v. 
Nunez, 133 Idaho 13,20, 98 1 P.2d 738, 745, reh'g denied (Idaho 1999). If the instructions 
include all the elements of a lesser crime, the defendant must be sentenced within the range of 
penalties for that offense. Id. 
Third, citing to Idaho Code Section 18-4004, the State contends that Petitioner was 
eligible for a death sentence based upon his first degree murder conviction alone. This, of 
course, ignores whether Ring should be given retroactive effect. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
already put beyond dispute that if Ring is retroactively applicable, Petitioner was not eligible for 
a death sentence based on his first degree murder conviction alone. See State v. Fetterly, 137 
'The additional related reasons include that the charging document, a prosecutor's 
information, failed to include the aggravating factor elements relied on at trial; no preliminary 
hearing determination was made that there was substantial evidence upon the aggravating factor 
elements relied on at trial; at trial, the jury did not determine that Mr. Stuart had the requisite 
mens rea, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 477 (1 98 I), a fact necessary to death being an allowable 
penalty; the jury did not determine that any aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances; and the jury did not determine that the mitigating circumstances did not make the 
imposition of death unjust. See Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Motion For Summary 
Dismissal Of Petition For Post-Conviction Relief And/or Writ of Habeas Corpus, Clearwater 
County Case Number SP02-00109 (3/6/2003), incorporated by reference in these proceedings, 
see Petitioner's Response at 4. 
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Idaho 729,730, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (2002) (acknowledging Ring invalidates "the death penalty 
scheme in Idaho which to this time has allowed the sentencing judge to make factual findings of 
the aggravating factors necessary to the imposition of a death sentence"). 
11. Even If Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 Does Apply To Petitioner's Case, It Violates The 
Idaho Constitution, Other Idaho Law, And The Federal Constitution. 
A. The Ex Post Facto Violation Claim. 
The State contends that because Section 19-27 19 does not increase death sentenced 
petitioners' sentences, it is not subject to expost facto constraints. State's Brief at 20-21. While 
Section 19-271 9's provisions may appear at first glance to implicate none of the categories of 
laws which violate the expost facto prohibition, neither did the statute struck down in Weaver v. 
Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1980). There, the challenged statute removed "gain time for good 
conduct" granted to prison inmates. Id. at 25. The state argued that the revised statute could not 
run afoul of the ex post facto clause because it was "'no part of the original sentence and thus no 
part of the punishment annexed to the crime at the time petitioner was sentenced."' Id. at 3 1 
(quoting State's brief). The Court rejected this argument, noting, first, that "we need not 
determine whether the prospect of the gain time was in some technical sense part of the sentence 
to conclude that it in fact is one determinant of petitioner's prison term-and that his effective 
sentence is altered once this determinant is changed' and, second, that "we have held that a 
statute may be retrospective even if it alters punitive conditions outside the sentence." Thus, a 
statute may sufficiently affect a sentence so as to violate the expost facto prohibition even 
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though it constitutes no part of the imposed sentence. As the Supreme Court noted in Calfornia 
Department of Corrections v. Morales, 5 14 U.S. 499 (1 999,  "We have previously declined to 
articulate a single 'formula' for identifying those legislative changes that have a sufficient effect 
on substantive crimes or punishments to fall within the constitutional prohibition, and we have 
no occasion to do so here." Id. at 509 (citation omitted). Instead, the test for determining 
whether a change in law violates the expostfacto prohibition is whether the change "created 'a 
sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.' 
[Morales, 5 14 U.S.] at 509." Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000). 
The Garner test, however, does more than clarify whether a law which was no part of the 
imposed sentence violates the expost facto prohibition. It also serves to distinguish those 
procedural changes which constitute expostfacto violations and those which do not. As the 
State notes, the Supreme Court holds that procedural changes do not implicate the expost facto 
clause. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, (1977); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,29 (1980); 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,44-46 (1990). The State contends that because "enactment 
of I.C. tj 19-27 19 was procedural in nature[,]" it cannot violate the state and federal constitutions' 
prohibitions against expost facto laws. State's Brief at 24. The flaw in the State's argument is 
its assumption that Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 is procedural in nature. See inji-a at 12 
(discussing State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 828 P.2d 891 (1992)). Applying the Garner test 
demonstrates that the procedural changes enacted by Section 19-2719 run afoul of the expost 
facto clause. 
Applying Idaho Code Sections 19-271 9(3) & (5) to Petitioner's case would 
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unquestionably create a significant risk of making Mr. Stuart's sentence more burdensome than if 
the UPCPA were applied. For while Sections 19-2719 (3) & (5) contemplate barring claims not 
raised within 42 days of the filing of the judgment regardless of petitioner's mental state in 
relation to those claims and their waiver, under the UPCPA a petitioner's delay in asserting 
claims may be deemed a waiver only if he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived the 
claims. I.C. $1 9-4908. As the Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
In capital cases, a successive petition is allowed only where the 
petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not known or 
could not reasonably have been known within the 42-day time 
frame. This is in contrast with the UPCPA, which requires waiver 
to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. I.C. 9 19-4908. 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,701,992 P.2d 144, 150 (1 999). Because the Section 19-4908 
hurdle is significantly lower for petitioners than the Section 19-27 19 hurdle, it is more likely that 
the Court would reach the merits of Mr. Stuart's claims if he were required to clear the former 
and not the latter. This was, of course, the Idaho legislature's expressed purpose in enacting 
Section 19-2719, as is clear from the contrast between that statute and Section 19-4908, 
McKinney, as well as the legislature's explicitly described purpose. I.C. fj 19-271 9 ("The 
following special procedures shall be interpreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating 
unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.") (italics added). Further, Mr. Stuart's 
claims are remarkably strong. The relative strength of Mr. Stuart's claims shows that he would 
likely prevail on their merits and thus obtain a reduced sentence andlor vacation of his 
conviction. Thus, not only does the statutory change and purpose in enacting Section 19-27 19 
allow an inference that the change created "a sufficient high risk of increasing the measure of 
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punishment attached to the covered crimes" such that it violates the expost facto clause, the facts 
of the instant case compel it. Garner, 529 U.S. at 250. Because death is a more burdensome 
penalty than life, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411 (1986)(plurality opinion)("execution is 
the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; . . . death is different."), applying Section 
19-27 19 to block a merits review of Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
constitutes an expost facto violation. 
B. The Separation Of Powers Violation Claim. 
Noting that the UPCPA is an expansion of the writ of habeas corpus, the State argues that 
because the Supreme Court has held that the legislature "may add to the efficacy of the 
[constitutionally guaranteed] writ [of habeas corpus]" and that statutes should be construed as 
"promot[ing] the effectiveness of the proceeding," Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228,23 1, 392 
P.2d 279,280 (1964), "I.C. 919-2719 does not unduly restrict the district court's jurisdiction in 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine." State's Brief at 28. But the fact that the 
constitution allows the legislature to enact laws subject to certain restrictions hardly means that 
the legislature abides those restrictions. On the contrary, "[plassing on the constitutionality of 
statutory enactments, even enactments with political overtones, is a fundamental responsibility of 
the judiciary, and has been so since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,2 L.Ed. 60 
(1813)." Miles v. Idaho Power Company, 116 Idaho 635,640,778 P.2d 757,762 (1989). The 
Section 19-27 19 provisions at issue cannot be construed to promote the efficacy of the writ 
because they remove jurisdiction to consider claims the district courts' could have considered in 
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considering a habeas petition. Mahafley at 229-30, 279 (reversing district court dismissal of 
successive habeas petition brought ten years after conviction). While the legislature's express 
streamlining purpose in enacting Section 19-27 19 may have been permissible, its chosen means 
violated the separation of powers doctrine. 
Relying on Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464,471,4 P.3d 1 1 15, 
1 122 (2000), for the proposition that "the legislature has the power to limit the remedies 
available to plaintiffs," the State reasons that the legislature therefore "necessarily has the power 
to limit the remedies of capital petitioners in seeking postconviction relief." State's Brief at 28- 
29. This argument suffers the same fatal defect as the last. In particular, it fails to account for 
the constitutional guarantee that the "writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case 
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it, and then only in such manner as shall be 
prescribed by law." Idaho Const. art. I, 95. In Kirkland, the issue was whether a statutory cap on 
a jury's damage award impermissibly invaded the judiciary's "right ... to reduce jury verdicts in 
those instances where the evidence demonstrates the jury's verdict is excessive as a matter of 
law." Id. at 1 122,471. The Court nowhere addressed the interplay between the legislature's 
power to limit remedies available to plaintiffs and any constitutional rights vested in plaintiffs. 
By stark contrast, Petitioner is constitutionally guaranteed the right to seek a writ of habeas 
corpus and Idaho courts hold that this remedy may now be sought only through the vehicle of a 
postconviction petition. This means that the legislature's prerogative to limit remedies in the 
postconviction context is not unlimited. Rather, the limits may not suspend the writ. The fact 
that district courts did reach the merits of habeas claims filed outside the Section 19-27 19 time 
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restrictions, Mahaffey, demonstrates that the statute suspends the writ in violation of the 
constitutional guarantee. 
C. The Violation Of Prohibition Against Retroactive Application Of New Law 
Claim. 
Acknowledging that Idaho Code Section 73- 10 1 generally forbids retroactively applying 
newly enacted legislation, the State contends that the exception applies in this case. Specifically, 
noting that Section 73-1 01 provides that new legislation may be retroactively applied when the 
legislature "expressly so declared" in the new legislation, the State contends that the legislature's 
express declaration of retroactive application in 1984 applies today. It is true that the 1984 
version of Section 19-271 9 included an express declaration that the act "apply to all cases in 
which capital sentences were imposed on or prior to the effective date of this act[.]" I.C. 5 19- 
27 19(9) (1 984). Equally true, however, is that the legislature deleted this express declaration 
from the current version of the statute, which was enacted in 2001. Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft 
Corporation, 11 3 Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987) ("an amendment to an existing 
statute will not, absent an express legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive 
in application") (citations omitted). The 1984 version's declaration of retroactive affect has no 
application here because it was not in effect at the time Petitioner filed the instant postconviction 
petition. Rather, the statute in effect at the time the petition was filed governs. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's holding that Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(3) "creates, defines 
and regulates a primary right" and is, therefore, substantive in nature, compels the same 
conclusion. State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992). For as the Supreme 
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Court has long held, 
[I]t also is the rule in Idaho that retroactive legislation is only that 
which affects vested or already existing rights. Remedial or 
procedural statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish or 
destroy contractual or vested right are generally held to operate 
retrospectively. 
City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 5 12, 5 15,660 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1 983) (citations 
omitted). Applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(3) to this case would, therefore, constitute a 
retroactive application in violation of Idaho Code Section 73-101 
111. The UPCPA Manifest Injustice Exception Applies To This Case. 
Contrary to the State's suggestion, the Idaho Supreme Court has signaled that the 
UPCPA's manifest injustice exception is available to capitally charged successive postconviction 
petitioners. The State contends that the Idaho Supreme Court's description of the requirements 
successive petitioners must meet under Idaho Code Section 19-271 9 rather than Idaho Code 
Section 19-4908 demonstrates that successive capital petitioners unable to meet the Section 19- 
27 19 requirements may not seek relief even where the UPCPA's manifest injustice provisions 
would otherwise apply. Specifically, the State relies on this general description: 
In capital cases, a successive petition is allowed only where the 
petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not known or 
could not reasonably have been known within the 42-day time 
frame. 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,70 1,992 P.2d 144, 150 (1 999). This sentence is part of a 
description of different vehicles generally available to capital and non-capital successive 
petitioners, not a catalog of all possible vehicles available to death sentenced prisoners seeking 
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successive postconviction relief. This is plain from the very next sentence in the decision, "This 
is in contrast with the UPCPA, which requires waiver to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
I.C. 519-4908." Because the Supreme Court was neither resolving nor stating in dicta whether 
the UPCPA's manifest injustice exception is available to death sentenced successive petitioners, 
the block quoted sentence from McKinney provides no support for the State's position. 
Whether the manifest injustice exception is available to death sentenced successive 
postconviction petitioners is an issue of first impression. Settled legal principles, however, 
compel the conclusion that it is. In particular, the UPCPA "takes the place of all common law, 
statutory or other remedies previously available. It therefore is broader in scope than a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus." Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235,237,459 P.2d 101 7, 101 9 (1969). Further, "the 
legislature (absent certain contingencies) is without power to abridge this remedy [i.e.- the writ of 
habeas corpus] secured by the Constitution, [though] it may add to the efficacy of the writ." 
Mahafley v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 23 1,392 P.2d 279, 280 (1964). Before the UPCPA's 
enactment, the writ of habeas corpus was available to petitioners without regard to when the 
petition was filed. This is clear from the absence of any constitutional provision to the contrary 
and from Idaho caselaw. See Idaho Const. art. I, 55 and Mahaffey, at 229-30,279 (reversing 
district court dismissal of successive habeas petition brought ten years after conviction). 
Consequently, the UPCPA's time limitations on filing postconviction petitions are invalid with 
regard to claims previously cognizable in petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Of course, to the 
extent that the UPCPA "comprehends ... other common law, statutory, or other remedies," the 
time limitations may pass constitutional muster. 
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Each of Petitioner's claims alleges violations of federal and state constitutional 
guarantees. Each is, then, within the purview of Idaho's habeas corpus remedy: 
The "Great Writ" of habeas corpus is a time-honored method of 
testing the authority of one who deprives another of his liberty. 
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. 475,93 S.Ct. 1827,36 L.Ed.2d 439 
(1973); Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123,376 P.2d 704 (1962); C. 
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 53 (4th ed. 
1983). Ordinarily, the writ is available to effect discharge from any 
confinement which is in violation of constitutional protections. C. 
WRIGHT, supra. In Idaho, the writ is not simply a statutory 
remedy. It is a remedy recognized and protected by the Idaho 
Constitution. Mahafley v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 
(1964); see IDAHO CONST. Art. 1, 9 5. The action is to be 
construed and applied to preserve, not to destroy, constitutional 
safeguards of liberty. Mahafley v. State, supra. 
The essence of habeas corpus is an attack upon the 
legality of a person's detention for the purpose of 
securing release where custody is illegal. The writ 
was developed as an extraordinary remedy where 
correctional actions are inadequate. The writ is an 
avenue by which relief can be sought where 
detention of an individual is in violation of a 
fundamental right. 
In re Application of Robison, 107 Idaho 1055, 1057, 695 P.2d 440, 
442 (Ct.App. 1985). 
Gawron v. Roberts, 743 P.2d 983, (Idaho App. 1987). 
For these reasons, the State's contention that Idaho law bars Petitioner's claims pursuant 
to, among other provisions, the UPCPA's manifest injustice exception fails. For the reasons 
stated in his Petition, in his Petitioner's Response, and in this pleading, and based on the facts 
which should be fully and fairly developed at an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Stuart has 
unquestionably suffered a manifest injustice. 
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IV, The Court Should Deny The State's Motion To Summarily Dismiss Mr. Stuart's 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims. 
Applied to this case, Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (2001), requires adjudicating the 
merits of Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The State urges this Court to 
decline applying Hoffman because doing so "would have an adverse impact on the state's ability 
to prevent capital litigants from raising first-time claims in federal court, even when new counsel 
has been appointed to represent capital litigants during the course of their first post-conviction 
proceedings." State's Brief at 40-41. The State, however, proffers no reason to accept its 
assumption that applying HofJinan to the intended narrow class of cases-those in which original 
trial counsel continued to represent death sentenced Idaho prisoners during the 42 days following 
the filing of judgment-will lead the federal courts to abandon established principles of comity 
and federalism in other death cases. By contrast, the narrowly tailored language of Hoffian is 
evidence that applying it to Mr. Stuart's case will not have the consequence the State fears. This 
Court's declining to apply Hoffian, though, will result in additional time, expense, and energy to 
obtain a federal court hearing on Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
The State contends that Mr. Stuart has not asserted his ineffective assistance of trial and 
appellate counsel claims within a reasonable time. State's Brief at 41-42 & 45-46. Mr. Stuart 
notes that he has explained that upon appointment, federal counsel immediately began the task of 
collecting the record, reviewing it, and investigating the case; has quoted the description in the 
American Bar Association's Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003) of the awesome amount of work required by 
postconviction counsel endeavoring to identifl claims; has represented that the pending 
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postconviction Petition was filed as soon as possible after identifying potential issues, beginning 
to conduct appropriate investigation, and obtaining evidence supporting the claims raised; and 
has moved, to the extent that the State disputes Petitioner's factual assertions, for an evidentiary 
hearing at which the factual issues may be fully and fairly developed and addressed. Petitioner's 
Response at 23-25. In light of the State's contention that Mr. Stuart has not asserted his claims 
within a reasonable time, he renews his motion for an evidentiary hearing at which the factual 
issues may be fully and fairly developed and addressed. 
Next, the State contends that there is no material issue of fact regarding Mr. Stuart's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. This simply ignores the numerous factually supported 
claims contained in Mr. Stuart's Petition. 
Finally, the State suggests that it has "scoured Mr. Stuart's successive petition for an 
allegation of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel and found none. State's Brief at 
13-14, n. 9. The State should have conserved its energy by simply directing it attention to the 
section of the Petition cited and quoted in Petitioner's Response. See Petitioner's Response at 23 
(citing and quoting the Petitioner at Section IIP). There, in enumerated deficiency number eight, 
Mr. Stuart asserts that prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing "to adequately 
conduct prior post-conviction proceedings with regard to each of the issues raised in the instant 
postconviction petition." Petition at 37. 
V. The Court Should Deny The State's Motion To Summarily Dismiss The 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims. 
The State contends that because Mr. Stuart assertedly could have unearthed the 
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prosecutorial misconduct at some earlier time, his claims are untimely. "The state is not 
mandated to spoon-feed information to Stuart or his attorneys." State's Brief at 3 1. Due 
process, however, requires the State to disclose material, exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Kyles v. Whitley, 5 14 U.S. 41 9 (1 995). Further, the State 
has, despite a pretrial request for exculpatory information, failed for over two decades to disclose 
the factual bases or any information which would reasonably put defense counsel on notice of the 
factual bases for Mr. Stuart's prosecutorial misconduct claims, including the facts that it advised 
at least one of its trial witnesses not to testify that Mr. Stuart suffered from mental health 
difficulties and that state witnesses were under the influence of drugs while testifying. Strickler 
v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 284 (1999) (reasonable for defense counsel to rely on presumption that 
the state would fully perform its duty to disclose all exculpatory materials); cf Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,439 (2000) (where state's disclosure of information put defense counsel on 
notice of the factual bases and possible materiality of withheld information, petitioner's failure to 
develop his Brady claim in state court precluded an evidentiary hearing in federal court). 
Further, the State argues that because Mr. Stuart and defense counsel assertedly must 
have been aware during pretrial and trial proceedings of two facts supporting his claim that the 
prosecution encouraged its prior bad acts witnesses to exaggerate his misdeeds by providing a 
heightened sense of danger, the claim must be untimely. State's Brief at 32-32. However, even 
assuming that Mr. Stuart and defense counsel were aware of those two facts, the claim rests on 
the cumulative effect of all the supporting facts. 
The State contends that Mr. Stuart has failed to explain how and when he became aware 
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of the facts supporting his prosecutorial misconduct claims. State's Brief at 32-33. As Mr. 
Stuart has previously noted in a somewhat different context, upon appointment, federal counsel 
immediately began the task of collecting the record, reviewing it, and investigating the case. As 
the American Bar Association's Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death PenaIfy Cases (rev. ed. 2003) at 12-14 aptly describes, the amount of work 
required by postconviction counsel endeavoring to identify claims is awesome. Finally, the 
pending postconviction Petition was filed as soon as possible after identifying potential issues, 
beginning to conduct appropriate investigation, and obtaining evidence supporting the claims 
raised. See Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Petition 
For Postconviction Relief And Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus at 23-25. To the extent that 
the State disputes these factual assertions, Petitioner moves for an evidentiary hearing at which 
the factual issues may be fully and fairly developed and addressed. 
Though the State contends that there is no material issue of fact, the facts alleged in Mr. 
Stuart's pending petition show otherwise. State's Brief at 34-39. The State suggests that Mr. 
Stuart's claims are "extraordinarily vague." State's Brief at 36. On the contrary: Mr. Stuart 
contends, based on sworn affidavits, that the State failed to disclose to the defense that state 
actors offered preliminary hearing witnesses small tab pills said to have a calming effect before 
they testified and that some preliminary hearing witnesses accepted the offer and ingested the 
pills; that it encouraged its prior bad acts witnesses to exchange their anticipated testimony 
through three means articulated in the Petition, see Petition at 8; and that the State encouraged its 
prior bad acts witnesses to exaggerate Mr. Stuart's misdeed by providing a heightened sense of 
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danger by utilizing four methods spelled out in the Petition, see Petition at 8. These 
particularized factual claims individually and cumulatively support the legal claim that the State 
withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Mr. Stuart's rights to due process and 
reliable sentencing. They also support the legal claim that by manipulating the witnesses to 
provide false testimony, the State engaged in egregious misconduct in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United State Constitution and the Idaho Constitution, Article 1, 
Section 13. 
Finally, the State contends that because it allegedly had an "open file" policy allowing 
trial counsel access to all prosecution files, the State met its Brady obligation. State's Brief at 39. 
This conclusion is flawed in two respects. First, the fact that the prosecution has material 
exculpatory information does not mean that there is a document reflecting that information. For 
example, there may be no document revealing that state actors provided witnesses with drugs, 
but that hardly suggests that the prosecution did not and should not have known of that 
misconduct. Second, it is settled that an "open file" policy does not in itself satisfy the 
prosecution's Brady obligation. Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,647, 8 P.2d 636,642 (2000) (in 
reliance on Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1 999), "reject[s] the State's theory that 
[exculpatory information was] discoverable merely because of the prosecutor's open file 
policy"). 
Conclusion 
For all these reasons considered separately and together and for all the reasons contained 
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in Petitioner's previous pleadings in this case, the Court should deny the State's motion to 
summarily dismiss the Petition. In keeping with the Court's June 12, 2003, briefing order which 
contemplates a final response from Petitioner to the State's responsive pleadings, the Court 
should grant Petitioner leave to file an additional responsive pleading limited to addressing the 
State's replies to his responses in the instant pleading to the State's new claims. See supra at 1. 
The Court should, as well, conduct a full and fair evidentiary hearing to determine whether Mr. 
Stuart meets the manifest injustice exception. See supra at 111. The Court should also conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 
counsel claims and prosecutorial misconduct claims were raised within a reasonable time of their 
discovery. See supra at Sections IV & V. 
lc, Dated this If? day of December, 2003. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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201 North Main Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS'IIUCT OF 
THE STATE OF DAHO, IN AND FOR TKE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
Gene Pmncis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OB IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and 
GREG JDSBER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximum Sechrlity Institution. 
Respondent. 
CAPITAL CASE 
CASE NOS, SP02-109, 
8495, & 
SP02-151 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUIPPClRT OF 
MOTION TO STAY PI;:OC;EEDINGS 
PENDING DISPOSITION IN THIE: 
IDmo SUPREME CO'URT OE: 
H O F W  v. STATE AND IN THE 
UNITED STATES SUPIUEME COURT 
OF SC&RLRO v. SUWERLIN 
I, Joan M. Fisher, declare the fol10wing unde]: penalty of perjury: 
1. Because resentencing proceedings would be expensive, lengthy, and complex, sentencing 
relief in this case would Likely lead the parties to consider resolving Petitioner's entire 
case short of additional litigation. Thus, moving forward on these mattr~rs before 
dispositions in Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 833 (2003) (certiorari rsview granted), 
and H o p a n  v. State, Case Nos. 29354/29355 (Idaho S.Ct. 2003) (appcds h m  denials 
Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Stay -1 
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of Ring relief in 19 I.C. $2719 petition and I.C.R. 35 motion), may wastern. 
Additionally, it would be consistent with Idaho Supreme Court and federal court orders in 
the Ring context. 
2. Petitioner, who stands convicted of ht degree murder (Idaho Code Section 18-4001 & 
4003 (1977)) and is under sentence of death for that offense, has three matters pending 
before this Court. In two of these matters, Petitioner seeks sentencing relief through the 
application of Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428,2432 (2002), to his case.' In the third, he 
seeks, among other things, sentencing relief on factually complex non..Ring grounds.2 
3. In Ring, the United States Supreme Court held as a matter of federal constitution law that 
a jury must determine the existence of each fact necessary to render a defendant eligible 
for a sentence o f  death. The Idaho Supreme Court has achowledged tllat Ring invalidates 
the statutory scheme under which Mr. Stuart was sentenced to death. State v. Ferterly, 
1 3 7 Idaho 729,52 P.3d 874,875 (2002) (holding that Ring "appears to invalidate the 
death penalty scheme in Idaho &ch to this time has allowed the sentencing judge to 
make factual findings of the-aggravating kctors necessary to the imposition of a death 
\ 
sentence. ") . 
4. Thus, if Ring is found retroactively applicable in SummerIin or Ho*?, Petitioner will 
be legally entitled to vacation of his death sentence. Respondent has acknowledged this 
'Petition For Post-Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus, Case Number SP- 
02-00109, and Motion To Correct Illegal Sentence, To Vacate Sentence Of Dei~th And For New 
Sentencing Trial, Case Number 8495. 
'Petition For Postconviction Relief And Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus, Case 
Number SP02-15 1. See id. at 7-8 (Claim A: prosecutorial misconduct mandates new sentencing 
proceedings) and 18- 19 (Claim C: Brady violations require new sentencing proceedings). 
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entitlement in the case of a simiIarly situated death sentenced prisonel-. Specifically, in 
oral argument before the Idaho Supreme Court in Hofian, Respondeat stated that if Ring 
is found retroactively applicable the State will. "have no other choice.-.in the interest of 
fairness" than to concede that resentencing proceeciings are 
5. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari review to decide whether fderal 
law requires the retroactive application of Ring to cases where the direct appeal was final 
before Ring 'LV~S announced. Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03-526. 
6. Even if fedaal law does not require retroactive application of Ring, Idaho state law may 
do so. Of the several cases raising before the Idaho Supreme Court tht: question of Ring's 
retroactivity, the only case fully briefed and argued is Hof ian  and the Supreme Court 
has stayed that matter pending disposition in Summerlin. H o w n  v. State, Order 
Suspending Appeal, Case Nos. 29354/29355 (Idaho 2/12/2004). Whilt: the Supreme 
3The following exchange took place during oral argument before the Idd~o  Supreme 
Court on February 9,2004: 
Justice Trout: . . . @..,the U.S:Supreme Court did decidz 
. [Ring] was retroactive, why I mess at that 
point in time ... the State would concede ken 
as I understand it that [Appellant Hoffman] 
should be resentenced at that poht? 
Asst. A.G. Anderson: Your Honor, I don't believe that we'd have 
..- - 
any other choice ... But in the iaterest of 
fdua-&d$,quite W y  can't envision 
the scenario where the State would not say 
you have to be resentenced 
This quotation is taken from the Idaho Supreme Court audio tapes of the oral agaument, not from 
au. official transcript. 
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Court has not stayed d l  cases raising the issue of Ring's retroactivity: it has stayed some4 
and, in any event, no case other than Ho%n which raises the question has been fully 
briefed andlor argued before that court. 
7. The Federal District Court for the District of Idaho has stayed proceeclings in many 
habeas corpus cases fled on behalf of death sentenced prisoners penkng the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision as to whether it will apply Ring retroacitvely on collateral 
review, where the cases were not already stayed on other grounds. Set:, Rhoades v. Arave, 
Case No. CV 93- 1 56-S-EJL (6130103); Rhoades v. Arme, Case No. C1l 93-1 55-S-I2-X 
(6130103); Creech v. Paskett, Case No. CV 99-0224-S-BLW (5120103): Fiel& v. Klauser, 
Case No. CV 95-422-S-EL (6130103); McKinney v. Paskett, Case No. CV 96-177-S-EJL; 
Row v. Miller, CV 98-240-S-BLW (619103); and Sivak v. Mauser, CV-96-0056-S-BLW 
(619/03). 
8. me Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, too, has stayed proceedings in an Sdaho case pending 
final disposition by the United States Supreme Court of Summerlin anc. the Idaho state 
courts' fmd disposition of state postconviction proceedings based upor 1 Ring in Hornan. 
Hoffmm, v. Arave, Orders (Nos. 02-99004, 1011012002 & 02-G9005, 10/1712003). 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit haz stayed proceedings in the case of an I&ho death 
sentenced prisoner p e n h g  "final disposition of Summerlin by the United States Supreme 
4See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, Case Nos. 29180129212 (Idaho 12/18/03); iMcKinney v. State, 
Order Granting Motion To Suspend Appeal, Case Nos. 2626912941 1 (Idaho 11'.6104); State v. 
Sivak, Order Granting Motion To Suspend Appeal, Case Nos. 29662129663 (Idaho 1120104); 
State v. Creech, Order Granting Motion To Suspend Appeal, Case Nos. 29681129682 (Idaho 
1120104); Hairston v. State, Order Granting Motion To Suspend Proceedings In Appeal, Case 
Nos. 28528/29653/29680 (Idaho 2/24/04). 
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Court." Pizzuto v. Arme, 345 F.3d 11 19 (ga Cir. 2003). 
9. Thus, staying these proceedings pending disposition in Summerlin and the Hoffman cases 
may preserve judicial resources and would be consistent with Idaho Supreme Court and 
federal court orders. 
Dated t h i s a d a y  of March, 2004. 
- 
Attorney for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
AiPidavit In Support Of Motion To Stay -5 
03/32/2004 17:49  FAX 208 883 1472 FEDERAL DEFENDERS a011 
CERTIFICATE OX SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the$ day of March, 2004, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, posixge prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
L. W o n t  Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise DD 83720-00 10 
(f)  208-334-2942 
John A. Swayne 
Clearwater County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
(f) 208-476-97 10 
&S Mail -
Hand Delivery 
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- Federal Express 
 US Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAJL DISTRICT OF 
THIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TEE COUNTY OF CLEkRWATER 
Gene Francis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of  Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Magimum Security Institution. 
Respondent. 
CAPITAL CASE 
CASE NOS. SP02-109, 
8495, & 
SPO2-151 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 
PENDING DISPOSrrr~lN IN m 
IDAHO SUPRErn CO URT OF 
XIOFFMAN v. STATE AND IN 
TBE UNXTED STATES SUPRIEME 
COURT OF SCHRlRO 11 S m R L n V  
Petitioner, Gene Francis Stuart, moves to stay these proceedings pending the outcomes in 
cases now before the Idaho Supreme Court ( H o r n  v. State, Case Nos. 2935~./29355) and the 
United States Supreme Court (Schriro v. Summerlin, Case No. 03-526), in which the divsitive 
issues are identical to issues raised before this Court. Specifically, common to Sumrnerlin and 
Petitioner's cases is the question whether Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (200.2), should be 
applied as a matter of federal law to cases in which direct appeal proceedings u.ere complete 
before Ring was decided, while common to Hoyj%zan and Petitioner's cases are (I) the same 
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question just noted regarding Sumrnerlin and (2) whether Ring should be app'lied as a matter of 
state law to cases in which direct appeal proceedings were complete bdore Ring was decided. 
Because resentencing proceedings would be expensive, lengthy, and complex, sentencing reIief 
in this case would likely lead the parties to consider resolving Petitioner's entire, case short of 
additional litigation. Thus, moving forward on these matters before dispositions in Summerlin 
and Hofian  may be wasteful. Additionally, staying these proceedings woulci be consistent with 
Idaho Supreme Court and federal. court orders in the Ring context. 
Dated this day of March, 2003. 
Attorney for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART ) CASE NO. CR81-8495, SP02-00109, 
1 SPO2-00151 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 COURT MINUTES 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, ET. AL. 
i 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
District Judge Presiding: Ron Schilling 
Joan Fisher and Oliver Lowery: Attorneys for Plaintiff 
John A. Swayne and Lamont Anderson: Attorneys for Defendant 
Deputy Clerk: Sue K. Summerton 
Date: Scheduling conference '3 3; ~q 
, Tape: C3656 
................................................................. 
................................................................. 
FOOTAGE: 
81 8 Parties present telephonically: Honorable Ron Schilling; Oliver Lowey and Lamont 
Anderson. John Swayne present in court. Joan Fisher not present. Court advises 
now is the time for a scheduling conference. Court advises receipt of Plaintiffs 
Motion and Affidavit to stay. 
908 Mr. Lowey argues the Motion to Stay. 
932 Court questions Mr. Anderson and Mr. Swayne regarding their position. 
941 Mr. Anderson argues in opposition to Motion to Stay. 
1036 Mr. Lowey continues argument to Motion to Stay 
1162 Mr. Anderson continues argument. 
Deputy Clerk - Sue K. Summerton 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
Approved: & 
GENE F. STUART 
CR8 1-8495 
SPO2-109 
SP02-151 
1220 Mr. Lowery continues argument. 
1247 Court remarks to aitarneys. Cotxi advises fha: after ;2\!iew cjf f h e  motion and 
argument from the attorneys that the motion to stay is granted. Court stays these 
cases until either party, for good cause, notifies the court of another consideration. 
Court orders Mr. Lowey to prepare an order rendering this opinion. 
1404 Court in recess. 
Deputy Clerk - Sue K. Summerton 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
Approved: 
District Judge 
JOAN M. FISHER 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
OLIVER W. Loewy 
Illinois State Bar No. 6197093 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastem Washington & Idaho 
201 North Main Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Facsimile: 208-882-1492 
IN TRE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICML DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TKE C O m  OF CLEPcRWATER 
Gene Francis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCMR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution. 
Respondent. 
1 
) CAPITAL CASE 
) 
1 
1 -CASE NO. SPOZ-151 
1 
1 MOTION FOR LIMITED ADlWISSION 
1 
) 
) 
1 
) 
) 
Undersigned local counsel, Joan M. Fisher, moves pursuant to Idaho Bar Commission 
Rule 222, for the limited admission o f  the undersigned applyj.ng counsel, Oliver W. hewy,  to 
allow him to appear for Petitioner in the above-captioned matter pro hac vice and to allow him to 
do so without payment of any fee. In a telephone conversation on March 1 1,2003, between L. 
LaMont Anderson and Oliver Loewy, Mr. Anderson stated that he has no objection to granting 
the motion for limited admission and doing so without requiring payment of any fe. 
Motion for Limited Admission -1 
Applying counsel, Oliver W. Loewy, certifies that he is an active memk er, in good 
standing, of the bar of the State of Illinois; that he maintained the regular practice of law at the 
above noted address as aa Assistant Federal Defender; that hi.$ practice i s  1hitt:d exclusively to 
L. 
representing indigent clients; and that he is a resident of the State of Idaho but is not licensed to 
practice law in the state courts of Idaho. Mi-. Loewy certifies that he has previcusly been 
admitted under Idaho Bar Commission Rule 222 and appeared as counsel in t h t :  Idaho state 
courts in the following matters: Stuart v, State, Case No. SP02-00109, and State v. Stuart, Case 
No. 8495, in the Second Judicial District; Rhoades v. State, Case No. CV 2002-3822, Rhoades v. 
State, Case No, CV-02-4674, and Stare v. Rhoades, Case No. C-87-04-547, in lhe Seventh 
Judicial District. 
Both undersigned counsel certfy that a copy of this motion h a  been served on all other 
parties to  this matter and that a copy of the motion has been provided to the Idaho State Bar. 
Local counsel, Joan M. Fisher, certifies that the above information is tnte to the best of 
her knowledge, after reasonable investigation. Local counsel acknowledges thxt her attendance 
shall be required at all court proceedings in which applying counsel appears, uiless specifical1.y 
excused by the trial judge. 
Applying counsel. also moves that the court waive the two hundred doll= ($200) fee 
generally required for a limited appearance. Petitioner is an indigent death roq. inmate who has 
previously been granted in formapauperis status by the Idaho state courts and -he United States 
District Court for the District of Idaho. Applying counsel, Oliver W. Loewy, generates no fees as 
a result o f  his representation o f  petitioner and is an attorney employed by the Capital Habeas Unit 
of the Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho ('Tederal Defenders"), which was 
Motion for Limited Admission -2 
appointed to represented Petitioner in federal court. The Federal Defenders wi.1 not seek 
payment for their representation of Petitioner in state court. 
43 
Dated this 11 - day of March, 2004. 
Local Counsel 
Motion for Limited Admission -3 
Applying Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OR SERVICE 
4 I hereby certify that on the he2 day of March, 2004, I caused to be ::erved a me and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
John A. Swayne US Mail 
Clearwater County Prosecutor's Office Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2627 Facsimile 
Orofino, Idaho 83 544 - Federal Express 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0010 
US Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
- Federal Express 
Motion for Limited Admission -4 
31LUP ~UILLAL U ~ L Y  A N L 1 ~ v u n a ,  u n n  A -.?=I.v 
Ii . - .D FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR\. 2R 
150 MICHIGAN AVE . . :  r , ,  :.I{ 
OROFINO, IDAHO I33544 5 ~ E : : K - O l s ~ f i l ~ j  COURT 
CLEARWATER COU'tTy 
~l~tlrl~::, IDAHL 
8 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 
VS 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
) 
) Case NO: CV-A!$-H~~O?~ A q: 35 
) 
) NOTICEOF@* 
) q'.: 
* J' - 4  
3 Y-- DEFUT': 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Status Conference Friday, January 06,2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling Pacific 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on December 23rd, 2005. 
LORI GILMORE 
P.O. BOX 2627 
OROFINO ID 83544 
. . 
(j 
Mailed , *\ Hand Delivered 
Dated: December 23rd, 2005 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 
VS 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Ih P- 4D FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR\. t R  
150 MICHIGAN AVE 
. - 
- .- OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 i > ' - .  , , t  L. , . i> , - ,  - !  A L h  
.-, - - , 5 , , -  
' , ~ t : i r i  QiSTRiC: COURT 
CLEARWATER COL'XTY 
OROF!!(O, lDAHO 
) Case No: C V ? @ w $ ? j 7 3 ~  q: 35 
) NOTICE O F ! , E & w G  
- 
1 - 
', . 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Status Conference Friday, January 06,2006 10:00 AM Pacific 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on December 23rd, 2005. 
L. LAMONT ANDERSON 
P.O. BOX 7 129 
BOISE ID 83707-1129 
'<' Mailed 
-Cc Hand Delivered 
Dated: December 23rd, 2005 
Robin Christensen 
yTerk Of The Dkjtrict Court 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
SECON 'TDICIAL DISTRIC'I' CUUK I ,  3 1 A r r - W A U ~  
IN t ,  *D FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARRL. LR 
150 MICHIGAN AVE 
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 L ( > - . I  .dtEi 
~;~tfX-UiSih:C I COURT 
CLEARWATER COiifdTY 
G R C f  i? i:. I D A H C  
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 
VS 
1 
) Case NO: ~ ~ W B t i f 0 6 b 3 7 3 A  4:3b 
1 
) NOTICE O P I ~ A ~ B L I ~ ~  
State Of Idaho, Defendant ) C. , \,Y , 
OY - - D E P U T Y  
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Status Conference Friday, January 06, 2006 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
10:OO AM Pacific 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on December 23rd, 2005. 
- - , - \ .  
! ' b i  < , ' 
JOAN M. FISHER 1 
20 1 N. MAIN 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: December 23rd, 2005 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
r--. (. 
By: ;f<qLL:; -, !:A,, , ')$ ,,)Ti] -:-$-.. .*,, , :  
- 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
0 
IN TKE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
a 
TRE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
Francis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR Director, Idaho 
Department of Cormdon, and 
GREG FISHER Wnrden, Idaho 
Marimurn Security Institution. 
1004 MAR 11 I P @ 57 
1 / 
1 M R A L  CASE c~~ T,' p-3- c2ib 
I 
1 S f 3  9EPL!T':' 
1 CASE NO. SPM-151 
1 
1 ORDlER GRANTJXG LI.W%D 
1 ADMISSION AND W-UJER 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
The motion for limited appearance of Oliver W. Loewy in these proceedings is granted. 
The request to grant the limited appearance with waiver of fke is also granted. No poment of 
any attomy fees or travel expenses to Mr. Loewy or his employer, Federal Defenders of Eastern 
W a s h g t m  and Idaho, wiU be ~~. 
Entered this 1.5 Lday of March, 2004. 
Idaho District Court Jucl~e 
ROBlN C~RISTEHSEN 
CLERK-DISTRICT COURT 
IN 'IBE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRL€mER COUNTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEA~RT+JQWC* IDAHO 
1004 MAR I I P 12: 51 
Gene Francis Stuart, 1 
Petitioner, 
1 
1 
1 
YS. 1 
1 
1 
STATE OF IDAEO, and ) 
TOM BIEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho ) 
Department of Correction, and 1 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho ) 
Maximum Security Institmtlon. 1 
Respondent. 
1 
) 
1 
CAPITAL CASE C A S E  140 , .  
ub2- , d y q 3  CASE NOS. -p pa- 9 DEPUTY 
$495, & 
w 1 ~ 2 .  - 0 0 0 0 ~ 7 3  
ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS 
PENDING DISPOSITION IN TEE 
IDAHO SUPREME COIJRT OF 
H O F M  v. STATE AYD IN 
TBE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT OF SCHRLRO 31. S U M M € m  
Having duly considered Petitioner's application to stay each of these tbree p r o c e e w  
and, on March 3,2004, having heard and considered oral a r v t  addressing the applicdon, it 
is hmby ordered that: 
F ' r o c ~  in each of these cases are hereby stayed pending 
disposition ~JI the Idaho Supreme Court of 1410-n v. Stdt., 
Cue  Nos. 29354/29355, and in the Unitcd State Sapremc 
Coart of Scbrlro v. Summedin, Case No. 03-526. In the 
interim, either party may move to dissotve the stay In either 
case for good cauw. 
. 
ft 
Dated this 1.5 - day of March 2004. 
Ronald ~ % i l l i i  
Idaho District Court Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
P C  I ? L ~ i h  C i< f< , .~  j .  t . ~ ~ h  
CLESK-DISTR!CT COURT 
CLEARWATER COUNTY 
1 ORCFIi:3,  IDAHO 
ZOO5 OEC 2 1  A 1 1 :  3 3  
/' \.r . - , - j - - /  'j 
CASE HO' ' - ,3\ - J -  
\. ?~. , *, By --, - DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution, 
Respondents. 
1 CASE NO. CV 2002-0000473 
) 
1 
) MOTION TO LIFT STAY 
) 
1 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW, L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Capital 
Litigation Unit and Special Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, State of Idaho, 
and does hereby request this court to lift the stay imposed on March 17,2004. 
MOTION TO LIFT STAY - I 
In the March 17, 2004, Order, this Court granted Petitioner's Motion to Stay 
Proceedings pending the dispositions in Hoffman v. State, #29354/29355 and Schnro v. 
Summerlin, # 03-526. On September 14, 2005, pursuant to LC. 4 19-2719, the Idaho 
Supreme Court issued an opinion dismissing the appeal in Hofban v. State, --- Idaho ---, 
121 P.3d 958 (2005). The Remittitur has been issued. On June 24, 2004, the United 
States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
Because the underlying bases for this court's order staying the instant case has 
now been concluded, the state respectively requests that the stay be lifted and a 
scheduling order be entered to complete the Iitigation in the instant case. 
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2005. 
u 
Deputy ~ttorney'6eneral 
chief,-capital Litigation Unit 
MOTION TO LIFT STA Y - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the 22nd day of December 2005, I caused 
to be serviced a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following: 
Joan M. Fisher 
Federal Defenders of 
X U.S. Mail 
Hand Deliverv 
4 
Eastern Washington & Idaho Overnight Mail 
3 17 W. 6rh Street, Suite 204 Facsimile 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Honorable Ron Schilling X U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 125 1 Hand Deliverv 
Meridian, ID 83680-125 1 Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
Lori Gilmore X U.S. Mail 
Clearwater County Prosecutor Hand Delivery 
Box 2627 Overnight Mail 
Orofino, ID 83544 Facsimile 
MOTION TO LIFT STAY - 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART ) CASE NO. CV2002-00443, 
1 CV2002-00473 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 COURT MINUTES 
vs  . 1 
1 
STATE OF !DAHO, ET. P.L. 
1 
Defendant. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 CASE NO. CR1981-008495 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
VS. ) 
) 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) 
) 
Defendant. 1 
) 
District Judge Presiding: Ron Schilling 
Joan Fisher and Oliver Lowery: Attorneys Gene Stuart 
Lamont Anderson and Lori Gilmore: Attorneys for the State 
Deputy Clerk: Sue K. Summerton 
Date: 1/6/06 Tape: C3741 Time: 10:lO a.m. 
Subject of Proceeding: Telephonic Status Conference 
................................................................. 
................................................................. 
FOOTAGE: 
001 Court advises Ms. Fisher, Mr. Lowey, Mr. Anderson, and the court are present 
telephonically and Ms. Gilmore was present in person. Court advises that this 
matter will be recorded but not reported. Court advises now is the time to hear the 
motion to lift stay. 
25 Mr. Lowey has no objection to lift the stay and moves to submit a brief to the court. 
31 Court grants motion to lift the say and for supplemental briefs. 
COURT MINUTES - I 
Mr. Lowey moves for 1 month to file brief. 
Mr. Anderson has no objection to 1 month for filing of brief. 
Court orders Mr. Lowey to file his brief by 2/3/06 and that any time there is a filing 
please send a courtesy copy to the court at his Meridian, Idaho address. 
Ms. Fisher moves for more time to file the brief. 
Court grants motion and continues deadline to 2110106. Court questions Ms. 
Gilmore. 
Ms. Gi!more respo~ds. 
Mr. Anderson moves for his brief be due 311 0106. 
Court questions the attorneys regarding the 3 pending cases. 
Mr. Lowey clarifies the issues pending. 
Mr. Anderson responds. 
Colloquy between the Court, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Lowey regarding pending 
issues. 
Mr. Lowey moves to set a briefing schedule hearing. 
Court grants motion and orders the briefs dues a follows: PetitionerlDefendant's 
brief is due 211 0106 and the RespondentlPlaintiff's brief is due 311 0106. Court sets 
a telephonic scheduling conference for 3130106 at 10:OO a.m. pacific time, to set an 
oral argument hearing. 
Mr. Andersor! remarl.,s regarding an order appointing Mr. Lo~vey in the post 
conviction cases. 
Court orders Mr. Lowey to review the files for a specific order and if one is not 
located, he is to prepare one. 
Court in recess. 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
SLCVP' ' U U l L I A L  U13 INL I ~ u u r r l ,  a l n  J r l u m r x v  
L W FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR\ -i I'ER 
150 MICHIGAN AVE 
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 
- _JU?.7 
L ,;?*;:,j~? :c ' i _  TY 
- - .- . , g a !  
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 1 
VS 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Scheduling Conference Thursday, March 30,2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on January 23rd, 2006. 
L. LAMONT ANDERSON 
P.O. BOX 7129 
BOISE ID 83707-1 129 
' ! f i Mailed x Hand Delivered 
Dated: January 23rd, 2006 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
- - 
. . 
'XI , : . ?.,* -, By: , , .,A & .% .'i-J ~ y, ,H ,.-; ! - ~ 
- 
~ e ~ u ! $  %le'rk ' 
NOTICE OF HEARING 00000-562 
SECOK 7JDICJAL DISTRICT COURT, STATF IDAHO 
Lh . ,D FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARVI . - 2 ER 
4 ' 
\ 150 MICHIGAN AVE 
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 
VS 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
) iiTb -!J.~J 2 3 ,.j 8:3 8 ir.2 
.; . 5 ' '  y r - : .  
-- 2 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Scheduling Conference Thursday, March 30,2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on January 23rd, 2006. 
OLIVER LOEWY 
3 17 W. SIXTH STREET, SUITE 204 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
%, ; Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: January 23rd, 2006 
Robin Christensen 
C!prk Of The District Court 
, i 
NOTICE OF HEARING 0000056-3 
S E C O P  YJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATW ' IDAHO 
I .  , tD FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR', , I  ER 
150 MICHIGAN AVE 
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 -ii - 
- 1 '  
, .:! =, ; ,, -, .;:ss1 
~~~l , " ' ,~: -  c;: 17y 
14- 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 1 
VS 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
) Case No: CV-2002-000Ppq7J , ? 91 , 2: 38 
- " - 3  d:, : L3 r *  
I 
) NOTICE OF HEARING r t ' ' , ' - - >> - 
1 - , ,! - * -- 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Scheduling Conference Thursday, March 30,2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this off~ce. I further certify that copies of this Notice were sewed as follows on January 23rd, 2006. 
JOAN M. FISHER 
3 17 W. SIXTH STREET, SUITE 204 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
A%' Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: January 23rd, 2006 
Robin Christensen 
,Clerk Of TheDistrict Court 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
S E C O F  7JDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATw " IDAHO 
L A ,D FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR ER 
150 MICHIGAN AVE 
OROFLNO, IDAHO 83544 . - -,. 
- , I  : C U R ;  
,*p!?.:;n r.;,, 
LC, . _ , L " .  TY 
I I r<?;a , ,  
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 1 
VS 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
I 
) NOTICE OF H E W 9  ,? ,  .' , - 
1 .L - 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Scheduling Conference Thursday, March 30, 2006 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on January 23rd, 2006. 
LORI GILMORE 
P.O. BOX 2627 
OROFTNO ID 83544 
Mailed " '  HandDelivered 
Dated: January 2?rd, 2006 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
,--. 
,- 
.t- \ i : I; 'x;,.\.i -1: yt<, .~, , :., \ <\ By: ,)\.L< : ? '  > t ' 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 / 
OLIVER W. LOEWY -. , -.I . .---, jr , -': 3 3  
J - '  Lirnited Admission I _ -. - 
Y ' I.. 
' I _/ 
Capital Habeas Unit 1 . + I  ' ,
L' 9 _ C_-- 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho - , . 
3 17 West Gb Strcet, Suite 204 - 
/ _ _--- --- Moscow, ID 83843 
Telephone: 208-383-0 180 
Facsimile: 208-883 -1472 
Attorneys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuaxt 
IN THE DISTNCT COURT O F ' T J ~  SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TRE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
Gene Francis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution. 
Respondent. 
CAPITAIL, CASE 
CASE NO. CV2002-00473 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
RIESPONSE IN OPPOSWION TO 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR 
POSTCONVICTTON RELIEF AND 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS 
On January 6,2006, the Court granted Petitioner leave to file supplemental briefing 
regarding the State's motion for summary dismissal. 
~ I T T ~ o w R ' S  SUPPLEMENTAL ]RESPONSE b4 OFPOSITTON 
TO SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY D~SM~SSAL OFPOSTCONVICTXON 
RELIEF AND PETITION FOR WRKT OF HABFXS CORPUS -1
procedural Backsround 
The State first moved fox summary dismissal in answering Mr. Stuart's Petition For 
Postconvi~tion Relief And Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus. See Answer To Fourth Petition 
For Post Conviction Relief at 5-6 (3/11/03). In June, 2003, the Court entered a briefing order 
requiring Petitioner to file briefing responsive to the State's summary judgment motion by July, 
11,2003, the State to file a .response to Petitioner's responsive briefing by October 10,2003, and 
Petitioner to file a reply to the State's response by November 14,2003. Petitioner timely filed 
an opposition to the State's summary dismissal motion. See Petitioner's Response In Opposition. 
To Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Petition For Postconviction Relief And Petition For Writ 
Of Habeas Corpus (7/14/93) ("Response In Opposition"). Subsequently, the State filed a 
response to the Petitioner's Response In Opposition. See Motion For Summary Dismissal & 
Brief In Support Of Respondent's Motion For Summary Dismissal (10/10/03) ("State's Brief In 
Support Of Second Motion For Summary Dismissal"). Petitioner timely filed a reply to the 
State's Brief In Support Of Second Motion For Summary Dismissal. Petitioner's Response In 
Opposition To Second Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Petition For Postconviction Relief 
And Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus ("Opposition To Second Motion For Summary 
Dismissal"). In the instant pleading, Petitioner supplements his Opposition To Second Motion 
For Summaty Dismissal. 
Armunent 
Respondent notes that the Idaho Supreme Court has held Idaho Codes Section 19-27 1 9 
PETITIONER'S IWLIEMENTAL RESPONSE INO P P O ~ O N  
TO S~com, MOTION FOR SUMMARY D I S ~ L I ~ A L  OFPOSTCONYICTXON 
RELIEF AND P E ~ N  FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS -2 
requires that Petitioner make aprima facie showing in a successive petition that the issues could 
not reasonably have been known during the first proceeding. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 
707,992 P.2d 144,156 (1999). Citing exclusively to federal court authority, Respondent fbrther 
suggests that Petitioner had a due diligence obligation to unearth exculpatory evidence from 
pretrial forward. Brief In Support of Second Motion For Summary Dismissal at 3 1. On 
Respondent's vicw, then, Petitioner had a duty at the time of his first postconviction proceeding 
to investigate whether the prosecution had engaged in illegalities to obtained a jury verdict and 
death sentence against him. More specifically, Respondent does not deny that the prosecution 
failed to advise the defense of its misconduct. Rather, it contends that Petitioner had a duty to 
detemin.e for itself that the prosecution had engaged i.n the foIlowing misconduct: 
The prosecution advised at least one witness not to testifl at trial that Petitioner 
suffered from mental health difficulties; 
The prosecution was aware that before testifling at the preliminary hearing, state 
witnesses were ingesting small tab pills which purportedly bad a calmi.ng effect, 
yet failed to share that information with defense counsel or the court; 
.The prosecution encouraged i ts  prior bad acts witnesses to exchange their 
anticipated testimony; and 
=The prosecution encouraged its prior bad acts witnesses to exaggerate 
Petitioner's misdeeds by providing a heightened sense of danger. 
See Petition For Postconviction Relief And Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus at 8. 
The United States Supreme Court has squarely rejected Respondmt's position that 
Petitiiona had a due diligence obligation to discover the prosecution's misconduct. Banks v. 
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004). To the extent that Idaho Code Section 19-2719 imposes such a duty 
on postconviction petitioners, Banks makes clear that it violates the Fourteen,& Amendment's 
due process guarantee. 
In Banks, it was only "through discovery and an evidentiary hearing authorized in a 
federal habeas corpus proceeding" that petitioner unearthed the "long-suppressed evidence" of 
the State of Texas' misconduct constituting the factual basis for his Bra@ claims. Texas 
contended and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appcals had agreed, that the petitioner had not been 
d c i e n t l y  diligent in searching out Texas' misdeeds. Specifically, the misdeeds at issue were 
Texas' failure to correct the false testimony of oxle of its key witnesses, Roberr Farr, that he had 
never taken any money fiom police oficers, had not given any policc officers a statement, and 
had not talked to anyone about the case until a few days before trial, h fact, Mr. Farr was a paid 
police informant who had provided critical information regarding Mr. Banks' "'coming to Dallas 
to meet an individual to get a weapon" and who had helped the police on the case i.n exchange for 
money and out of fear of being arrested on drug charges. Banks at 676,678. 
Rejecting Texas' argument that the petitioner was insficiently diligent in unearthing the 
state's misdeeds and finding that the State's misconduct constituted cause for petitioner's 
procedurally defaulting his claim, the Supreme Court noted; 
It has long been established that the prosecution's "deliberate 
deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false 
evidence is incompatible with rudimentsly demands of  justice. " 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 1 50, 153 (2972) (quoting Moaney 
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,112 (1935) @er cu~iam)). If it was 
reasonable for Banks to rely on the prosecution's full disclosure 
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representation, it was also appropriate for Banks to assume that his 
prosecutors would not stoop to improper litigation conduct to 
advance prospects for gaining a conviction. 
The State ... suggests that Banks's failure, during state 
postconviction proceedings, to "attempt to locate Fan and ascertain 
his true status," or to "interview the investigating officers, such as 
Deputy Huff, to ascertain Fan's status," undermines a finding of 
cause; the FiRh Circuit agreed. In the State's view, "[tlhe question 
[of cause] revolves around Banks's conduct," particularly his lack 
of appropriate diligence in pursuing the Farr Brady claim before 
resorting to federal court. We rejected a similar argument in 
StricHer.,. Our decisions lend no support to the notion that 
defendants must scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material 
when the prosecution represents that dl. such material has been 
disclosed. As we observed in StricWer, defense counsel has no 
"procedural obligation to assert con.stitutiona1 error on the basis of 
mere suspicion that some prosecutorial misstep may have 
occurred." 527 US., at 286-287. The "cause" inquiry, we have 
also observed, turns on events or circumstances "external to the 
defense," Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214,222 (1988) (quoting 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,488 (1986)). 
The State here nevertheless urges, in effect, that "the prosecution 
can lie and conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to ... 
discover the evidence," Tr. of OraI Arg. 35, so long as the 
"potential existence" of a prosecutorial miscoaduct claim might 
have been detected, id, at 36. A rule thus declaring "prosecutor 
may hide, defendant must seek," i.s not tenable in a system 
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process. 
"Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have properly 
discharged their official duties." Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 
909 (1997) (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 
272 U.S. 1, 1.4-1 5 (1 926)). .. Courts, litigants, and juries properly 
anticipate that "obligations [to refiain horn improper methods to 
secure a conviction] .. . plainly rest[ing] upon the prosecuting 
attorney, will be faithfidly observed," Berger, 295 U.S., at 88. 
Prosecutors' dishonest conduct or unwarranted concealment should 
attract no judicial approbation. See KyEes, 5 14 U.S,, at 440 ("The 
prudence of the careful prosecutor should not . .. be discouraged."). 
Banks at 694-696 (citations omitted). 
PETITIONER'S S U P S L G R ~ A L  RESPONSE bJ O.PPOSITION 
TO SJJCOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY ~ I S S A L  OFPoSTCONYT~ON 
RELIEF ANX) DTITTON FOR WRIT O F  fbBEAS CORPUS -5
Banks h,ol.ds that placing a due diligence burden on postwmviction petitioners to unearth 
prosecutorial misconduct violates due process. Consequently, the Court should reject 
Respondent's argument that it must sumarily dismiss Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct 
claims because Petitioner failed to earlier find evidence of the prosecutions misdeeds. 
&J&g&J 
For all these reasons considered separately and together and for all the reasons contained 
in Petitioner's previous pleadings in this case, the Court should deny the State's motion to 
s u m d l y  dismiss the Petitions. 
+! 
Dated tlus 1 0 day of February, 2006. 
Respecfil.ly submitted, 
Joan M. Fisher 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
~ede.ra] Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
208-883-0180 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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I hereby certify that on the -%a y of February ,2006, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the United States Postal Service. first class 
po.stage mcd, addressed to: 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capita) Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise ID 83720-001 0 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE IN OPPOSIT~ON 
T o  SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY DXSMIS~AL OFPOSTCONWCT~ON 
RELW AND PETl'l7ON FOR WRIT O F  HABEAS CORPUS -7 
] A ? .  10. 20r 2 :  05PN " T T N Y  G E N  C R I M D I V  NO. 252 F. 2 i 6  
LA i RENCE G. WASDEN 
Atti I ney General 
Stst of Idaho 
ST1 I 'HEN A. BWATER 
Re!l I ty Attomey Genera]. 
Chi r , C M  Law Division 
L. 1. MONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687 
Dell .ty Attorney Gmad 
Cri I inal Law Division 
Ca1 I a1 Litigation Wait 
P.C , Box 83720 
Boj: :, Idaho 83720-0010 
Tell )hone: (208) 334-2400 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE il3C 31 D J'UD1CIA.L I IIS'RICT 
( F THE STATIS OF IDAHO, IN AND FOF . TH E l  :OUNTY OF C LE'1RWATE.R 
GEF I 3 FRANCIS SWfdXT, 
Petitioner, 
STA' E OF IDAHO, and 
TO& lB M U C W  Director, Idaho 
Dep: t ment of Correction, and 
GRl i 3. FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maxi num Samity Institution, 
Respondents. 
1 (1, SE NO. CV : C O2~X)00.173 
1 
1 
1 
1 S1'[ PPLEMENT, id B: .W IN 
1 C X  PRORT OF Ii ESP( INDENTS ' 
1 841 M?ON FOR : :I JMI M Y  
1 Cl: 3MSSA.L 
1 
1 
1 
1 
COMES NOW, L. W o n t  Andason, Dep ~ t !  Attorney Ge lr:ral, Chief, Capital 
Liti f ition Unit and Special. Prosecuting Attornc:y f( I' 4 llearwater Co ulty, State of Idaho, 
and .oes hereby submit, pursuant to this Court': : On 11:t this supplem mtal brief in support 
off I : state's Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
SU1 'mE2VTAL, BRIEF IN SWPORT ?F .I! 3SPONDEhil:; AIOITON FUR 
SVi ! MARY DISMISSAL - 1 
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BACKGR(; tUN C! 
The relevant: background for the state's Mot it11 for Su.mmaq :Iisinissal has been 
deti 1 .ed in. the statds opening brief in suppo: t of jl: Motion for : i iu~lary Dismissal. 
(St; :'s brief in support, pp.2-11.) The state acluall I -: .oved for sum r ary dismissal in its 
ans ; er and Petitioner ("Stuart") filed a responsi :. A 5.1: Stuart filed h is response: the state 
fi1e.j a formal Motion for Summay Dismiss.: l an c'. .upporting br z :. Stuart has also 
rep:j :d to the state's supporting brief. Over the ;st ~te's objectio~t, this Court stayed 
Stuj t's case pending the United States and 1d;ho h i  reme Courts' tlecirions regarding 
the I :troactivity of Ring v. Arizoaa, 536 U.S. 5 M (: 0( 2). Pwrsuant i o the state's motion, 
this :om Wed the stay and ordered supple ma^ tal t ri: b g .  
Stuart's sole argument in his Supplem. bl I k; i ,onse is that, 1: i s 4  upon Banks v. 
Dre t 2,540 U.S. 668 (2004), he is not required. to n ~ ; 3 1  = a prima facj s showing under 19- 
-. 
271 ! , thar his "prosecutorial misconduct" c1a.b: E m €:I-1 known or re u 'ona bly could have 
beer h o r n  when he filed his first post-convic.ion ?(: ition. Stuart l us greatly misstated 
the 1 olding of Banks, which was in an entirely cliff1 1+13 it procedmd 1ostu:e than Stuart's 
cast: Banks initially raised claims that the si;ite 1vi1  held excuIpa:ccy (:videace in his 
thir f post-conviction motion before the Texas post .I:( nviction cow . Id, at 682. After 
the rate post-conviction court d d e d  Banks' s cl ai l  u, the Texas C01;a of Criminal 
Apl) als affirmed. Banks then fled a fed ral  t~ )eas petition. I:& m g  federal 
ha.: f f i  proceedings, additional evidence was (: ism vt: ed that had I ot been provided to 
Bar1 s prior to his trial and which he contendeli wl s xculpatory. 1 d: 684-85. Because 
SUP ' W E T A L ,  BRlEF IN SUPPORT 3F .I: BPONREm i 
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son I of that evidence was never presented in ro ate :rl rt, the F i  C i -cui ; concluded the 
clair L was produal ly  defaulted Id. at 688. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court agre~xl E E C :  cs failed to ~rcduce some of the 
evic I nce during state postconviction proceedh~ gs a I( 1 was procedur, II ly d sfaulted. Xd. at 
691. Therefore, Banks had to demonstrate ''came i l l  his 1Fail.m to develop the f a a  in 
stat z court proceedings and actual prejudice .! asulj~~ ; from that f ti lure ." fd. at 691. 
Det E ling the three components of a due prom, i vic lzr :on under Bra *r v. Mawland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963), the COW explained, "cause ant: pre 11: ce in this casd : 'paallel two of the 
thrc c components of the alleged Brudy violatior itse li " Xd. (quotinl l;trit .kla v. Greene, 
527 J.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). -ex reviewins thl: f LC&, the Cour : conAuded, "Banks 
had cause for failing to investigate, in sl ate pr stconviction proct edings, Farr's 
con r xtions to Deputy Sheriff Huff," Id, at r i93. ' I  he Court reit zatec, 'The 'cause' 
inq I ry, we have also observed, turns on ee rent c r circumstanc e s 'r:xtemal to the 
defi: .sea"' Id. at 696 (qyoting Amad= v. ht, 186 11. ;. 214,222 (1, ):18)) 
However, whetha Stuart has demo1 ~stra r:c "cause" ua i 3r 'dad habeas 
staT ( ards is not the issue before this Court. R;: ther t i  : qyestion in t is successive post- 
con c ction case is whether Stuart knew or rea. ;ona 11; could have I r ow 1 of the cl& 
wht : he filed his first postconviction petiticl 1. : ( 1  1 9 - 2 7  ) P s explained in 
Mc! k e y  v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 707-07, I: 92 . ',: i 144 (1999) .'Even if the State 
-- 
viol : ed [Stuart's] right to due process . . . , [Stuart, 18 s required to raise this issue, like 
otht : constitutional issues, within the time frame ILE dated by 1.C . $ 13-2719." This 
Cox: . IS bound to follow the Idaho Supreme Court :; n-onouncema t ~.I jdcKinnee and 
lea7 I for the federal courts to determine wheth~i r St cir can establish c aus 3 m? prejudice 
S U ) ' ' = . A L  BRlEF IN SUPPORT 13F .F! SPONDENI:; k!O3TOiV 
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to ( I  ercome the procedural &fault created by his :ii ure to presen hese claim in his 
firs ; )ost-conviction. 
Because Stuart has failed to establish hr s "p, or mtorial misc ziduct" claims were 
not mown or reasonably could not have hem k c c  m when he fled his first post- 
con 1 lction petition, S m ' s  claims must be disi: lissr c l  
CONCLU! ; I 9  
The state r e s p a y  requests this calrt g7 21) the state's h [otio~l for Summary 
Dis r issd and dismiss Stuart's successive Petiti, >n fc I* j ost-Convictic 3 Relief. 
DATED this 1 0 ~  day of March, 2006. 
n 
Dt: ?uty .?. My Geaer: 1 
CIk ief, 4 :zr itaI Litigatior 1 Jnit 
1 
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CERTIFICATE C! F SJ c!! VICE 
I HERJ3BY CEIRTIEY That on or about the 11: day of Man b ,2C 06, I caused to 
be :; rviced a tnxe and correct copy of the fort: soin ; I o m e n t  by t I#: m :thod indicated 
be11 I v, postage prepaid where applicable, and a. !dm z t : 1 to the follom u lg: 
Joan M. Asber 
Federal Defenders of 
- --- - 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Deli'l r rv 
- --- - 
Eastern Washington & Idaho 
- -.. - overnight v h  
317 W. 6th Street, Suite 204 - 6: -.. - Facsimile 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Fax: (208) 883-1472 
Honorable Ron Schilliw rC: U.S. Mail 
- ---. - 
P.O. Box 1251 
- -.-  
Hand Deli: rc :ry 
Meridiaa, ID 83680-1251 
- -a  - Overnight &[al l  
- - - 
- -.. - 
Facsimile 
Lori Giltnore 
Clearwater County Prosecutor 
Box 2627 
Orofmo, ID 83544 
Fax: (208) 476-9710 
- --- - 
US. Mail 
- --. - 
Hand Deli. r( :ry 
- --. - Overnight kEail 
7; Facsimile 
--.-  
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JOAN M. PISHER 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
OLIVER W. LOEWY 
Limited Admission 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
3 17 West 6'h Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Facsimile: 208-883-1472 
Attorneys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF 
THX STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANT) FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
Gene Francis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STAm OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department o f  Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Waxden, Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution. 
Respondent. 
1 
1 CAPITAL CASE 
1 
1 
CASE NO. CV2002-00473 
) 
) PETITXONER'S REPLY TO 
1 SUPPLEMENTAL BXUEF IN SUPPORT 
) OF RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR 
1 SUMMARY DISMI[SSAL 
1 
) 
1 
Respondents asscrt that Petitioner "has greatly misstated the holding of Banks [v. Dretke, 
540 U.S. 668 (2004)l which was in an entirely different procedural posture than" the case at bar. 
SuppZemental Brief ln Support Of Respondents' Motion For Summary Dismissal ("Supplemental 
Brief')at 2. Respondents' particular contention is that since the narrow question before the 
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO SUPPLEMENT 
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Supreme Court was whether the habeas petitioner had shown cause for his failure to present 
evidence of his Brady claim, its decision has no bearing on this state postconviction matter. Id. 
at 3. 
On its face, Respondents' Supplemental Brief is a technical statutory argument. 
Described in broader terms, however, Respondents9 position is this: If the State obtains a 
conviction and/or sentence by illegally suppressing exculpatory evidence and is clever enough 
not to get caught until the defendant is in successive postconviction proceedings, then the defense 
should lose any and all remedies from the State's illegal suppression. Put in terns of this case, 
Respondents argue that they should be allowed to kill Mr. Stuart even thou,gh they obtained his 
conviction and sentence by illegally suppressing material exculpatory evidence. Notably, 
Respondents have not denied with specificity any of Petitioner's allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct. Indeed, Respondents' argument begs thc question: What additional misconduct did 
the prosecution engage in to achieve a conviction, death sentence, and later dfirmances of those 
tainted judgments against Mr. Stuart? 
Respondents' technical statutory argument that Banks ' due process standard does not 
govern I.C. 9 19-271.9(5)'s "known or reasonably should have known" requirement fails.' As the 
Banks court noted, "a petjtioner shows 'cause' when the reason for his failure to develop facts in 
I Petitioner contends and elsewhere argues with regard to Respondents Motion For 
Summary Dismissal that I.C. 9 19-2719 violates thc Idaho Constitution., other Idaho law, and the 
Federal Constitution. See Petitioner's Response In Opposition To ISecond Morion For Summary 
Dismissal Of Petition For Postconviction ReliefAnd Petition For Writ OfNabem Corpus at 7 et 
seq. In the instant reply, Petitioner assumes for the sake of argument that I.C. 5 19-27 19 does not 
violate either the federd or state constitution or other relevant law. 
state-court proceedings was the State's suppression of the relevant evidence.[.]" Id, at 691. 
Respondents correctly note that in McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,992 P.2d 144 (1 999), the 
Supreme Court held that, "Even if the State violated McKinney's right to due process by 
withholding evidence, McKinney was required to raise this issue, like other constitutional issues, 
within the time h e  maodated by 1.C. 19- 2719." Id. at 707, 156. However, Respondents fai.1 
to quote the critical next sentence: "Thus we examine the individual items to determine i.f they 
reasonably should have been known at the time of McKinney's fixst petition for post-conviction 
relief." Id. In the succeeding analysis, the Supreme Court determined that each of the items in 
question reasonably should have been known to the petitioner at the time of his first 
postconviction petition. Nowhere did the Supreme Court hold, statc in dicta, or otherwise 
suggest that a petitioner "reasonably should have known" a claim at the time of his first 
postconviction petition where the reason he was unaware of it was that the prosecution had 
illegally suppressed its evidentiary basis. 
However, a year after its decision in McKinney, the S u p m e  Court held the opposite. In 
Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,647,8 P.3d 636,642 (2000), the Supreme Cowt held, "Defense 
attorneys are entitled to rely on the presumption that prosecutors have fully discharged their 
official duties, including the duty to disclose exculpatory material. [Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263,] 286-87 [(I 999)]." In short, $271 9(5)'s "known or reasonably should have known" 
standard incorporates due process, i.e.- petitioners are! entitled to rely on the presumption that the 
prosecution has discharged it legal obligations to discharge their official duties and, therefore, 
claims based on exculpatory facts suppressed by the prosecution should not reasonably have been 
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO SUPPLEMENT 
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b o w n  to petitioners at the time of their first postconviction petitions. 
In the instant case, Petitioner filed pretrial discovery motions and postwnviction 
discovery motjons seeking all exculpatory evidence. The prosecution's continuing duty to 
disclose all exculpatory evidence started then and continues through the present day. Banks and 
Sivak both stand for the proposition that Petitioner was entitled to rely on the presumption that 
the prosecution discharged its official duties. Yet to date the prosecution has utterly failed to 
disclose any fact supporting thc prosecutorial misconduct claims raised in Petitioner's instant 
petition. Of coursc, to the extent that Idaho law is inconsistent with Banks, the federal 
supremacy clause mandates that it is unconsritutional and requires that it be struck. 
Conclusion 
For all these reasons considered separately and together and for all the reasons contained 
in Petitioner's previous pleadings in this case, the Court should deny the State's motion to 
summarily dismiss the Petition. 
Dated this 3 "clay of March, 2006. 
Respectfhlly submitted, 
Joan M. Fisher 
Oliver W, Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
208-883-0 180 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
a? I hereby certify that on the 3 b day of March, 2006,I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the United States Postal Service, first class postage 
aff'uted, addressed to: 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise ID 83 720-00 1 0 
h m t 0 N E R ' s  REPLY TO SUPPLEMENT 
gRnF IN SWWRT OF RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SlmWRY DISMXSSAL -5
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1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE -- 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART 1 CASE NO. CV2002-00443, 
1 CV2002-00473 
Plaintiff, 1 
) COURT MINUTES 
vs. ) 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, ET. AL. ) 
Defendant. 
) 
. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) CASE NO. CR1981-008495 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 
) 
VS. 1 
1 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) 
1 
Defendant. ) 
) 
District Judge Presiding: Ron Schilling 
Joan Fisher and Oliver Lowery: Attorneys Gene Stuart 
Lamont Anderson and Lori Gilmore: Attorneys for the State 
Deputy Clerk: Sue K. Summerton 
Date: 3130106 Tape: CD162 Time: 10:06 a.m. 
Subject of Proceeding: Scheduling Conference 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
_---------------------------------------------------------------- 
FOOTAGE: 
10:06 Court advises Ms. Fisher, Mr. Lowey, Mr. Anderson, and the court are present 
telephonically and Ms. Gilmore was present in person. Court advises that this is 
the time for a scheduling conference. Court has reviewed the briefs that were 
filed. 
10:08 Mr. Lowey advises that there will be a motion for discovery filed. 
10108 Colloquy regarding scheduling a hearing. 
Deputy Clerk - Sue K. Summerton 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
Approved: 4 
10:11 Court sets May 22, 2006 for argument on the motions. Hearing to be held at the 
State Maximum penitentiary. 
10:13 Court sets this matter for 10:OO a.m. on 5/22/06 and the clerk will make the 
scheduling arrangements with the penitentiary. 
10: 1 5 Court in recess. 
Deputy Clerk - Sue K. Summerton 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART ) CASE NO. CV2002-00443, 
) CV2002-00473 
Plaintiff, ) 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
vs  . 1 
STATE OF IDAHO, ET. AL. 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) CASE NO. CR1981-008495 
Plaintiff, 
) 
1 
VS. 
) 
) 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
) 
) 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Monday, the 22nd day of May 2006, at the hour of 
10:OO a.m., is hereby set as the time to hear motions in the above-entitled actions before , 
the Honorable Ron Schilling, in the Courtroom of the Maximum Security Prison in Boise, 
ID. 
DATED this 18'~ day of May, 2006. 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN, Clerk 
- 
. . 
- ,  I.r,; ' - i I.,. > 
. ,  I .. ; 
NOTICE OF H 
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk, do hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the 
foregoing document to the following person on the 1 8th day of May, 2006. 
Lori Gilmor 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney 
Courthouse Mail 
Orofino, ID 83544 
L. Lamont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83270 
Boise, ID 83720-001 0 
Joan Fisher 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders 
317 West 6th Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
Clerk m 
BY 
DepQ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART 1 CASE NO. CV2002-00443, 
) CV2002-00473 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 COURT MINUTES 
vs  . ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ET. AL. 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) CASE NO. CR1981-008495 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 
) 
VS . ) 
1 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 
) 
Defendant. ) 
1 
District Judge Presiding: Ron Schilling 
Oliver Lowery: Attorney for Gene Stuart 
Lamont Anderson and Lori Gilmore: Attorneys for the State 
Deputy Clerk: Sue K. Summerton 
Date: 5/22/06 Tape: Stuart Tapes: 1, 2, 3, and CD 4. Time: 10: 18 a.m. 
Subject of Proceeding: Motion hearing 
_C_-____-_-____-___---------------------------------------------- - - ---- __ ___ ---------------------------------- 
FOOTAGE: 
001 Court advises Mr. Lowey, Mr. Anderson, Lori Gilmore and Gene Stuart are present 
in court. Court explains now is the time to hear the Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
11 8 Mr. Anderson argues. 
263 Court remarks regarding the briefs that have been filed. 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
278 Mr. Lowery argues. 
360 Court has sidebar. 
702 Mr. Anderson argues. 
791 Continued to Stuart Tape 2. 
264 Mr. Lowery argues. 
501 Continued to Stuart Tape 3. 
001f435 Mr. Lowey continues argument. 
10:45 a.m. Stuart CD 4 
Court explains the issues with the tapes of this hearing. Court further explains that 
the SP numbers that were initially assigned to Mr. Stuart's cases have been 
converted to CV numbers due to a computer update at the court office. 
Mr. Lowey reiterates his previous argument. Mr. Lowey moves for an evidentiary 
hearing to see if the female witnesses were available to the defense for interviews 
and an evidentiary hearing on the reasonable time to appeal issue. Mr. Lowey 
further moves for copies of trial files, police and sheriff's office files, in camera to 
be provided to the defense. 
11:20 Mr. Anderson objects to Mr. Lowey's motions. 
1 1 :34 Mr. Lowey gives rebuttal argument. 
11 :38 Court allows counsel to provide additional citations by 6/1/06. 
Mr. Lowey moves for another week to provide the citations to the court. 
Court grants continuance to 6/8/06 to provide citations. 
Mr. Lowey continues argument. 
11:45 Court reiterates deadline for attorneys to file citations. Court takes this matter 
under advisement and advises a written decision will be provided. 
Mr. towey continues argument. 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
Court advises not prepared to rule on Mr. Lowey's argument. Court orders all 
motions to be in writing. 
Defendant leaves the courtroom. 
Court advises issues to be raised outside of the prison guard. 
Mr. Lowey argues motion to seal records, pleadings of 3/19/03, Affidavit in Support 
of Post conviction Relief. 
Court grants motion to seal. 
Mr. Anderson advises there are 4 affidavits to the pleading. 
Mr. Lowey argues filing of declarations or affidavits. 
Mr. Anderson argues in opposition to filing declarations or affidavits. 
Mr. Lowey continues argument. 
Court questions Mr. Lowey regarding the declarations or affidavits. 
Mr. Lowey responds. 
Mr. Anderson argues. 
Court grants motion to file declarations or affidavits. 
Mr. Anderson continues objection. 
Mr. Lowey advises the court of each declaration or affidavit to be filed and their 
claim. Mr. Lowey addresses court regarding a settlement conference. 
Court does not schedule a settlement conference however advises that the parties 
may meet to discuss settlement if they wish. 
12:lO Court in recess. 
Deputy Clerk - Sue K. Summerton 
COURT MINUTES - 3 
Approved : 
County of King ) 
) 
State of Washington ) 
STATEMENT OF SHERI WALD 
I, Sheri Wald, swear under penalty of pe jury that the following is true: 
1. My name is Sheri Wald. 
2. Gene Stuart and I dated for about four years in the late 1970s. I first met 
Gene in 1977 at the Woodinville Tavern where I worked as a bartender. Gene never 
drank more than a single beer, was quiet, usually stayed to himself, and was always 
pleasant. 
3. When Gene and I started going out, I was a single mother with three children 
aged, 6 months, 2 % years, and 4 years old. We saw each other a lot during the first 
year we dated. Gene and I spent a lot of time together at one or the other of our places, 
and more often than not, my kids were with us. Also, Gene babysat the kids at least a 
half dozen times during the fmt year of our relationship. 
4. At no time did I ever see Gene become upset with any of my children. At no 
time did I ever see Gene spank or otherwise physically punish or hurt any of my 
children. At no time did any of my children or anyone else tell me that Gene had 
become upset with or physically punish or hurt any of my children. At no time did I 
ever see any evidence that Gene might have become upset with or physically punished 
or hurt any of my children. Based on my knowledge and observations of Gene, he was 
not a person who could accurately be portrayed as enjoying inflicting pain on others or 
as being consistently abusive toward a child. 
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5. Gene and I were very close. If I needed someone to talk to, I'd call Gene. 
He'd help me see both sides of an issue. As for Gene, he would call me, or example, if 
had a bad day at work. We were very comfortable with each other. 
6. While Gene and I had disagreements fiom time to time like every couple, 
Gene never became aggressively angry or threatening. At no time did Gene ever 
threaten me or touch me in anger or act like he was going to do me physical harm. At no 
time did I ever see Gene threaten or touch in anger anyone else or act like he was going 
to do anyone else physical harm. 
7. One night, Gene invited me over to his place for dinner. When I arrived, he 
surprised me by introducing me to his son, Gene Lee. Gene Lee was pretty whiney 
throughout the dinner and seemed to want all of his dad's attention. Gene had the 
patience of a saint with Gene Lee. It was clear that for Gene, the sun rose and set on his 
son. 
8. Though Gene and I were very close, we did not have an exclusive 
relationship. And though I never met any of Gene's other girlfriends, Gene did tell me 
about an incident with one of them, Theresa. At the time he told me, Gene and I were 
sitting on a dock and Gene said that he had dropped Teresa into the water nearby. He 
said he did it because Theresa was drunk, out of control, and wailing on him. After 
dropping her in the water, he took her back out. 
9. Gene and I kept in touch after he moved to Idaho. When we talked, Gene 
frequently spoke of Kathie's son Robert. It was obvious fiom our conversations that 
Gene loved Robert. 
10. I did not know that Gene was anrested and tried for Robert's death until 
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after the fact. When I did find out, I contacted the l a v e r  representing him on appeal. 
This was sometime between 1992 and 1994. I told the lawyer that I would help in any 
way I could. He left me thinking that I would sign an affidavit regarding my knowledge 
of Gene, but I never heard from him afier that. I was living in Clarkston, Washington, at 
that time, and I shared that information with the lawyer. At the time, the lawyer was 
living in Orofino, Idaho, about forty-five miles from Clarkston. 
1 1. Except for what is related in the immediately preceding paragraph, before 
being contacted by the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Defenders of the Eastern 
District of Washington and Idaho, no prosecuting attorney, defense attorney, attorney's 
representative, or law enforcement official has ever initiated contact with me regarding 
Gene Stuart. Nor do I have knowledge of any such attempt to contact me. Had any 
such person contacted me at any time, I would have told them all 1 know about Gene 
Stuart. 
Sheri Wald 
Sworn before me this 0 7 day of 
, .  ,2005. 
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County of Ravalli ) 
1 
State of Montana ) 
Statement Of Coby L. Smith 
I, Coby Smith, state the following under penalty of pe jury: 
1. I am the owner of Farmer's Peat Moss Corporation in Hamilton, Montana, a family- 
operated business since 1964. I also occasionally work as an independent contractor, hauling 
logs by truck in northern Utah. I am a lcnown and respected member of the Hamilton 
community, and I have had a long and successfbl marriage to my high school sweetheart, 
Raylene, since 1973. I am active in my church, I was elected to the local school board, and I am 
a successfU1 businessman. 
2. During the summer of 1966, my family moved to Darby, Montana. In the Fall I entered 
the tenth grade at Darby High School, where I met and became good friends with Gene Stuart 
and Doug Seeger. We were all in the tenth grade, and the Stuart family lived just down the road 
from mine. 
3. Gene, Doug, and I were decent, hard working guys, but Gene had a much tougher time at 
home than Doug or me. Gene's dad, Bob Stuart, was very strict with his kids. He insisted that 
Gene and his sisters, Susan and Sandra, come right home from school every day. Bob Stuart 
always had a list of things for Gene to do in the wrecking yard after school and on weekends. 
4. Gene's father was abusive. On at least three occasions I saw Bob backhand Gene so hard 
it would have knocked any normal guy off his feet. Another time Gene was on a creeper 
working under a car with his legs sticking out. Bob got mad at Gene for something and kicked 
his legs. A final example: One time after school I was visiting Gene as he worked on a car, his 
dad came over and asked Gene if he had finished a work project he had given him. When Gene 
said 'no,' his dad instantly became enraged, braced himself and dumped a roll away toolbox with 
three toolboxes over. Tools scattered everywhere. As Bob Stuart stormed off he yelled at Gene 
to get the tools picked up that night. Gene just stood there. These are examples of how Bob 
Stuart treated Gene when he knew I was there, From what I saw, Gene got it worse when no one 
else was around. 
5 .  Bob Stuart's abuse extended beyond the physical. He yelled, swore, and demeaned Gene 
as well as Gene's mother and sisters in fiont of other people. While I never saw Dorothy, Sandra 
or Susan argue with Gene's dad, Gene would occasionally. When he did, Gene's dad would hit 
him. For example, I remember a time when Bob accused Gene of getting home after midnight, 
and Gene denied it. Bob got very angry and backhanded Gene. On that occasion, I had been 
with Gene and knew he was correct, but his dad would not listen. 
6. It seemed Bob was unusually protective of Susan and Sandra. Susan and Sandra had to . 
wear dresses, even though most girls wore pants. Boyfriends were not allowed. Whenever Bob 
lefl the house, he took Susan and/or Sandra with him. 
7. Sandra dropped out of school just after she finished the eighth grade. There seemed to be 
something wrong with her: She didn't comb her hair, she dressed shabbily, and she rarely spoke. 
Also, after dropping out of school, she was always with her father. I remember thinking it odd 
that when she was fifteen and sixteen years old, Sandra would sit right next to her dad in their 
truck, rather than on the passenger side. 
8. I occasionally went inside Gene's house. We were all afraid of Bob, so we didn't go in 
often Sometimes I went in to talk with Gene's mom, Dorothy. When I was there, Dorothy kept 
to herself mostly, although she was friendly to me. I belonged to the Church of Latter Day 
Saints, and I talked with Dorothy about it. She said she had been to an LDS church when she 
was younger and that she wished she could go to church but that Bob would not let her. She told 
me that Bob refbed to let local LDS church representatives visit her in their home. She 
explained that she had to accept out of love for her three kids whatever Bob said. To me, 
Dorothy seemed scared to death of Bob. 
9. The last time I was in Gene's house, Gene and I were both working on our 1955 Chevys. 
Dorothy was malung barbeque hamburgers and potato salad for the family for lunch, and she 
invited me to join them. When it became clear that there was not enough food to go around, Bob 
began slapping Dorothy. Dorothy ended up being the one who did not eat so that I could. Had I 
known that Dorothy was going to go without, I would not have stayed. I felt terrible, and vowed 
never to go into Gene's house again after this episode. 
10. Later, when I asked Gene why they didn't have enough food, he became quiet and said he 
didn't want to talk about it. But he did say that Bob never gave Dorothy money to buy enough 
groceries. I never saw Bob give Dorothy any money, and I never saw Dorothy shop by herself 
Instead, Bob did all the shopping, and he would almost always take Sandra-never Dorothy- 
with him. 
1 1 ,  The Stuart family was poor. Their home was a single story, rundown, rough wood, 
unfinished structure. The steel roof was in need of repair. The kitchen flooring was wood 
planking. The three bedrooms and the living room floors were covered with an old carpet. A 
wood stove in the kitchen heated the house. 
12. Despite all his hardships, Gene was a good guy. He had a good sense of humor and made 
people laugh. In school, he did his schoolwork and respected his teachers. For example, once 
after Gene was married, he and his wife Sharie were riding on the school bus on a field trip. 
When Gene gave Sharie a little kiss on the lips, and the teacher, Mrs. Foutz, came over and 
slapped Gene in the face. Gene was angry and humiliated, but he just sat there. 
13. Gene wasn't allowed by his father to do any sports until his junior year when he did 
wrestling. Gene was a very good wrestler. He had huge biceps from all of the work he did and 
was very strong. Despite his strength, Gene was not a bully and he did not go around getting into 
fights. 
14. Gene was the kind of guy who would help anyone who needed it. If we ever drove by 
anyone who had broke down on the side of the road, Gene would always stop and try to help. 
Sometimes this trait of Gene's annoyed me, as it was sometimes an inconvenience to stop and 
help. If anyone needed help with their cars, they just had to ask Gene and he would spend hours 
helping them out. 
15. Gene was very protective of his sisters. He watched out for them. I remember a time 
when we were seniors and Susan got drunk at a homecoming game. Gene told her to stop 
drinking or their dad would kill her. She refused. Gene went over to Susan and took her long- 
neck beer bottle away, and threw it as far as he could. Then he left the game to take her out for 
coffee. 
16. Gene was a good and reliable worker. Gene held many different seasonal jobs, which 
were the primary type offered in our area. Gene and I worked for my father every spring from 
1967 to 1970 at Hamilton Peat as general laborers bagging potting mix. We worked the evening 
shift and made $35 to $40 per night. Gene always arrived at work early, and he worked very 
hard. In fact, I remember one time my dad asked me, "Why don't you work like Gene?" 
17. Gene was seriously injured in a car accident in high school. To the best of my 
recollection, the accident occurred on a Friday in the fall of 1968 when we were high school 
juniors. On that day, Gene, Doug Seeger, and I drove to Missoula. Doug drove us in his dad's 
car, a Buick Wildcat. We spent the day in Missoula looking for car parts, and at hot rod shops. 
When we returned to Darby late that evening we were all in the front seat, Doug dnving, me in 
the middle, and Gene on the right. None of us wore a seatbelt. As we crested the hill just 
opposite Gene's house on Highway 93 heading south, I saw a mule in the road and yelled and 
ducked just as we hit the mule. 
18. The mule crushed the front of the car, rolled over the hood and top of the car crushing 
and folding the top of the car down and into the front seat at forehead level. The mule continued 
on over the top of the car and crushed the trunk before coming to rest on the highway. I wasn't 
injured, but Gene and Doug both hit their heads. Each had severe cuts Mly across their 
foreheads and glass embedded in their faces, and each was knocked unconscious. I remember 
thinking that Gene was dead. E s  head was covered with blood and he wasn't moving. Gene 
was unconscious for at least five minutes. After regaining consciousness Gene was having 
trouble with his balance and was disoriented. W h e ~  he realized that Doug had not yet regained 
consciousness, he said that Doug was dead and it was his (Gene's) fault because we were 
speeding to get him home on time. We were near a bridge, and Gene started to make as if he was 
going to jump. I had to tackle Gene to prevent him from jumping. Gene thought that Doug had 
been killed in the accident and Gene was taking the blame. When the police and ambulance 
arrived, Gene and Doug were taken to the hospital and admitted. Gene and Doug both stayed in 
the hospital overnight. Both had stitches on their foreheads. I was surprised that neither Doug 
nor Gene was killed during this accident because the mule literally peeled the roof of the car 
back, caving the entire top in. 
19. Gene was in at least two other car accidents. Neither was as dramatic as the Wghway 93 
collision with the mule, but in each Gene got banged up. 
20. Gene and Sharie Toavs fell in love during our junior year of high school. Sharie was a 
pleasant and attractive girl in our class, and she came from a middle class family. Her father 
owned and operated a cattle ranch near Darby. Gene grew up and became more responsible as he 
and Sharie dated. Gene was proud of Sharie, and he treated her with respect. He told me that 
Sharie was the best thing that ever happened to him. 
2 1 .  After Sharie became pregnant, she and Gene married in our senior year. They were the 
only married couple attending our school. Even though they no longer lived at home, even 
though they were struggling to make ends meet, and even though they were expecting their first 
child, they both graduated with our class. 
22. After high school Gene, Sharie, Doug Seeger, Bill Foster, Tom Thorn, and some other 
classmates lee Darby and moved to Denver. Gene attended an automobile trade school. I stayed 
in Darby and continued working for my father and raising cattle. I used to go to Denver in 
January, nearly every year because that was the main regional cattle trading show, the National 
Western Stock Show. During one of those visits, I stopped in to see Gene and Sharie. By then 
their first child, Gene Lee, was born. They were happy, proud of Gene Lee, and clearly in love. 
I never saw Gene or Sharie having any trouble. They didn't fight or argue, and I never saw 
Sharie with any bruises or injuries. 
23. I later learned from Dale Welch, who was also in Denver, that he had an affair with 
Sharie while she and Gene were married. Gene also told me about the affair, and it was 
consistent with Dale's reputation for having affairs with many married women, including many 
wives of his married male friends. 
24. At some point after returning to Darby, Gene got into trouble for charging long distance 
calls to the phone company and was sent to prison I felt very bad because I had taught Gene 
how to do that. At the time, you could call the operator and give a fake number in which to 
charge the call that you were making. All of our friends would use tlus process to call car dealers 
in Missoula, and other nearby places, to ask about cars and parts for sale. Gene made the mistake 
of using this scheme to call our friends in Denver. He would use the telephone company's own 
number and the Valley County Sheriff Department's number to charge these longdistance calls. 
All of our friends in Darby did this scheme, and it just happened to be Gene who was caught. 
When the police said Gene was responsible for all of the calls, Gene took the blame for all of us, 
refusing to admit that other people were involved. I heard on the radio that Gene got in trouble 
for these fraudulent calls. I remember thinlung it was unfair that of all of us who were involved 
in the scheme, Gene was the only one to be charged and convicted of a crime for it. 
25. When Gene's father died sometime around 1972 or 1973, Gene called me very upset and 
crying. Because I was religious and there was no one else, Gene asked me to conduct the 
fimeral. I did not like Bob, and I felt a little young at 2 1 or 22 to be conducting a funeral, 
especially since I had only recently returned from my LDS mission in northern California. 
Nevertheless, I did it for Gene who was very concerned that his father be properly laid to rest. 
26. Gene and I had occasional contact as the years went on. My family's peat moss business 
stocked the Seattle-Tacoma K-Mart stores. One August when I was there, I called Gene and met 
him for lunch. Gene was accompanied by his son Gene Lee and his new wife, Vicki. Gene and 
his son got along very well, and Gene and Vicki appeared to be happy. Gene had a good 
working as a mechanic at a car dealership. I did not see any tension, injuries, or anything else 
that would make me to think there was some sort of problem between Gene and his wife or son. 
27. Before being contacted by the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Defenders of Eastern 
Washington and Idaho, I had never been contacted by any police officer, court official, 
prosecution or defense representative with regard to Gene Stuart's case. If any such person had 
contacted me earlier, I would have told them everything I know about Gene's background. Since 
I still live in the Hamilton area, I am easy to find. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this a \ day of October, 2004. 
CHRISTI M. PAUN 
NOTARYPUBUGMONTANA 
Notary Public for Montana d S m , h t a n a  
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